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Abstract
Rather than with the success of Life Studies, the 
failure of "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" is where the 
major shift in Robert Lowell's poetry occurred. Yet, 
while the rest of his work has received more critical 
attention than that given any other poet of his genera­
tion, "The Mills" has been generally slighted.
The first two chapters of this study are devoted 
to establishing the background to the poem Itself. The 
opening chapter provides an exegesis, with some atten­
tion given to a few pertinent biographical details. A 
stanza-by-stanza reading of the poem exposes places 
where the mythic method that Lowell employed collapses 
into irreconcilable ambiguity. But generally, signifi­
cant details in the poem are highlighted as part of an 
extended paraphrase which is useful for later discussion.
The second chapter is devoted to a summary of the 
critical reception which the poem received upon publica­
tion in volume form plus a summary of later opinions as 
they have appeared in books more generally devoted to 
Lowell. As a summary, it completes the basis necessary 
for the more specialized third and fourth chapters.
iv
The third chapter Is a twofold treatment of narra­
tion that seeks to explain why Lowell had to change his 
style. There are problems particular to this poem's 
narrative, also more general problems. The realism of 
literal events in Anne Kavanaugh's revery relies upon 
causality. The significance of those events, however, 
operates through allegory. With the loss of a Christian 
cosmology, Lowell's particular experience is that his 
poetry loses the ability to signify allegorically. Rath­
er than vertical, events become strictly horizontal. A 
change in poetics becomes necessary.
For the fourth chapter, I have borrowed heavily 
from Heidegger and Husserl because their concerns are 
strikingly similar to Lowell's. The chapter argues that 
a sense of groundless process appears first in "The Mills, 
then matures as a series of lyrics in Life Studies.
With Heidegger to round out why Lowell changed his 
style, Husserl can be used to describe how such a poetics 
operates. Anne Kavanaugh's series of reveries and the 
poet's description of physical and mythical detail create 
a counterpoint which is basic to the poem's structure.
Her revery carries the poem dlachronlcally, and her de­
scriptive detail (plus that provided by an omniscient 
narrator) supplies a synchronic multiplicity that com­
pounds the poem's meaning. A similar process is carried
out more successfully by the series of lyrics In Life 
Studies, through which Lowell (rather than using a per­
sona such as Anne Kavanaugh) posits past phases of him­
self which operate reflexively and in sequence to locate 
a present-fleeting self.
Lacking a Christian cosmology, Lowell lost the al­
legorical level of meaning. His later poetry operates 
as a mode of thought that brackets experience. If not 
unity of experience, his poetry still could create a 
continuum of events.
vi
Introduction
Since its appearance as the title poem in Robert 
Lowell's third volume, most critics have maintained that 
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" is a remarkable but fatal­
ly flawed poem. Assuming that some failed poems can be 
as important to the discussion of poetry as other poems 
which are entirely successful, I have undertaken an ana­
lytical study of Lowell's longest poetic work and of the 
shift it represents. The poem is significant in itself, 
but it is also important for reasons which are, strictly 
speaking, external to it. It is Lowell's most ambitious 
effort, and it marks the major turning point in his ca­
reer; his rejection of Catholicism, his mental disburb- 
ances, and his abandonment of strict form appear during 
or right after the poem's composition. In fact there is 
evidence for all three of these within the text of the 
poem.
At present, Lowell's poetry has received more seri­
ous critical attention than that of any other poet of 
his generation, yet "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" has 
been generally ignored. Critics who mention it do so in 
passing, classifying it a failure as they proceed to
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other interests. My first point is that, while the poem 
is a failure, it is an important one. A significant 
phase in Lowell's poetic development has been overlooked 
by his critics, and the more important the rest of his 
career becomes the more glaring such a gap becomes.
But more importantly, "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" 
(1951) is at the center of the poetic shift Lowell made 
between his first phase, which reached maturity in Lord 
Weary 's Castle (1946), and his second phase, announced 
with the publication of Life Studies (1959). That is, 
as much as the success of Life Studies, the failure of 
"The Mills" represents the major change in Lowell's ca­
reer. And, because he has had wide influence, any rea­
sons for such a change that can be detected within his 
work are pertinent to a more general discussion of poetry.
The way a poet perceives the world and the way he 
writes operate in conjunction. As 1 will discuss later, 
Hugh Staples argues that "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" 
contains "a complex of dualisms" which constitute a 
"characteristic habit of mind" for Lowell. One side of 
these "dualisms" (finally, "antagonisms") is optimistic, 
the other pessimistic; and their alternation is reminis­
cent of Lowell's perceptions, his manic vacillation. 
Within "The Mills" he seeks to mediate this split through 
the use of a unifying myth, that of Persephone and Pluto; 
however, contrary to Eliot's belief that myth can give
3unity to modern experience, this center does not hold. 
Why such a "center cannot hold" constitutes my first in­
quiry, and how this is overcome becomes ray second.
We often hear about a poet's vision, and just as 
often we hear about his voice. 1 believe that Lowell's 
style contains both of these and in its larger faculty 
amounts to a mode of apprehension which he uses to guage 
experience. If this is the case, then the way he sees 
the world is bound up in the way he writes; and the way 
he writes can be discussed in a larger context which re­
veals patterns of thought, patterns which out of their 
closure at times provide disclosure but which at other 
times preclude disclosure.
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs"
I
Robert Lowell's "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" is an 
example of poetry operating for the self as a locating 
mode of thought. As will be evident later, Life Studies 
performs a similar function but does so in a radically 
different manner. One way of understanding the predica­
ment faced by Lowell, when writing either "The Mills of 
the Kavanaughs" or Life Studies, is to think of time as 
a process that continually absents and presences the ex­
ternal world. Such a world serves as an analogue for 
the self; therefore, its presence or absence--finally, 
its rotation between these two--effects an interior world, 
that of the self. For Lowell, poetry gauges such change 
and by doing so generates unity of experience.
1 am interested in using Husserl and Heidegger to 
treat poetry as a locating mode of thought that brackets 
experience. I want to show that due to problems with 
causality in narration and with compound mythical allu­
sion Lowell abandoned his earlier mode for a series of
5lyrics, as in Life Studies. intended to create a continu­
um of retentional modification that locates the self.
The locating process is active in "The Mills," but 
Lowell's poetic mode at this stage in his career hampers 
it. Anne Kavanaugh's series of reveries and the poet's 
description of both physical and mythical detail create 
a counterpoint which is basic to the poem's structure.
Her revery carries the poem diachronically, and the poet's 
descriptive detail, imagery, provides a synchronic multi­
plicity which is intended to magnify the poem's meaning. 
However, what actually happens is that the synchronic 
multiplicity of images and mythical allusions trips over 
itself, is self-defeating. Carried forward by narrative 
(and backward), Anne's "dream vision" overlaps into what 
Hugh B. Staples calls a "montage"1 but what is more near­
ly a kaleidoscope, something which defies interpretation.
What follows, therefore, is a reading of "The Mills" 
which goes as far as the poem will allow. Though there 
are three versions, only the first and second are impor­
tant. I have based my discussion upon the second, per­
manent version which appeared as the title poem in The 
Mills of the Kavanaughs in 1951, and this is included in 
Appendix B. The other Important version appeared as the 
lead piece in The Kenyon Review, Winter, 1951, and is 
included in Appendix A.
To give a brief paraphrase or summary of the poem's
action Is to run the danger of making it sound trite. 
Nevertheless, such a sunmary is necessary for the sake 
of clarity during the longer treatment which follows.
And, I might add, it is fair to say that some of the de­
tails of Harry's and Anne's personal experience are 
trite; not only in the sense that they seem all too fa­
miliar but also because they fail to signify, to point 
beyond themselves.
A brief look at Jean Stafford's "An Influx of Poets" 
and "A Country Love Story" demonstrates the autobio­
graphical character of Lowell's poem. And this fact 
obviously reinforces the position that Lowell's writing 
is a self-locating process. The events that are covered 
by both the stories and the poem amount to the dissolu­
tion of a young couple's marriage. The two have taken 
up residence in an old house in the New England country­
side, one that is near water. The tensions that surface 
between them are heightened by their isolation. In 
Stafford's stories the end brings divorce; in Lowell's 
poem, the end is more violent, bringing one and possibly 
two suicides.
The best brief summary of the action that takes 
place in "The Mills" is given by Hugh Staples. I quote 
his summary because I cannot improve upon it:
As the poem opens, Anne Kavanaugh sits in the
garden of her husband's estate, Kavanaugh (which
is the actual name of an old family mansion in 
Damariscotta Mills, Maine). She is playing a game 
of solitaire. She faces her husband s grave, which 
has a flag on it, Indicating his naval service.
She meditates on the decay of the Kavanaugh fortune, 
and on the tradition which she and her late husband 
have inherited. She remembers their childhood, and 
then falls off into a day-dream, which is intermit­
tently interrupted by brief moments of return to 
the waking world. Psychologically right, these mo­
ments come near the beginning and end of her dream 
(stanza 5, stanza 32). From the end of stanza 2 to 
the middle of stanza 33, however, the narrative is 
a mixture of remembered incidents in her life and 
a symbolic commentary, largely phrased in Ovidian 
allusions, by which she endeavours to interpret 
these events. In terms of the outer framework of 
the poem, the action is confined to her imagination. 
The children splashing about in the pool, for ex­
ample, in stanzas 7 and following, are images of 
herself and Harry Kavanaugh as children, not their 
issue. Indeed, part of the irony of the poem de­
pends on the fact that the Kavanaugh line has be­
come extinct with the death of her husband.
Her dream vision, although it has the overlap­
ping quality of a montage, ranges over four periods 
of her life, which, in accordance with the basic 
myth of Demeter and Persephone, are ordered in 
terms of the four seasons. First she casts her 
mind back to the springtime of her life as she re­
calls her first meeting with Harry while she is 
picking flowers illicitly at Kavanaugh (stanza 4). 
Childhood is a romp through the verdant countryside 
(stanzas 6 and 7), but imperceptibly, spring becomes 
summer as they frolic and struggle in the mlllstream 
below the estate (stanzas 8-10). Adolescence coin­
cides with harvest-time, and their sexual relation­
ship, already prefigured in the swimming scene, 
becomes actual in stanza II [sic]: 'The world hushed. 
Dying in your arms, I heard / The mowers moving 
through that goldeneared / Averaal ambush . . .  *
Anne Is rescued from her indigent, shiftless and 
alcoholic father, with his 'thirteen children and 
his goat* by Harry's mother. She comes to live at 
Kavanaugh after her adoption, and her relationship 
to Harry becomes in a sense incestuous. In stanza 
14, it is late spring again, and we learn that the 
pair are to be married in July. This marriage of 
Cinderella to Prince Charming is as brief as it is 
unhappy, and Anne is relieved to see her husband,
8an officer in the Naval Reserve, sail with his ship 
for the Pacific in the summer of 1941. But he re­
turns, mentally disturbed, after Pearl Harbor. The 
central part of the poem, stanzas 17-31, relates 
the progress of his mania and the gradual suspicion 
on AnneTs part that the failure of their marriage 
is somehow her fault. Harry's illness reaches a 
pitch of horror when he tries to throttle his wife 
on Christmas morning. A paranoiac, he interprets 
her apparent reference to another man during the 
course of her nightmare as evidence of infidelity.
In a sense, he is right, but the tragic irony a- 
rises out of the fact that the man referred to is 
himself Idealized. Failing, however, in his murder­
ous intent, his aggression turns inward, and he 
tries to kill himself by asphyxiation. After this 
episode, he is put under restraint at Kavanaugh, 
but his mental condition continues to deteriorate 
during the winter and spring, and he dies, presum­
ably by his own hand, as the rest of the town cele­
brates Independence Day.
At this point (stanza 33) of her reverie, Anne 
Kavanaugh comes back to full consciousness. She 
’rambles down the weedy path, past hill / And grave­
yard to the ruined burlap mill' (which also serves 
as a locale for 'The Holy Innocents' and 'New Year's 
Day' in Lord Weary * s Castle). The remaining five 
stanzas record Anne 'a thoughts as she gets into her 
boat and rows down the millstream. Her quest for 
the meaning of her life is a coda that summarizes 
the meaning of the poem. It is a review of the 
history of the Kavanaughs, her marriage ('Even in 
August it was autumn') and her future ('Love, I ^ 
gave / Whatever brought me gladness to the grave').
The poem is preceded by two epigraphs, one taken 
from Arnold's "Dover Beach" and the other from In the 
American Grain, by William Carlos Williams. Both express 
disillusionment by their minimal views of human relation­
ships and in particular of the possibilities for love 
and morality. Arnold's famous poem confronts the possi­
bility of love without the "Sea of Faith," after it has 
been lost. For him, religious faith as well as any kind
of faith, any coherent system that might give meaning 
to the world, is failing in one "long, withdrawing roar, 
Retreating, to the breath / Of the night-wind." All that 
is left is the possibility for human kindness in an un­
intelligible and dangerously violent world. The lines 
that follow those which Lowell quotes state that the 
world has "neither joy, nor love, nor light, / Nor certi­
tude, nor peace, nor help for pain." In its own way,
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" sets about demonstrating 
this opinion.
The quotation taken from Williams, that "Morals are 
the memory of success that no longer succeeds," suggests 
the ethical wash Lowell may have found himself in once 
having left the Catholic Church. (And, as I will dis­
cuss later, Lowell was moving away from the Church while 
writing "The Mills.") Having lost his faith, he lacks 
the theistic ground necessary either to posit or consis­
tently distinguish good and evil. The Kavanaugh's Catho­
lic religion and the Kavanaugh fortune are specific 
instances "of success that no longer succeeds." As the 
paragraph that precedes the first stanza tells us, Harry' 
is an old and prominent Catholic family in Maine, and, 
as Anne quickly reveals in the poem's opening stanzas, 
it has become part of the bankrupt aristocracy. Later 
we learn of Red Kavanaugh's unscrupulous treatment of 
the Abnakls Indians. Thus the Kavanaugh "success" with
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money has ended with "Harding's taxes," and the integrity 
of the Kavanaugh's religion is made suspect by the "skulls 
of the Abnakis left / Like saurian footprints by the lum­
ber lord."
The line from Williams also fits with the fact that 
much of the poem "is a revery" within Anne's conscious­
ness of "her childhood and marriage." That is, the good 
and the bad characteristics of the Kavanaugh past as well 
as those of Anne's marriage with Harry are approached via 
memory. Thus "the memory of success that no longer suc­
ceeds" is Anne's memory of her marriage and of the family 
into which she not only married but into which she was 
adopted as a child.
In the opening paragraph I described the absenting- 
presenclng function of time in the external world as 
being an analogue for the self. Anne's revery functions 
in relation to this. Her memory telescopes back and 
forth from the present to the absent past. The motive 
for her search is "the memory of success that no longer 
succeeds," but her method is grounded in the various 
physical details of Kavanaugh surrounding her, details 
that carry significance because of past events.
Her somewhat romantic revery allows Anne to recall 
and to associate time and place. In particular, a place 
such as the mill pond at Kavanaugh enables her to re­
present past events that once occurred there and to
11
associate these with Instances taken from mythology and 
the political past of her region. Further, her revery 
means that on one level past events still literally take 
place in her consciousness, and ours while we read.
The external world that by the nature of time ab­
sents and presences itself is recalled by an interior 
world of revery that re-collects past events in an order 
that is meaningful in light of the present. This pro­
cess brackets the self. Anne locates herself by going 
both beyond and short of her disastrous marriage. The 
process is a sort of temporal range finding, and it func­
tions to reconcile the dilemma contained in the quotation 
taken from Williams.
In the prose section that precedes the opening stan­
za we are given a series of related details. The time 
is both "afternoon" and "fall." The place is a garden 
within a small village with a grave "At one end of" that 
"garden." The suggested outcome of the setting as well 
as that of the time of year is the grave, death. That 
this is Lowell's intention becomes explicit during the 
course of the poem, which ends with Anne's saying "I 
gave / Whatever brought me gladness to the grave."
However the strongest suggestion that the outcome 
of Kavanaugh as manifested by Harry and Anne is death 
is made by the presence of Persephone. As part of the 
setting given before the poem's opening, Lowell mentions
12
"a marble statue of Persephone, the goddess who become 
[sic] a queen by becoming queen of the dead." The stat­
ue Is by the mill pond, and this detail echoes part of 
the myth of Persephone. The pond is reminiscent of the 
pool Ovid calls Cyane.
The following are the central parts of Ovid's ac­
count of Persephone's abduction by Pluto and of the man­
ner in which Ceres regained her daughter. Because I 
will have reason to refer to the myth often, I quote a 
large part of Ovid's account:
'Not far from Henna's walls 
There is a pool called Pergus, whose deep water 
Hears the swans singing, even more than Cayster.
A wood surrounds the pool, and the green leaves 
Keep off the sunlight, and the ground is cool,
And the ground is moist, with lovely flowers growing, 
And the season is always spring; and in this grove 
Proserpina was playing, gathering flowers,
Violets, or white lilies, and so many 
The basket would not hold them all, but still 
She was so eager--the other girls must never 
Beat her at picking blossoms T So, in one moment,
Or almost one, she was seen, and loved, and taken 
In Pluto's rush of love. She called her mother,
Her comrades, but more often for her mother.
Where he had torn the garment from her shoulder,
The loosened flowers fell, and she, poor darling,
In simple innocence, grieved as much for them 
As for her other loss. Her ravager 
Drove the car fiercely on, shook up the horses, 
Calling each one by name, the reins, dark-dyed.
Sawing the necks and manes. Through the deep lakes, 
Through the Palician pools, that reeked with sulphur, 
That boiled where earth was cracked, beyond the city 
Corinthian men once built between two harbors,
One large, one small, they rode.
'Between Cyane 
And Arethusa lies a bay, its waters 
Held in the land's embrace. And here Cyane,
Who gave the pool its name, the one most famous
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Of all Sicilian nymphs, rose from the ripples 
That circled at her waist. She knew the goddess,
Daughter of Ceres, and she cried aloud:
"No farther shall you go! Ceres shall have 
No son against her will; Proserpina 
Should have been asked, not taken. If I may 
Compare small acts with great ones, Anapis loved me,
And I became his bride, but at least he asked me,
He did not force or frighten me into wedlock."
She flung her arms widespread, as if her slimness 
Could block that onrush, but the son of Saturn,
Burning with terrible anger, whipped the horses,
Whirled, with his strong right arm, the royal sceptre, 
Smote the pool open to its very depths,
And the earth opened, and the chariot plunged 
Through the new crater down to Hell.
'Cyane
Grieved for both violations, girl and fountain,
And in her silent spirit kept the wound 
Incurable, and, all in tears, she melted,
Dissolving, queen no longer, of those waters.
Her limbs were seen to soften, and her bones
Became more flexible, and the nails' hardness
Was gone: the slenderest parts went first, the hair,
The fingers, legs, and feet: it is no great distance 
From slimness to cool water. Back and shoulders,
The breasts, the sides, were watery streams, and water 
Went through her veins, not blood, till there was nothing 
For anyone to hold.
'And Ceres, meantime,
Was looking for her daughter, in every land,
On every sea, . . .
'It would take too long 
To tell what lands the goddess wandered over,
What seas she crossed, and all in disappointment.
So she came back to Sicily, and searching still 
Came to Cyane. Were the nymph not water,
She would have told her everything; she tried to.
But had no lips, no mouth, no tongue to speak with,
Still, she had evidence to give: the girdle 
Proserpina wore, lay floating on the surface 
Where it had fallen when they went down. And Ceres 
Saw it , and only then appeared to fathom 
Her daughter's fate, and beat her breast in sorrow,
And tore her hair. Where is she? She does not know, 
Still does not know, arid caTls the lands ungrateful, 
Unworthy of her gifts; above all others 
Sicily is to blame, for there she found 
The evidence of her loss. She cursed the land,
Breaking the ploughs that turned the earth, and killing 
Cattle and men in anger, making fields
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Lie sterile, blighting seed and crop: the land 
Had a good name, but you would never know it 
To see it now, corn withering in the blade,
Excessive sun, excessive rain, and stars 
And winds both evil, and the greedy birds 
Eating the planted seeds, thistle and darnel 
And crab-grass taking over.
'Then Arethusa,
Daughter of Alpheus, from the Elean pool 
She lived in, rose, pushed back the dripping hair 
That fell across her forehead, saying: 0 mother
Of the girl sought over the whole wide world, 0 mother 
Of fruit and harvest, cease the endless labor.
Do not be angry at the loyal earth. . . .
the solid earth had opened 
A way for me, I went through deepest darkness,
Rose here at last, and saw the stars again,
But in my voyage underground, I saw 
Proserpina, with these very eyes 1 saw her,
Sorrowful, to be sure, and still half-frightened,
And still a queen, the greatest of the world 
Of darkness, and an empress, the proud consort 
Of the proud ruler of the world of darkness."
Ceres was like a woman turned to stone,
And then a woman raving, but her frenzy 
Dwindled, at last, to anguish, and she drove 
Her chariot to Heaven, pleading . . .  "I have come, 
Great Jove, to speak as suppliant for a daughter,
Your blood and mine. . . .
And Jove answered:
"She is our daughter truly, yours and mine,
A common bond, a common care. But let us 
Be willing to face the facts: this was not done 
Through wickedness, but love. . . .
Still, if you must 
Break up this marriage, let Proserpina come 
To the upper world again, on one condition:
She must, in the world below, have eaten nothing, 
Tasted no food--so have the Fates enacted."
And Ceres, as he ended, was determined
To have her daughter back, but the Fates forbade it.
She had been hungry, wandering in the gardens,
Poor simple child, and plucked from the leaning bough 
A pomegranate, the crimson fruit, and peeled it,
With the inside coating of the pale rind showing,
And eaten seven of the seeds. . . .
But Jupiter, holding the balance even 
Between the husband and the grieving mother,
Divides the year in half, so that the goddess 
May be with both and neither; and her bearing
15
Is changed, her sorrow alternates with sunlight,
The cloud and shadow vanishing.5
Lowell's poem not only begins with a pool reminis­
cent of Cyane, it ends with Anne, having gathered lilies 
as Persephone did, rowing across the pond. She thinks 
that she and her Pluto, Harry, "row together"; then she 
remembers the scene from Ovid that recounts Pluto whip­
ping his horses through the opened pool, and closes with 
the line I have already quoted: "I gave / Whatever brought 
me gladness to the grave." The intention throughout is 
that the Persephone myth be central to the poem's meaning,
Lowell's underworld motif is treated as mental in­
stability in Jean Stafford's "A Country Love Story" and 
"An Influx of Poets." In "The Mills" the cyclical nature 
of the Persephone myth seems to parallel the cyclical 
nature of Lowell's illness as far as we can understand 
it. However, over against such light-dark motifs there 
are also Instances of fixed order, the presence of which 
is vital for purposes of contrast and, finally, meaning. 
Preceding the first stanza, Lowell mentions not only the 
garden where Anne is sitting but the Bible (of which she 
makes an "opponent" in her game of solitaire), the fact 
that Harry was a naval officer, and the fact that "The 
Kavanaughs are a Catholic family." Each of these repre­
sents a fixed order. Harry's madness and Pluto's abduc­
tion occur despite such order. The dramatic significance
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of Che abductIon-madness motif, which suggests a sort 
of psychological underworld, is dependent upon the firm 
establishment of a healthy, waking upperworld; therefore, 
Lowell begins with a setting that contains not only the 
means of access to the underworld, the grave and the 
mill pond with Persephone beside it, but one that also 
contains the outward symbols of order for a living, up­
per world.
As I believe will become clear during the reading 
of the poem which follows, the upper world of order does 
not receive enough emphasis to provide a sufficient con­
text for the poem's general departure from that world. 
There is a binary relation between Lowell's upper world 
and his lower world. For example, Hugh Staples identi­
fies a "series of antagonisms" which he lists as "spring 
and fall, summer and winter, light and darkness, fertil­
ity and sterility, growth and decay, sanity and madness, 
wealth and poverty, love and hate--summing these up-- 
life and death. This list provides particular instances 
of Lowell's binary world. One part of each of these 
takes its meaning from the other. A problem of meaning 
will arise, therefore, if one part (or, half) is stressed 
to the exclusion of its counterpart. Lowell's over­
emphasis upon the second half of each of these threatens 
the context within which his poem, more generally, would 
have meaning. Nevertheless, the notion of a God-ordained,
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orderly world is basic to the poem's context, even when 
that world is seen as negated.
Mythical allusion Is another basis for the poem's 
context, and, in addition to the above problem, it is 
often employed excessively, with a similar loss of bal­
ance occurring as a result. The specific situation of 
Anne and Harry Kavanaugh is intended to take meaning 
from its implied opposite, a normative and ordered world, 
as well as from an external, mythological construct.
And this often works. When it does not work, however, 
it fails as a result of unbalanced emphasis.
The third element basic to the poem's problematical 
context is the supposed historical background of the 
Kavanaughs. The acquisition of what at one time was ap­
parently excessive wealth was achieved at the sacrifice 
of a near extinct tribe of Maine Indians. Harry's ances­
tor, Red Kavanaugh, built a fortune on land taken from 
the Abnakis, and inscribed on his signet ring, "Cut down 
we flourish." While this originally applied to the 
Kavanaugh timber fortune, it takes an ironical meaning 
with Anne and Harry who are childless, and more generally 
it fits the Persephone myth. Where this third element 
also fails, however, is again in terms of uneven treatment. 
Parts of the Kavanaugh past fit neatly and significantly 
with the Kavanaugh present; others dangle as inexplicable 
details.
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II
In the opening line of "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" 
we are presented with the Douay Bible, which has been 
placed on a garden chair. During the notes which precede 
the poem, Lowell has mentioned the presence of a Bible, 
that the Kavanaughs are a Catholic family, and that they 
"came to Maine in the 17th century." This cluster of 
details creates part of the background against which 
Anne and Harry stand.
The Douay Bible was printed in its entirety at Douai 
in 1609-10 by Catholic English exiles.^ Later in that 
same century the Catholic Kavanaughs immigrated to Ameri­
ca. The wilderness they experienced must have been like 
moving, to reverse W. H. Auden*s phrase, from a formal 
to a wild vineyard. Their moving to America brought them 
to a new garden, and from the start the reader is prepared 
to encounter some new manifestation of The Fall, this time 
discovered in the Kavanaughs* family history.
The particular nature of that fall is first indicated 
in the following two-and-one-half lines. The lady, Anne, 
is playing solitaire, and she is wearing a sealskin toque 
and a pair of blue jeans. The toque, being a modified 
form of a 16th century, small, plumed hat, worn by men 
and women, is reminiscent of another century, much as the 
rest of Kavanaugh seems left over from another century.
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The Incongruity between past and present is suggested by 
the incongruity of Anne’s clothing; the blue-jeans she 
wears are not suitable for a member of the Kavanaugh 
line. They are suitable, however, to her original fami­
ly, which was very poor. The toque, as hats often do, 
might be taken to symbolize her office or position, but 
the blue-jeans contradict this position.
In addition to her contradictory dress, which in 
the larger context of the poem's entirety suggests a 
fundamental confusion in Anne’s position, she is playing 
solitaire, and "The Douay Bible . . .  Is Sol, her dummy." 
Solitaire suggests solitary, which is part of Anne's 
position; it also suggests that she is gambling with 
herself, which, she later muses, "Is love of self."
This leads us to a third Implication, that Anne is a 
solipsist, and this is vitally bound up with what she 
suspects was her failure in her marriage. A fourth im­
plication results from what can only be handled as a 
cluster of details. It is the suggestion that Sol, her 
opponent in solltarie, may also be Sol the Roman sun 
god who shares a relation with Hellos and Apollo. (In 
particular, Apollo appears later in the peom in an al­
lusion to Daphne.) Sol also suggests wisdom as it is 
an abbreviated name for King Solomon, and it is with 
this final understanding that Anne later says " 1 Sol /
If you will help me, I will win the world.’" A competing
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correlation is Apollo's association with prophecy. Thus, 
Sol as Solomon or as Apollo (it would be characteristic 
of Lowell at this point to say both) is a source of 
heightened knowledge, and Anne sees his knowledge as 
the means for control, or power, over "the world."
But "The Douay Bible . . .  Is Sol, her dummy."
Thus in her solipsism, Anne ironically asks Sol, Bible 
yet dummy-opponent, to help her by his greater knowledge 
(that of Solomon, Apollo, and the Catholic Christian 
Tradition) to "win the world." She is asking to be re­
stored to the world, yet she is also asking someone who 
does not exist but rather who is posited by herself as 
a sort of temporary alter ego. In her complete isola­
tion, Anne addresses herself. Playing solitaire, she 
can win the world because she is the world. The presence 
of the Bible in a garden, therefore, is ironical. The 
various implications of it as "Sol, her dummy" point to 
her intellectual pride and self-love, the opposite of 
what a Bible's presence would normally mean.
Consistent with the Kavanaugh garden's relation to 
that first garden, the serpent is figuratively present:
There's a sort of path 
Or rut of weeds that serpents down a hill 
And graveyard to a ruined burlap mill;
That the path is "a sort of path" means that it is not a 
very good path in the sense that it is not clear or
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certain. Also, "sort" suggests class, having something 
in common, thus this path "serpents down" in direction 
past a "graveyard to a ruined burlap mill." Descent is 
suggested, and the manner of descent may be discovered 
by the "rut of weeds" that characterizes the path. Lit­
erally, the rut is a grooved track one follows; however, 
indiscriminate copulation is also suggested by an alter­
nate meaning for rut and by the fact that weeds, which 
are a sign of disuse yet are also indiscriminate, are 
growing along the rut. The rut, therefore, leads to 
ruin and death, as the "graveyard" and "ruined . . .
mill" insinuate.
Lowell is developing a modern locus for original 
sin. In Roman Catholicism original sin causes the loss 
of sanctifying grace. As I will discuss later, Martin 
Heidegger would call this the god's absence. But with­
in Lowell’s terms, at the time he wrote "The Mills of 
the Kavanaughs," I think that the loss of grace as a re­
sult of original sin means the loss of God's love, and 
grace is instrumental in man's taking right action.
That is, the metaphysical loss results in a moral loss.
Beside the "ruined burlap mill" and the mill pond 
there is "a maternal nineteenth century / Italian statue 
of Persephone." Part of Anne's failure, she suspects, 
i8 that she and Harry did not restore life to Kavanaugh. 
They raised neither the family fortunes nor the next
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generation. The Ironical presence of a "maternal" 
Persephone is an early hint as to Anne's particular 
situation, her marriage to death. Related to this and 
to the absence of grace, the statue "beckons to a mob 
of Bacchanals / To plunge like dogs or athletes through 
the falls." In a sense, the absence of one god evokes 
the presence of another, more primitive god. Persephone 
intends for those who "plunge like dogs . . . through
the falls" to "fetch her the stone garland she will 
hurl." Whether as decoration, as poetry or as the prize 
for heraldry--the garland ie stone; immediately after 
this Anne kneels at her husband's gravestone and folds 
his flag, his bit of heraldry. Persephone will hurl a 
stone garland and Anne kneels at a grave because the 
present god's nature is vitally bound up with death:
"This is the throne
They must have willed us. Harry, not a thing
Was missing: we were children of a king."
At the end of the first stanza we know that Anne's 
marriage is in some way a marriage with death, if not 
with Pluto outright. In addition, we also know that 
Kavanaugh has been the scene of some private re-enactment 
of the first fall from grace, and that in the wake of 
the Christian God's withdrawn favor a pagan god has sur­
faced. It appears that, in her revery, Anne sees Harry 
as Hades and herself as Persephone.
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Experiencing the absence of the Christian God, Anne 
directs her affections toward the logical antipode, as 
it is incorporated in classical mythology. Experiencing 
the absence of her lover, she does the same thing. In 
both cases the process is one of giving to that which is 
absent the sentiments which naturally should be directed 
toward something present and capable of perception. In 
his essay, "Aesthetic Poetry," Walter Pater identifies 
a similar process:
Into this kingdom of reverie, and with it into a 
paradise of ambitious refinements, the earthly love 
enters, and becomes a prolonged somnambulism. Of 
religion it learns the art of directing towards an 
unseen object sentiments whose natural direction 
is towards objects of sense. Hence a love defined 
by the absence of the beloved, choosing to be with­
out hope, protesting against all lower usesgof 
love, barren, extravagant [sic] antinomian.
Anne's revery, and Lowell's, generates Its own world 
(for Anne, solipsism and for Lowell, the poem). In the 
absence of apparent physical and spiritual life, Anne 
opts for physical and spiritual death. The poem partici­
pates not only in the tradition of the absent or lost 
lover but in one of the absent or lost god as well. As 
Pater points out, this absence allows the substitution 
of "reverie" directed towards "an unseen object." Such 
"reverie" is compensatory, but it ultimately identifies 
a basic antinomy in Lowell's understanding. The "series 
of antagonisms" that Staples identifies comprises a list
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of particular instances of this. As Staples summarizes, 
the antimony is finally between "life and death." Thus 
as long as we are in Anne's consciousness, her revery, 
death Is suspended but insninent due to her preoccupation 
For such a condition, Persephone is the natural embodi­
ment, half living and half dying.
As 1 outlined earlier, three basic stanchions in 
the poem are the assumption of a God-ordained order, and 
therefore context, the assumption of a mythical context, 
and that of a historical context. The opening stanza 
establishes the first of these and, in addition, intro­
duces the Persephone myth. The second stanza develops 
the historical context, while the third turns back to 
myth. In general, the entire poem is carried out via 
the interaction of all three contexts. Each is intended 
to comment upon the other such that the text moves for­
ward by a process of continuous contrast and reflection. 
This takes place within a floating omniscient point of 
view, one which occupies Anne Kavanaugh's consciousness 
for _ predominant part of the poem.
The potential for meaning with this method is tre­
mendous; its danger is equally great, however. Specifi­
cally, Lowell has difficulties maintaining distinctions 
between text and context. And his greatest problem a- 
rlses with excessive mythical allusion. His myths over­
lap to the point of obscuring each other.
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Anocher aspect of this problem, which is evident 
even in the second stanza of the poem, is that Lowell's 
history is so detailed it overlaps itself, obscuring 
some of what was its intended significance. For example, 
Anne has already begun addressing Harry in the first 
stanza. By the second she is recounting the family 
fortunes to him, though, if he hears, he should know 
the story better than she could ever know it as it was 
his family first. This is obviously a device, and her 
recounting is intended for the reader. But with con­
tinued use it becomes self-defeating.
However, the second stanza does flesh out the 
Kavanaughs* family history. Their dramatic fall from 
political and economic prominence is demonstrated by 
the contrast existing between Anne's reference to 
"Cousin Franklin Pierce" and her description of Harry's 
mother, "typing to redeem" the Kavanaugh "mills / From 
Harding's taxes." The fact that Kavanaugh must be re­
deemed morally, as well as economically, gradually sur­
faces during the course of Anne's revery.
In fact Anne actually begins her revery at this 
point by remembering her trespass on Kavanaugh land to 
gather flowers. Having established family prominence 
and family guilt in the second stanza, Lowell moves 
further into Anne's consciousness in the third stanza, 
and, as Staples points out, he relates the scene of
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Anne's trespass to that in Ovid's account of Proserpina's
g
abduction by Pluto. Ovid's description follows:
and in this grove 
Proserpina was playing, gathering flowers 
Violets, or white lilies, and so many 
The basket would not hold them all, but still 
She was so eager--the other girls must never 
Beat her at picking blossoms: So, in one moment,
Or almost one, she was seen, and loved, and taken 
In Pluto's rush of love. She called her mother, 
Her comrades, but more often for her mother.
Where he had torn the garment from her shoulder, 
The loosened flowers fell, and she, poor darling, 
In simple innocence, grieved as much for them 
As for her other loss.^O
Anne's account follows:
Once I trespassed--picking flowers 
For keepsakes of my Journey, once I bent 
Above your well, where lawn and battlement 
Were trembling, yet without a flaw to mar 
Their sweet surrender. Ripples seemed to star 
My face, the rocks, the bottom of the well;
My heart, pursued by all its plunder, fell,
And I was tossing petals from my lair 
Of copper leaves above your mother's chair.
Staples was the first to note that stanza eight repeats 
Persephone's (or, Proserpina's) abduction; stanza eleven 
deals with her return to earth, and stanza seventeen re­
counts "Pluto's assertion of his right to reclaim his 
bride at the end of the growing season.
The fact that the third stanza is related to Ovid's 
account reinforces the sense of foreboding already gener­
ated by the poem. The failure of Anne's life with Harry 
is implied; her self-love, seen in the reflexive "bottom 
of the well," is aB barren as the "copper leaves."
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The fourth stanza begins with the reflection of the 
Persephone statue, and those of the Bacchanals, seen in 
the mill pond. Married to the dead, Anne says that Harry 
was '"a fool'" to leave '"the Navy when disgrace / Still 
wanted zeal to look him in the face."' It is also at 
this point that she states that "gambling with herself /
Is love of self." As she acknowledges her narcissism, 
she briefly surfaces from it and "feels" Harry's "fingers" 
on "her neck." At the same time, however, she demon­
strates her relation to the dead.
By association, Anne’s thought turns to Daphne who, 
while fleeing, felt Apollo's breath on her neck. Her 
introversion during her marriage was a flight from Harry, 
and she is reminded of Daphne's similar flight from 
Apollo. Both undergo a metamorphosis. But while Daphne 
becomes the laurel, Anne's change is to become queen of 
the dead. There is also a certain amount of ambiguity 
in Anne, as in Daphne, who "yet, perhaps, saw nothing to 
admire / Beneath Apollo." That is, what they flee, they 
desire in part.
Much of the poem's progress is carried out by a sort 
of synesthesia within Anne's consciousness. Also, Lowell 
often takes the poem out of Anne's consciousness and es­
tablishes the objective existence of her surroundings 
only to plunge back into her mind for another series of 
associations, some more synesthetlc than others. As Is
becoming evident, the poem's foremost problem Is exces­
sive association. Or, rather, the poem's meaning often 
cannot be as fully and as dramatically realized as It 
should be because there is more free play (or, associa­
tion) within the text than the poem's context can recon­
cile. I quote the fifth stanza which demonstrates this 
problem:
The leaves, sun*s yellow, listen. Love, they fall. 
She hears her husband, and she tries to call 
Him, then remembers. Burning stubble roars 
About the garden. Columns fill the life 
Insurance calendar on which she scores.
The lady laughs. She shakes her parasol.
The table rattles, and she chews her pearled,
Once telescopic pencil, till its knife
Snaps open. "Sol," she whispers, laughing, "Sol
If you will help m e , I will win the world."
Her husband's thumbnail scratches on her comb.
A boy is pointing at the sun. He cries:
0 dandelion, wish my wish, be true,
And blows the callow pollen-Tn her eyes.
"Harry," she whispers, "we are far from home-- 
A boy and girl a-Maying in the blue."
In the space of sixteen lines she hears falling 
leaves, her husband and the "Burning stubble." Ironi­
cally, Anne keeps score on a "life / Insurance calendar" 
then "She shakes her parasol . . . [the pun Intentional] 
and chews her . . . pencil" while "The table rattles" 
and a "knife / Snaps open." Next she whispers, and we 
hear Harry’s "thumbnail . . .  on her comb." The rein­
troduction of Harry causes Anne to recollect him as a 
boy. Reintroduced, he proceeds to point "at the sun" 
and blows a "dandelion . . .  in her eyes." The stanza
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concludes with Anne whispering again, this time that 
she and Harry are "A boy and girl a-Maying in the blue."
Almost comically, Lowell is trying to do too much 
too quickly. Details such as the fact that the "pencil" 
is "telescopic" or that the "garden" is surrounded by 
"Burning stubble" that "roars" require our attention. 
However, these become lost in a crowd of others, all 
waiting to be interpreted. The problem is that such 
multiplicity denies meaning because the context is over­
loaded with details which it must reconcile.
The "Burning stubble" can be associated with the 
Kavanaugh motto, "Cut down we flourish," and with Pluto's 
entrance to the underworld. But association is not mean­
ing. The "pencil" was "Once telescopic." Is this a 
particularity with no significance beyond itself? Or is 
it in some way suggestive of lost distance or perspective? 
Other than because Anne "chews" on it, why does the pen­
cil's "knife / Snap[ ] open"?
With the knife's opening Anne asks "Sol" to help 
her "win the world." Immediately, Harry is there to 
run his thumbnail along a comb, creating his own sort 
of diatonic scale. Sol is , among other things, the 
fifth note in a diatonic scale. Is Anne's address to 
"Sol" reinforced by her doing so in the fifth stanza of 
the poem? Later, Harry's numbering process for cate­
gorizing birds is referred to, "'What's the twenty-eight, /
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the twenty-eight--0 wait."* This occurs (should we a- 
gain say ironically?) in stanza twenty-eight. In sum, 
all too often we are given much fact but no finding.
What can and should be said about the fifth stanza 
is that as Daphne's "laurel branches" drop "from the 
blue" in the previous stanza, here Harry and Anne "are 
far from home-- / A boy and girl a-Maying in the blue." 
This is part of Anne's revery, yet it is also Anne's 
and Harry's condition. Each is lost "in the blue" in 
two senses: Anne is lost and changed as Daphne was, yet 
while she flees through the world she also wishes to 
"win the world"; Harry, in death, pursues Anne much as 
Apollo pursued Daphne and as Pluto abducted Persephone, 
but at the same time he is also a lost little boy. It 
is this twofold existence that causes their marriage to 
fail. In particular, Anne dreams of making love with 
Harry as a little boy, and Harry cannot relent his own 
dark pursuit when he hears her talking in her sleep and 
thinks she is dreaming of another man.
In the third stanza Anne wanders into Kavanaugh to 
pick flowers. Her action repeats Persephones' straying 
into a "grove" to gather the narcissus. And Anne's 
narcissism reinforces this. As a further link, Lowell 
Introduces Ceres, or Demeter, in the sixth stanza. Ceres 
is mother to Persephone, or Proserpina. Upon losing her 
daughter, she made the earth barren, as was within her
power because she was Goddess of the c o m ,  of agriculture 
Thus, the failure of Kavanaugh may be seen as a curse 
placed upon it by Ceres due to the loss of her daughter, 
Anne's marriage to Harry,
Persephone's statue beckons to "a mob of Bacchanals. 
These followers of Bacchus or Dionysus suggest his pres­
ence and remind us of his early association with Ceres. 
Unlike many of the gods, these two were friends of the 
mortals. One was related to corn, or grain, and the 
other to the vine, two basic fruits of the earth that 
are needed daily. In addition, both represent assurance 
against death: Persephone's cyclic renewal is familiar; 
and Dionysus is associated with resurrection and there­
fore with belief in the life of the soul after death.
Anne fits as Persephone for several reasons; how­
ever, one reason is that she combines two myths. She is 
brought into the Kavanaugh family as a result of her 
father's excessive appetite and his Indigence. This 
parallels the myth of Erysichthon, in which Erysichthon 
offends Ceres and she curses him with famine. He offends 
Ceres by cutting down a tree (much as Red Kavanaugh cut 
down many trees) that is in a grove sacred to her. Ceres 
plagues him by ordering Famine to plant hunger in Ery­
sichthon. In order to buy food, he sells his daughter 
into slavery; however she prays to Poseidon who saves 
her by changing her back when the danger has passed.
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Erysichthon, as does Harry, finally kills himself. Per­
sephone, as does Erysichthon*s daughter, goes through meta­
morphoses In order to provide food. That Is, Erysichthon 
represents Anne's relation to the masculine world of Harry, 
her father, and Red Kavanaugh. Erysichthon's daughter, as 
Anne, enriches Anne's role as a Persephone to the dying 
Kavanaughs. Anne's purpose is one of redemption; her u- 
nlque significance within Lowell's terms is that she fails 
at this. That guilt which is incurred by violating a 
grove sacred to Ceres, or that which is incurred by vio­
lating the new Eden of America, cannot be expiated.
During the course of the sixth stanza Anne identi­
fies another part of her predicament:
How can I see 
Things as they are, my Love, while April steals 
Through bog and chalk-pit, till these boulders bear 
Persephone--illusory, perhaps,
Yet her renewal, no illusion, for this air 
Is orgied, Harry, and your setter yaps 
About the goddess, while it nips her heels.
The seventh stanza opens:
The setter worries through the coils of brush 
And streaming bramble, and the children rush 
Hurrahing, where no marsh or scrubby field 
Or sorry clump of virgin pine will yield. . . .
Jerome Mazzaro has suggested that "The setter worries
through the colls of brush" may be a reference to the
12Uroborus, a symbol for time. This seems appropriate, 
particularly in light of what precedes. Anne articulates
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one of her basic problems, that she Is time-locked, when 
she says, "How can 1 see / Things as they are." As I 1 
have already suggested, such a concern was Lowell's con­
cern, and poetry was his solution; It was his mode for 
seeing "Things as they are" in a world of time and pro­
cess. For Anne, the Persephone myth gauges time and 
process and explains her peculiar situation, a situation 
in which she is married to a dead man and married into 
a dying family, more generally, married to death.
In her role as Persephone, Anne is also supposed to 
generate renewal, something which would give unity to 
her life in the sense that it would mitigate her being 
time-locked. But in this capacity she fails. As she 
says, "the children rush . . . where no marsh or scrubby
field . . . will yield." They fail to catch "the half- 
extinct . . . bird" they chase, and it "sails beyond 
beyond."
That is, Anne falls to redeem the Kavanaugh line 
in a world where time has come to be understood not in 
terms of the resurrection but rather that of the Uroborus, 
the serpent that is circular because it eats its tail.
She cannot "see / Things as they are" because time, no 
longer grounded in historical fact, sets any particular 
point of view adrift. It is just such a predicament 
which makes a phenomenological approach to experience 
valuable. Anne's revery, or Lowell's poem, recollects
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the past sequentially and by doing so becomes a self- 
locating mode of thought. Anne's revery is, therefore, 
a modality intended to generate unity of experience.
As Staples maintains, the eighth stanza "recapitu­
lates Persephone's abduction by Pluto in the pool of 
13Cyane." In a sense, Lowell broadens the focus at 
moments, much as a movie camera might do, in an attempt 
to locate the particular in its larger context. By this 
point, the Christian context has been lost; what remains 
are snatches of history and classical mythology. If 
Anne can see herself as another Persephone then her 
experience, though a failure, is not aberrant. If it 
were an aberration, she could not locate it. Being able 
to locate her experience means that in some way she (or, 
Lowell) is able to stand outside a particular situation 
and to that extent not be totally subject to it.
Ovid blends the stories of Cyane and Arethusa with
that of Persephone, as the lines I quoted from his
Metamorphoses demonstrate. In stanzas eight, nine, and
ten Lowell intermixes these three stories and adds a
fourth, that of Narcissus and Echo. As Staples rightly
summarizes, Lowell is trying "to pack as much meaning
14into every line" as possible. What actually happens 
is that the myths overlap, and rather than concentration 
Lowell achieves confusion. In the next stanza Lowell 
alludes to the story of Paolo and Francesca, and if 
anything further compounds the confusion.
Lowell shifts Anne’s revery by Introducing various 
external facts such as the millpond or the knife attached 
to a "telescopic pencil." Another means by which he 
shifts her attention is by using seasons. Staples points 
this out, but he confuses certain details. He places 
Anne's and Harry's "first meeting" in stanza four, 
while . . . [Anne] is picking flowers illicitly at 
Kavanaugh, In fact, their meeting occurs in stanza 
three; and, it may be inaccurate to say that they meet 
in the first place. If they do meet, in either stanza, 
they do so strictly in terms of an allusion to Persephone' 
abduction by Pluto.
With the mention of "April," spring is introduced 
in the sixth stanza. The season parallels Harry's and 
Anne's youth. Stanza nine carries them into summer, and 
by stanza eleven they are in autumn. Thus, though al­
lusion is the most basic method, the progression of sea­
sons is used as a governing principle for Anne's and 
Harry's romantic progress.
Still within spring, stanza eight begins the pro­
cess of combining the myths of Persephone, Cyane, Arethusa 
and Narcissus and Echo. Persephone's absence from the 
upper world after her abduction corresponds with the pro­
gression of seasons into summer in stanzas nine and ten. 
Stanza nine includes the reference to Dante's Paolo and 
Francesca (the lovers who let passion overrule reason),
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and the next stanza alludes to the myth of Narcissus 
and Echo. Taken as a whole, the three stanzas unite 
Anne and Harry not In spring but in summer, and in the 
process of doing so they suggest several flaws that con­
tribute to the marriage’s failure. Narcissism and lust 
cause Anne and Harry to be ignorant of each other; the 
suggestion seems strong that their marriage is a mutual 
abduction, resulting in no more than the wind-borne 
passion of Paolo and Francesca.
During the course of the eleventh stanza, Harry and 
Anne make love in Autumn. Anne seems "to hear / The 
harvesters," her union with Harry being a harvest, not 
regeneration. "The mowers moving through that golden­
eared / Avernal ambush" not only refers to laglo Avernus, 
a lake near Possuoli, Italy, reputed to lead to the 
underworld because of its stench, but "ambush" also sug­
gests that they are trapped. Part of their being trapped 
results from the guilt of the Kavanaugh fortune; Red 
Kavanaugh's abuse of the land is one reason for "Persephone's 
deferred / Renewal of the earth." Another part of their 
trap, however, is that regeneration is "deferred" by their 
lust or passion of which George Santyana says of Paolo 
and Francesca that Dante means if you abandon yourself 
altogether to love and to nothing more than love, you 
already are in Hell.*** Whether one views Anne's relation 
with her dead husband as a sort of life-In-Hell or as
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Just a bad marriage, the circumstances that contribute 
to her predicament are concrete in terms of the poem: 
That is, family guilt plus lust and narcissism result 
not in regeneration of Kavanaugh but instead cause its 
degeneration.
Stanzas twelve and thirteen trace Anne's life from 
her origin as one member of a poor family with thirteen 
children to her adoption by Harry's mother and the very 
different life she led at Kavanaugh. Anne and Harry 
live as "Brother and sister!"; for them, as children, 
the woods seem haunted by Abnakis, while Harry's home 
is dominated by his ancestry. Though their relationship 
is that of brother and sister initially, later they are 
to marry.
We are given the history of Anne's origin from a 
destitute family of thirteen children, whose father 
kept a goat and "a second woman twenty farms up the 
road," to her adoption by Mrs. Kavanaugh, who "charged 
. . . [her] board and lodging to the town," This last
line suggests that Mrs. Kavanaugh's motive for taking 
Anne was to ease the family financial plight. Neverthe­
less, stanza thirteen does state that Anne and Harry are 
"Brother and sister!" which means that, "in a sense," 
their love is "Incestuous. If it is incest, it is 
primarily the result of Mrs. Kavanaugh*s expediency de­
signed to retain her family; incest is consistent with
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this motive to the extent that It too can be motivated 
by a desire for retention of the self through those 
closest to being the self.
Added guilt Is contained In references to the 
"Abnakis" Indians and to Red Kavanaugh in the following 
two stanzas, "who burned and buried child / And squaw 
. . . A pine-tree shilling a scalp." One may see Mrs.
Kavanaugh's bringing Anne home as another attempt to 
maintain a guilt-ridden name and property, and the even­
tual result of this is a marriage that Inherits guilt 
but which, because of its incestuous nature, cannot ex­
piate it. Also, I think that it is fair to add that 
Anne's and Harry's narcissism is a type of incest of 
spirit and that this finds its physical counterpart in 
their brother-sister relationship.
Staples argues that "Your mother came and signed 
my papers . . . And charged my board and lodging to the
town" (stanza 12) means adoption (and, therefore, in­
cest), though this may be going too far. If so, however, 
it is Lowell's fault. He is trying to make Mrs. Kavanaugh's 
action mean two things which cannot coexist: At one point 
we are told that Anne is taken In for financial reasons, 
and at another, that she is adopted, which would mean 
that the town no longer paid Mrs. Kavanaugh for Anne's 
room and board. There are several motives that can make 
Mrs. Kavanaugh's action understandable and believable,
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but we are given too little too quickly to make this 
part of the poem consistent and therefore completely 
realistic. Finally, if her adoption is for expediency, 
then can we really be convinced that Anne and Harry are 
"Brother and sister!" with all of the serious overtones 
to this which Lowell wishes us to accept?
The Persephone motif, more consistent than the in­
cest theme, continues in stanza fourteen with "the woods­
man [Red Kavanaugh] left a track / Straight as an arrow 
to the blacksmith's shack / Where 1 was born." This not 
only keeps the underworld relation in mind ("blacksmith"); 
it further relates Anne's origin with the Kavanaugh tradi­
tion. It is late spring and a month before their marriage 
and Harry swears that their "marriage . . . [will] renew
the cleft / Forests and skulls" of the Abnakis. The 
family motto, "Cut down we flourish," again suggests the 
Persephone motif, that winter (or, death) seen by her 
going underground will always be displaced by the renewal 
of her return, spring. The particularity of the use of 
the myth in this poem, however, seems in part to be that 
their marriage occurs in the summer (July), not in the 
spring, and that the season of renewal has already passed 
for them.
This idea continues. In stanza fifteen the dead 
Indians chant their "Miserere." As if that is not enough, 
the opening line of stanza sixteen shouts the point with
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(this time obvious) one more allusion: "Marriage by 
drowning!" In addition, the inappropriateness of the 
timing of their marriage is also suggested by Anne's 
being a "Cinderella at their Mass" whose bridesmaids 
are dressed in "red," not only the lust of Francesca, 
but the fire of Hades. Reminiscent of her gazing into 
the well in stanza three, she says, "'Prince Charming 
is my shadow in the glass.’" Then she shifts from 
revery back to the cards, "The lady stacks her cards.
She laughs and scores," remembering Harry’s statement 
that "God knows why!" he married her.
One flaw in the Persephone motif may be simply the
added association with Daphne. Cinderella (In stanza
16) echoes the change that Daphne underwent to escape
Apollo, who, like Paolo, did not have rational control
of his love. Taking revenge upon Apollo, Cupid said,
"Thine arrows may strike all things else, Apollo, but
18mine shall strike thee." Thus, beyond rational control, 
Harry says of his marriage to Anne, "'God knows why!’"
But Anne, like Narcissus, loves the reflection of herself, 
and, like Daphne and Persephone, she wishes to withhold 
herself.
The "shadow in the glass" is finally a solipslstlc 
shadow, and the omniscient shift from Anne's revery to 
a description of her continuing to play solitaire rein­
forces this. Incidentally, her playing is not objective
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(as It would be) but is In fact subjective; she does not 
shuffle but "stacks her cards," and this of course de­
termines the order in which they will come out. The 
consequences of this are suggested by the fact that she 
sees a shadow where her reflection should be.
But beyond being radically subjective, the charac­
ter of Anne Kavanaugh is not consistent: She moves from 
being a cluster of Persephone, Daphne, Francesca, and 
Narcissus (with which one might go along) to having the 
opposite characteristics of Apollo (with whom Harry was 
previously associated) in her attempts to win the world 
and to circumvent possibility by stacking the deck of 
cards. Is this to be read as just one more metamorphosis 
in Anne's character or one metamorphosis too many? Once 
again Lowell's dense method seems to be trying to do too 
much too quickly.
The following stanza is a further shift backward in 
time to Anne and Harry climbing the "snake-trail" of the 
mountain where a "Widow's Walk" is "balanced on a drop" 
and where "Demeter's daughter first reviewed the dead." 
Anne remembers one motive for her marriage, "hearing how 
she'd come to little good, / She took a husband to dis­
pirit hell." This echoes the Persephone theme and in 
particular may allude to Pluto's rape of Persephone, only 
this time it is in the context of the colloquial and the 
moral: "she'd come to little good." Harry has returned
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to commit suicide and, as Pluto, to lead her to a world 
of the dead. Anne's situation is soon to literally re­
quire a "Widow's Walk." Their marriage i£ "balanced on 
a drop."
The following stanzas trace Harry's mental dissolu­
tion and paranoia, his violence and his eventual death, 
either by suicide or as a result of an earlier attempt 
at suicide. Lowell does not make clear which. Stanza 
nineteen suggests Harry's interest in suicide, "falling 
from dishonor on a sword." At the same time Anne says 
that she "thought her kindness had restored him." In 
stanza twenty it is Christmas, and she says ironically 
(in light of both Harry's condition and the remark that 
Anne would "come to little good"), "'Harry's mine for 
good'" while he stumbles to onomatopoetically stir a 
"stoup of gliig." The mention of "a silver dollar" echoes 
Red Kavanaugh1s guilt and the mention of the gas oven- 
stove establishes the setting for Harry's attempted sui­
cide, a setting that reappears, along with other details, 
in "Her Dead Brother."
In the following stanza, twenty-one, Anne and Harry 
have gone to bed, and Harry has drugged himself, though 
he flinches when she touches him. Anne sleeps and dreams 
of their childhood at the "mill-fall," which was the 
locus for their re-enactment of the original fall from 
grace. Harry ideally defends Anne from Medusa and then
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says, M,I will have to yield / You to the dragon, if 
you fall asleep*" in stanza twenty-two. She dreams that 
she "slept" (which means that she i£ "yield[ed]" to the 
dragon or to Medusa, which the "snowplow" with its "eye- 
headlights" and "thirty gangling feet of angled lights" 
suggests).
Beginning in stanza twenty-one, however, there is 
a fusion of two events in the story of Perseus which is 
made possible because of Lowell's use of dream. By let­
ting Anne's subconscious carry events at this point 
Lowell is afforded even greater latitude than usual. 
Specifically, the "snowplow" represents first Medusa 
and second Harry's automobile. In addition, Harry has 
said that he "will have to yield" Anne "to the dragon," 
which plays off the scene in which Perseus saves Andromeda 
from a great snake. Part of Lowell's associational meth­
od follows:
Then I slept. I found 
That I was stalking in my moccasing 
Below the mill-fall, where our cave begins 
To shake its head, a green Medusa, crowned
With juniper. A dragon writhed around 
A knob above you, and its triple tails 
Fanned at your face. Furlongs of glaucous scales 
Wallowed to splatter the reproachful hound 
Eyes of the gorgon on the monstrous targe,
Plated with hatraoered-down tobacco tins,
You pushed and parried at the water's charge.
Your blue and orange broadsword lopped its fins 
And roaring . . .  I was back in bed.
Anne's dream continues, and, as I have already pointed
out, she believes Harry has threatened to "yield" her 
if she, in her dream, falls asleep.
Stanza twenty-three contains the main action in the
19poem, what has been called "one ancient bedroom joke." 
Anne dreams that she is making love with Harry as a boy 
but warns that the mature Harry is "driving back." The 
"snowplow" that she saw while falling asleep is now her 
husband's car. She wakes and Harry is asking "'who, who, 
who?'" and hitting her. She remembers the "green shoots 
on . . . [his] signet ring," In stanza twenty-four, he
ironically mocks her saying, "'Anne, / You want yourself,' 
which suggests that her solipsism has the effect of nar­
cissism. The effect that the event has upon Harry is to 
bring about his mental disintegration. Her dream has 
revealed a sort of Medusa and leaves Harry, if not stone, 
at least transfixed by his breakdown.
Anne's logical response is to say, "'Harry, we're 
not accountable for dreams.'" Yet, although she makes 
such a reply, she suspects she does have responsibility 
for Harry's disintegration, and it results from dreaming 
of one sort or another. A look at Jean Stafford's "A 
Country Love Story" adds credence to the idea that Anne 
robs Harry of his identity by having an imaginary lover, 
a sort of demon lover. The reality of their marriage 
is denied by this. Anne will not reconcile the ideal 
and the real. Her failure is that she does not mediate
between two polarities, what she believes should be 
(Harry as a boy) and what she actually experiences, a 
very imperfect man.
Anne's failure has destructive consequences, and 
they appear in stanza twenty-five. Harry attempts sui­
cide by cutting either his wrists or his throat, or both 
and by turning on the "oven jets." In stanza twenty-six 
Anne's inability to help Harry, "'I must have fainted,"' 
suggests Persephone's inability to keep Pluto from con­
ducting her to the underworld through Avernus. Anne 
says that where she "sank" the water "stank." Avernus 
is reputed to be the way to Hades because of its stench.
Having fainted at the sight of Harry, Anne dreams 
that they are in a "dory" and that Harry is using a 
"pitchfork" to catch "crabs." The crab is the fourth 
sign of the zodiac, which includes the months of June 
and July; Anne and Harry were married in July. The 
"pitchfork" suggests (as does "trident") Neptune; it 
also brings Satan to mind. The "eel-grass" seems to be 
an allusion to the serpent and to Medusa; both, 1 assume 
are sexual symbols intended to relate guilt and time, 
much as in stanza seven "the setter worries through the 
colls of brush" is a likely reference to the Uroborus.
But these allusions are identical to the action in 
Anne's dream, which is a Journey with Harry to death.
As mentioned before, the river stinks much as Avernus
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is supposed to stink, opening a way to Hades. In stanza
twenty-seven the water is yellow and appears to boil.
At the same time the Mdry-flies" snap past Anne's ears 
and seem to say "Wish m y , wish m y , wish," which returns 
us to Harry as a little boy with a dandelion. "Those 
dead-horse waters" suggest Pergus and Cyane, through 
which Pluto drove his horse drawn chariot. Perhaps the 
fact that the water in Anne's dream boils and is yellow 
identifies it with Ovid's description of Pluto’s driving 
his horses and car "fiercely. . . . Through . . . deep
lakes . . . that reeked with sulphur" and "That boiled,"
since the yellow water might be full of sulphur which is 
yellow. The water is literally yellow with "summer's 
drought," the time of year in which their childless mar­
riage took place. In fact, the child that does exist is 
Anne's memory of Harry as a boy who said, "wish my wish, 
be true" in the fifth stanza, which runs to the next with 
Anne saying, "'we are far from home-- / A boy and girl 
a-Maying in the blue / "Of March or April.'"
Anne's dream is a journey with Harry, who has just
attempted suicide, Into a region of the dead. The con­
cluding lines of stanza twenty-seven depict this, and 
the very last ones are those (though slightly altered) 
which ended the earlier version of the poem as it appeared 
in The Kenyon Review in 1951:
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I gasped. My mouth 
Was open, and I seemed to mime your hound*s 
Terrified panting; and our trinming ship 
Was shipping water . . .  I was staring at 
Our drifting oars. The moon was floating--flat 
As the old world of maps. I though, 'I'll stay. 
Harry,' 1 whispered, 'hurry, I will pray 
So truly; hurry! God, you must, you must 
Hurry, for Death, carousing like a king 
On nothing but his lands, will take your ring 
To bind me, and possess me to the dust.'
Despite this dream, Harry continues to live, "To 
baby-smile into the brutal gray / Daylight" as she puts 
it in stanza twenty-eight. He no longer recognizes the 
birds he "once memorized / By numbers." Their "kinds" 
are "numbers, numbers!" and (as mentioned earlier) he 
asks too cleverly, "'What's the twenty-eight, / The 
twenty-eight, the twenty-eight'" in a stanza of the same 
number. Lowell certainly did this consciously, but it 
is neither ironical nor humorous. It appears somewhat 
antic on his part; but its net effect is to appear 
contrived.
Harry continues to decline. In stanza twenty-nine, 
Anne says, "To the ungarnished ruin of your mind / Came 
the persona of the murderous Saul." Harry cries '"Where 
is my harper?*" then sucks his "thumb for joy" or "When 
the phantasmagoria" leaves, weeps "For their return."
Of this Anne feels it is as if she had "never lived . . . 
never, never anything," and she feels "the stump and 
green shoots at . . . ther] throat." That is, she has 
failed to restore life to Kavanaugh. If they are part
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of a royal line, as "Saul" and "children of a king" (in 
the first stanza) suggest, they are the last members of 
that line. Their marriage has not continued life but 
destroyed it. "Cut down we flourish," which was on the 
ring that Anne felt when Harry hit her, can only be under­
stood in a doubly ironical sense. By it Red Kavanaugh 
meant cutting down trees and Indians would bring prosper­
ity. By it, now, Anne means that she is to enter Hades, 
that her part in the Kavanaugh history is only the cut­
ting down, not the flourishing.
This segment is followed in the next stanza by an­
other revery of their marriage in which she says, "'My 
life / Is like a horn of plenty gone to grass. . . .
Who is this, and who is this. . . .  his kiss, / The 
consummation of the silvered glass.'" Her idealization 
of Harry is part of her solipsism; because she is the 
boundary of all that exists, she may have as many Harrys 
as she can create from one moment to the next. Opposed 
to this is the interjection of what is apparently Harry's 
fragmentary conversation with his "male-attendant," 
saying that Anne had taken him "for the other guy," which 
serves to return the action to the literal situation, 
Harry's deterioration.
The following stanza describes a child dressed as 
an Indian who tells Anne that Harry is dead. In the 
earlier version there actually is an Indian, which
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suggests that the Abnakis have outlasted Red Kavanaugh*s 
line. The month Is July, the same time of year in which 
Anne and Harry were married. It is also MThe month of 
freedom.*' His body sitting up in bed, Harry seems to 
say, '"You must bury me / As if you gloried in my liber­
ty. * " The stanza concludes with, "How will she disown / 
The leisured condescension of his frown / That still re­
fuses." The implied answer is that she will never "dis­
own" it .
Stanza thirty-two has Anne again playing solitaire 
and saying, ’"But it's so dull . . . This autumn.’" She
also says, "I am just a girl, / Just one man's not the 
fleet’s." However, her "wits" are somewhat "overseas." 
She builds "a card-house" which is meant to be Kavanaugh. 
The cards are described as Kavanaughs or "effigies / Of 
kings and queens" which she shuffles "so badly that she 
always wins," as "She dreams her luck has brought her 
husband home." Addressing him she says that "The ap­
plause" is for him, "Gods of ancient Rome / Rise from 
the mill-pond on their marble knees."
In the next stanza she continues meditating upon 
these gods, "their eyes, / Stars of a recognition" that 
nothing "will hinder." The nature of this recognition 
is suggested by the following lines:
now . . . they have found
Me their Persephone, gone under ground
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Into myself to supplicate the throne 
And horn of Hades to restore that stone,
Imperial garland, once the living flower,
Now stone--Harvest, my mother's, only dower 
To the dark monarch, and the futile dead 
In Hades, where I lost my maidenhead.
Hell, or Hades, is "myself" for Anne Kavanaugh. Her con­
dition is similar to Milton's Satan who says, "myself am 
Hell." A journey "underground” to the dead is simply a 
journey into her finite self, which like Satan's mind 
"is its own place," capable of success only by "shuffling 
. . . badly."
The concluding stanzas serve as a "coda," as Staples 
20points out. Anne reviews the Kavanaugh history of
fortune and guilt while rowing down the mill stream.
Lowell likens the scene she recollects to something from
Fragonard, supposedly sensual, fluid, and spontaneous.
Perhaps Lowell had Fragonard's Bathers in mind; a few
lines later he mentions Harry's mother bathing, her stock
ings and skirts a polite version of the Fragonard scene.
Also, there may be an intended parallel existing between
the Kavanaugh's having outlived their era and Fragonard
having outlived his, being reduced to poverty during the
21Napoleonic reign.
Anne rows and gathers lilies, much as Persephone 
gathered lilies. In the thirty-seventh stanza she says 
to Harry, '"I think we row together, for the stern /
Jumps from my weaker stroke.*" That is, Anne, like
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Persephone, Is with her Hades and on the water that opens 
to the underworld. In support of this I quote the view 
of Kavanaugh she describes while looking back from her 
boat:
and down the cove 
Our house Is floating, and the windows burn 
As If Its underpinnings fed the stove.
Then there is a definite shift from the temporal world 
in which Anne is rowing to an a-temporal one in which 
Harry’s mother is still present, typing to redeem the 
mills:
Her window's open; look, she waits for us, 
And types, until the clattering tin bell 
Upon her room-large table tolls for us. 
Listen, your mother’s asking, is it well? 
Yes, very well. He died outside the church 
Like Harry Tudor. Now we near the sluice 
And burial ground above the burlap mill;
I see you swing a string of yellow perch 
About your head to fan off gnats that mill 
And wail, as your disheartened shadow tries 
The buried bedstead, where your body lies-- 
Time out of mind--a failing stand of spruce.
Stephen Yenser argues that Anne commits suicide at 
the conclusion of the poem. While, as "Time out of mind” 
suggests, her consciousness certainly does move into a 
realm of the dead (indeed it has been, through revery, 
close to that realm during most of the poem), there is 
no evidence of suicide or that Anne actually dies in 
either version of the poem. Yenser is pressing a tenor 
unjustifiably beyond its vehicle. The last three lines
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of the poem state that as "the virgin . . . gave herself
because her blood was warm" so, "for no other reason,"
Anne Kavanaugh "gave / Whatever brought . . . t^er] glad­
ness to the grave." This does not mean she committed 
suicide so much as that she married death. Giving what 
gave her "gladness" is not synonymous with giving her 
life, or taking it. In fact "Whatever brought . . . [her]
gladness" can be only part of her life as obviously her 
life experienced both gladness and unhappiness. Persephone 
did not commit suicide, and Anne is being likened to 
Persephone. Both do, however, have to give themselves 
over to death for half of a cycle. But that is not suicide.
To summarize, the poem is an example of the method 
of mythical allusion. Its weaknesses are occasional ob­
scurity caused by different myths getting in the way of 
each other, and for Lowell history and ethical systems 
function as myths. In addition, the poem suffers from 
excessive density, which puts too much meaning into too 
little action. Nevertheless, the Persephone motif is con­
sistently maintained throughout the poem as a mediation 
between living and dying and as a thematic buoy about 
which the poem's action circles.
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III
The consistency in Lowell's use of the Persephone 
myth is a good angle from which to regard the two sig­
nificant versions of the poem. The earliest version ap­
peared, as I have mentioned, in The Kenyon Review.
Before publication as the title poem in Lowell's third 
volume, "The Mills" underwent somewhat limited but sig­
nificant revision. The third version, which is merely 
the last five stanzas of the second version, appears in 
Lowell's Selected Poems but is of no importance to this 
discussion.
What is of importance, however, is the question of 
consistency in the Persephone myth as motif, as it ap­
pears in the permanent version of the poem. Lowell 
gives a particular emphasis to the myth and maintains 
it consistently throughout the poem. But the consisten­
cy of that emphasis is satisfactory only if we regard 
the myth-motif internally, which the preceding exegesis 
sought to do.
Regarded externally, the poem actually employs only 
half of the Persephone cycle. That is, "The Mills of 
the Kavanaughs" is a long, detailed, meditative walk 
from late summer through autumn that ends with the ap­
proach of complete dormancy. Persephone's return to 
the upper world does not occur. From the poem's beginning
54
Anne and Harry are depicted as failing to bring new life 
to Kavanaugh and the Kavanaugh line. If Harry i£ Hades, 
how could they? But the larger aspect of this is simply 
that Lowell slights half of the significance of Persephone 
(renewal) in order to dramatically stress the other half 
(death), though neither half can have complete meaning 
without its counterpart. Anne is not Persephone. She 
is merely associated with one half of Persephone's nature.
Restated, the renewing character of Persephone is 
suppressed in order to give emphasis to her relation to 
death, and in the process of doing this Lowell does a- 
chieve dramatic meaning within the poem. Persephone, as 
the wife of Hades, does serve as the buoy or point of 
reference amid a drama of irony and paradox.
External to this, however, is the rest of Persephone's 
significance existing in the completed myth and operating 
in the average reader's mind. Though, as revised, "The 
Mills" seems to satisfy requirements for dramatic meaning, 
its earlier version demonstrates that Lowell was originally 
conscious of external pressures.
I have in mind his use of Catholic references. In 
particular. Saint Patrick and the Virgin Mary appear in 
the earlier "Mills," but they are removed from the second 
version. In the first version of the poem the Catholic 
allusions do not work as they were intended but create 
confusion in the manner I have already described, Lowell's
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crying to do Coo much In coo little space. That Is, on 
one level, his Intention to have such allusions was sound 
as they rounded out the poem's meaning, In particular Its 
use of Persephone. On another level, however, Lowell 
perceived the confusion that was actually created, and 
his removal of unnecessary allusions had an equally sound 
intention.
The essential point is that the presence of a tradi­
tional, religious understanding of events rounds out that 
part of Persephone that is otherwise missing. Renewal 
via Christ (or, Persephone) is a necessary ingredient 
for the significance of and meaning in Anne's lack of re­
newal. The absence of this completing element in the 
poem, I will argue later, is vitally related to a break 
in Lowell's cosmos, in particular his departure from 
the Church.
IV
In conclusion, I would like to comment briefly upon 
the poem's two versions. Aside from deletions I have 
already mentioned, the other change of real significance 
is the addition of the second version's concluding stanza. 
It contains some of the best writing in the poem. It 
also demonstrates Lowell's movement away from a Christian 
framework within which to depict, if not explain, events.
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The earlier version is useful not only because its pres­
ence alongside the second version helps to demonstrate 
Lowell's departure from Catholicism but because in some 
ways it reveals Lowell's original intentions and, by 
doing so, clarifies the permanent version in places where 
it is murky.
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" appeared as the lead 
piece in Winter Issue, 1951, of The Kenyon Review, As in 
the final version, there is a prose introduction pre­
ceding the first stanza. Unlike the final version, how­
ever, the quotations from Matthew Arnold and W. C. 
Williams are not present. Also, between the first and 
second prose introductions there are four significant 
differences, which should be pointed out. In the earl­
ier introduction we are given three details not present 
later: At the end of the garden in which Anne is sitting 
"there is a stone bedstead"; Anne's husband "has killed 
himself"; and he was "the last" of the Kavanaugh "line." 
The later version includes an explanatory sentence as 
to who the Abnakis Indians were, which is missing in 
The Kenyon Review version.
Anne's and Harry's situation is more fixed in the 
earlier introduction and the earlier poem. One reason 
for this is that the dramatic tension in the poem stems 
largely from the fact that Harry, a Catholic, consnitted 
suicide. In the later version, the Catholic context
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has been greatly restricted, and, as a result, Harry Is 
less dramatically guilty. Lowell compensates for this, 
however, by giving emphasis to the guilt Inherited from 
Red Kavanaugh*s treatment of the Abnakis Indians. This 
shift represents one instance in what can be generalized 
as Lowell's departure from the Church and entrance Into 
secular humanism.
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2A Critical Reception
Robert Lowell is a significant subject for any dis­
cussion of poetry written over the past thirty-five years 
simply because his career has become a benchmark for the 
poetry of his generation. No other poet of his era has 
received the critical attention that has come to Lowell, 
and, despite the many changes that occur in his work, he 
seems always to have had an enthusiastic audience in at­
tendance. That is, he has been favorably received on a 
very broad basis, which makes his work important to any 
study of poetry since World War II.
In many ways Lowell is a public poet, and the broad 
acclaim that he has received is in part due to his use 
of public themes. But before it is public, his work is 
private. It is vitally bound up with a sense of disloca­
tion, and on this primary level his writing serves as a 
modality for locating the self, for bracketing experience. 
Much as the cartographer's map, his poetry is intended 
to fix the self to an identifiable locus; one that is 
seemingly spatial because of Imagery but that In fact is 
predominately temporal. Early and late in his career,
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Lowell has led the way at points of change in poetry 
(particularly into confessional modes), and a considera­
tion of what he departed from as well as what he arrived 
at will help Identify fundamental concerns for poetry at 
the present. If poetry has taken some peculiar turns 
since World War II, Lowell's career will not only place 
these turns but will shed light on how they came about 
as he was often leading the way.
Critics give many reasons for the dramatic change 
which occurred between The Mills of the Kavanaughs (1951) 
anc* Life Studies (1959). One reason is Lowell's departure 
from the Catholic Church. Patrick Cosgrave says of the 
title poem in The Mills of the Kavanaughs that it "repre­
sents an important stage of Lowell's farewell to Catholi­
cism, and of his search for an alternative system or 
systems."*- Irvin Ehrenpries discusses this move as it 
surfaces in "Beyond the Alps," the opening poem in Life 
Studies. and says that basically the poem depicts "a
train journey from the city of priests to the city of
2
artists, Rome to Paris." Lowell's divorce from Jean 
Stafford may also be related to his break with Rome sim­
ply because within the Church it was unacceptable. And 
there are other events in Lowell's life which critics 
suggest may have contributed to his poetic shift: Mental
A  §
disturbances, an interest in psychology, the cold war, 
McCarthy, and (of all things) the election of a Republican
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to the White House^ are some of the reasons given. With 
the exception of the last of these, all may have played 
a role to some extent in Lowell's shift. In any event, 
the fact that so many reasons have been offered demon­
strates the seriousness with which the shift has been 
taken.
But for change to be significant it must be plotted 
with reference to an original state. For Lowell, that 
state reached its height in The Mills of the Kavanaughs 
and particularly in the title poem. Hugh B. Staples, in 
the course of summarizing the first twenty years of 
Lowell's career, has identified The Mills of the Kavanaughs 
as the last instance of Lowell's early phase:
But from a later perspective, it is easier to 
view The Mills of the Kavanaughs as a crisis 
in Lowell's career. It represents the continua­
tion and intensification of the experiments in 
an Impersonal approach towards experience al­
ready begun in Lord Weary's Castle--experiments 
in an objective narrative mode that remain ul­
timately lyrical and subjective. It marks, 
furthermore, the end of a style, first begun 
in Land of Unlikeness. perfected in Lord Weary's 
Castle, and ended i n t h e  pyrotechnics of The 
Mills of the Kavanaughs.
Staples goes on to say that due to "the obscurity of its 
narrative, the intricacy of its symbolic structure and 
the complexity of its theme: "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" 
has never received "the attention it deserves."** And 
though he made this remark in 1961, it Is still applicable 
today. Despite a burst of interest in Lowell around 1970,
most critics have either skipped over "The Mills" al­
together or have stressed the second half of Lowell's 
career, that dating from 1959 forward.
But Lowell has said that "All your poems are in a 
sense one poem."^ This being the case, then what he 
tried to do with his early, formal approach was continued 
by his second phase, but with radically different machin­
ery. I think that Lowell's most basic concern is with 
locating the self in a dislocating world. How he does 
this is accessible to us through his poetry; and as we 
have shared Lowell's dislocating world, his attempts to 
gauge it are of significance to us all, even when they 
partially fail. If, as I said earlier, Lowell was lead­
ing the way when poetic turns were taken,then how he 
made those turns is of importance. If some of them led 
to dead-end streets, a study of them is still important 
if for no other reason than their future avoidance.
Reviewing The Mills of the Kavanaughs for Furioso 
in 1951, Dudley Fitts says of the title poem that "It 
is a serious and beautiful poem; yet . . . gravely 
flawed." He finds its form "over-demanding," with many 
of its passages false dramatically, its facts "hurled" 
at the reader when many details are unnecessary. For 
Fitts, the most remarkable aspect is that "out of a 
great deal of imperfectly assimilated history and one 
ancient bedroom joke" Lowell was able to make of the
a
poem "so moving a story."
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William Arrowsmith's review is the most technical 
treatment of Lowell's method to appear when the book 
came out. Writing for The Hudson Review, Arrowsmith 
argues that Lowell takes methods used to sustain long 
poems and compresses them to short poems with the ex­
plosive results of Lord Weary1s Castle. However, for 
Arrowsmith there is a "monotony of violence" in "The 
Mills" which results from the methods he outlines below:
What Lowell had done [prior to "The Mills"] 
was to take almost every device by which, 
normally, long poetry is protected from 
monotony--the enjambement, the substitutions, 
the breath-sweep, clause-piling and rhyme 
roughening--and compress them within a shorter 
frame.*
Within "shorter" poems his method "worked; magnificently 
so." But within a larger frame Lowell was seeking to 
"expand" his "compressed lyric--at the same compression." 
Arrowsmith argues that this method has "boomeranged" 
on Lowell, that the result is "a monotonous poem" con­
taining "magnificent poetry." Fundamentally, he sees 
it as falling in terms of its narrative. In particular, 
the absence of "strophlc and antlstrophic balance" causes 
the lines to slam together. As he says, "economy and a 
sense of balance in big poetry might have suggested a 
tonal contrast between end-stopped couplets and enjambed 
verses."
Anne's revery, which covers her past and is addressed
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to Harry, serves as the poem's "tenor/' and Arrowsmith 
adds that this is meant to be "supported" by the Persephone 
myth. Yet he finds that Lowell's overly suggestive use 
of myth blurs the poem's meaning rather than clarifying 
it. Speaking of Persephone and Hades, he says that "The 
danger of eschatologies is their very richness." Ignor­
ing this problem, "Lowell . . . packs his symbols so that
his simplicities assume a complexity which wrecks them." 
Arrowsmith rightly concludes that in narrative and dramatic 
poetry "symbols have to be given a different kind of life 
than in lyric poetry" because they must sustain "motives, 
completions and pace." Lowell's expansion of the "com­
pressed lyric--at the same compression" fails at this.
I have quoted Arrowsmith at length because I think 
that he, along with Jarrell, has been the most incisive 
reviewer to tackle "The Mills." For him, "in both tech­
nique and content long Lowell looks just like short Lowell. 
And Lowell's Inability to modulate at this point suggests 
why later when he did change he did so in such an extreme 
manner; it was his inability to evolve a new style out 
of his earlier one that caused him to drop it altogether 
in favor of something radically different.
It is interesting to note that Randall Jarrell has 
employed the same term to typify "The Mills" that William 
Arrowsmith uses: What is "monotony of violence" for 
Arrowsmith is "monotonous violence" for Jarrell. Also,
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he is quick to mention the poem's failure as Ma narra-
12tlve poem," much as Arrowsmith points out Lowell's 
failure to modify his symbols to narrative needs. Thus 
for both reviewers there is a significant shortcoming 
as far as the believabllity of the poem is concerned, 
and 1 think this failure is grounded in a sense of 
realism as causality. We are convinced of an event in­
sofar as we can determine a process which has brought 
about that event. Lowell's inability to modify lyrical 
symbols to narrative needs is in effect a failure to 
provide a context (or background) that has enough rea­
sons in it to convince us of the reality of the action 
that takes place. To return to Dudley Fitts for a mo­
ment, the fact that he terms the central event in the 
poem a "bedroom joke" demonstrates that he is not serious­
ly convinced of the reality of the event. Similarly, 
Jarrell says of Harry and Anne that he does not think 
"many readers will think them real." He continues:
the husband of the heroine never seems so, and 
the heroine is first of all a sort of symbiotic 
state of the poet. (You feel, "Yes, Robert 
Lowell would act like this if he were a "girl"; 
but whoever saw a girl like Robert L o w e l l ? ) 1 3
For Jarrell, Lowell's is primarily a failure with 
narrative. He does not create "the live half-accidental 
half-providential rightness that some of his best poetry 
seems to h a v e . " ^  Again, a shortcoming in terms of
67
realism, though colored by Jarrell's particular way of 
seeing things. Near the end of his review, Jarrell says 
that Lowell has forced the poem, that "He is a poet of 
both Will and Imagination, but his Will is always seizing 
his Imagination by the shoulders and saying . . . 'get
to work!'11 ^  Thus rather than letting the poem's meaning 
surface through setting and action, which would provide 
sufficient causes for belief, Lowell has too often super­
imposed significance.
Arrowsmith and Jarrell argue that the poem's main 
problem is bound up In Lowell's confused method. As far 
as they go they are correct. However, I hope it will be­
come clear later that the mixed modes employed by Lowell 
are as much a confusion of perception as they are a fail­
ure in craftsmanship. The lyrical mode of perception is 
one that operates outside causality, while the narrative 
mode must use causality to make events believable, seem­
ingly real and therefore significant. Part of Lowell's 
confusion in "The Mills," therefore, is in terms of 
method, but the other part is in terms of perception.
Too often Lowell the lyric poet, standing outside strict 
reason, sought to be Lowell the public poet whose thought 
should be rational, and in particular causal.
Two other responses to The Mills of the Kavanaughs 
that appeared upon publication are brief enough to be 
quickly summarized. William Carlos Williams, writing
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for The New York Times Book Review, describes MThe Mills" 
in terms of "An unwonted sense of tragedy coupled with 
a formal fixation of the line." Otherwise, he is seem* 
ingly positive about the book yet so allusive the reader 
is left feeling u n e a s y . D a v i d  Daiches, writing for 
The Yale Review, is equally brief in his treatment but 
pointed enough to register a complaint similar to 
Arrowsmith's and Jarrell’s. He finds "an odd mixture of 
casualness and hysteria" throughout the book, saying 
"the poems" are "studies in the instability of memory 
and desire." In addition, Daiches finds that rather 
than having this confusion restricted to his poetry’s 
theme, Lowell has been unable to separate subject from 
craft. Lacking "full control" he lets "his talents run 
w i ld."^ As I suggested above, Lowell’s confused method, 
identified by Arrowsmith, Jarrell and Daiches, In turn 
becomes his confused perception.
To return to Hugh Staples, the critical "consensus"
from 1951 to the present Is basically "a great talent,
18but not a great book of poems," and of course this ap­
plies to the title poem. During his discussion of the 
poem, Staples cites the remark made by Dudley Fitts, 
which I have already quoted, as being "a middle critical 
position." Yet while Staples agrees that the poem is 
at once remarkable and "gravely flawed," he singles out
the character of Anne Kavanaugh as moving and memorable,
19even reminiscent "of Greek tragedy."
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Perhaps at this point It is worth returning to 
Lowell's process of locating a dislocated self through 
poetry. Staples correctly ends his discussion of "The 
Mills" by singling out Anne Kavanaugh; the poem's action 
is primarily filtered through her consciousness as it 
spans her childhood and maturity. The poem's central 
motif is Anne's likeness to Persephone in her role as 
wife to a dying line. That is, the poem's action is a 
bracketing of Anne's life carried out within her con­
sciousness that seeks to locate her in the midst of a 
confused, dying and therefore dislocating world.
But, as Jarrell says, "the heroine is first of all
a sort of symbiotic state of the poet." (As noted in
the first chapter of this study, there are striking
similarities between events in "The Mills" and events
in Lowell's life.) In his discussion of the poem,
Staples concludes that "The final meaning of the poem"
is not "in the series of dualisms with which Anne . . .
contends, and of which she is a part"; the meaning re-
20sides "in her ultimate acceptance of them." Thus 
insofar as it at least tangentlally locates a dislocated 
Robert Lowell, the poem seeks to integrate contemporary 
and historical conditions with personal experience in an 
intellectual climate of dualism. Much of Lowell's locat­
ing process depends upon the acceptance of certain dual­
isms which seem fundamental to his understanding. Indeed 
to his temperament.
Lowell's basic dualism Is "life and death," and by
1951 this Is confronted In a world without religion where
death Is magnified. Rather than Promethean, his task
Is very modern: There are no longer any Gods to steal
from. As Is evident from a comparison between the early
version of "The Mills," published in The Kenyon Review,
and the later version which appeared as a title poem,
Lowell was moving away from Catholicism while rewriting 
21the poem. As Staples first noted, the earlier "version 
contains numerous allusions to the Virgin Mary and to 
St. Patrick. . . . These are omitted in the later ver­
sion." Generally, "there is a theme of opposition to
22Catholicism . . . that goes beyond mere indifference."
Anne Kavanaugh comes late in "the fall of a noble house."
In her acceptance of death she says she "gave / Whatever
brought" her "gladness to the grave." To quote Staples
once more, the poem concludes not on a note of Christian
23consolation but on one of "stoic resignation."
In a more recent discussion, Stephen Yenser agrees 
with Arrowsmlth that the mythologies employed in "The 
Mills" "do not c o h e r e . H o w e v e r ,  for Yenser this is 
in part a result of Lowell's tendency to yoke "contraries" 
also he emphasizes the poem's on-goingness, its "multi­
plication of analogy." In a poem such as "At the Altar," 
"The Lord and Lucifer are inexplicably one figure, who 
solicitously rocks the baby's carriage and sadistically
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roasts the soul upon a spit." However, In "The Mills" 
opposites do not remain static: On the one hand, Lowell's 
attempt at continuous modification of mythologies re­
sults in their lack of coherence; on the other, "This 
multiplication of analogy" consistently produces the 
poem's "rich texture and complicated point of view," as
"Lowell's chief means of analysis is multiplication of 
27analogy." There is nothing new in this except the at­
tempt to have analogies revealed in sequence so that 
they are in a process of continuous modification. The 
result, as I will demonstrate later, is often eidetic 
variation resulting from a poetry that is in many ways 
phenomenological.
Speaking of this analogical method as it develops, 
Yenser says Lowell begins "to see his poems in the same 
way that he sees his symbols, and he is starting to organ­
ize those poems into a narrative sequence that is itself
2ft
symbolic." Life Studies is the first instance of this 
as described here, but the basic process of continually 
modifying myths and symbols had already been attempted 
in "The Mills," with narrative used to govern the move­
ment. There are roughly two strategies for achieving 
continuous modification of "contraries." One may be 
seen in "The Mills"; the other is a series of lyrics 
which take up a subject from different points of view. 
Yenser actually touches on both in his third chapter, 
titled "The Logic of Contradiction":
In a world that Is fundamentally ambivalent, 
to have but one point of view Is perhaps to 
falsify; It Is perhaps to become, In Stevens's 
words, a "lunatic of one Idea." People, In­
stitutions, and even the gods, at least in 
the perspective framed by mortals, are complex 
and self-contradictory, Lowell implies, and 
therefore only a certain ambivalence can keep 
one from oversimplifying.*9
Just as Staples finds "The Mills of the Kavanaughs"
ends on no more than a note of "stoic resignation," the
avoidance of "oversimplifying," for which Yenser opts,
is at best a minimal goal. For the later Lowell, however
truth is no longer apodictic because he finds that the
30"world . . .  is fundamentally ambivalent." Knowing 
this helps to explain his shift from intricate use of 
symbol and myth within long, self-qualifying poems, such 
as those in Lord Weary1s Castle, to use of a series of 
seemingly casual lyrics which are nevertheless carefully 
arranged, as in Life Studies. In a sense, "The Mills" 
is the fulcrum underneath this shift, for after this 
transitional poem Lowell exchanges one modality for an­
other, one mode of thought for another, as he seems in­
creasingly convinced of the world's "ambivalence."
It is in this context that I earlier said that 
Lowell's mixed modes are as much a confusion of percep­
tion as they are the failure of craftsmanship that 
Arrowsmlth argues. I think it is fair to say that in a 
world that has become relative and therefore "ambivalent, 
in a world no longer grounded in a metaphysical system
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such as that provided by Congregationalism or Catholicism, 
the "rich texture and complicated point of view" that 
Yenser speaks of are all that are left. And in a world 
such as this, phenomenology offers a particularly inter­
esting approach to a poetry now concerned with generating 
some formal structure for phenomena. For where there are 
merely phenomena, the self is first of all dislocated 
and, secondly, responsible for whatever locating takes 
place.
Discussing the similarities between Lowell’s third
book and the two preceding ones, Yenser notes an important
difference, "Lowell's Increased tendency to contradict
himself, to get the process of thought rather than its
31product into the poetry." In an "ambivalent" world 
"process" appears to have more potential as a way of 
understanding because it contains ambivalence to the ex­
tent that it continues moving from one point to another, 
whether the points contradict or agree. As Staples noted, 
"stoic resignation" is possible; however, statement is 
not. Instead of any notion of truth, all attention is 
given to the mind's dialectical working from one moment 
to another in an attempt to establish pattern. As Yenser 
says a little later, "it Is not so much that the poems 
[in The Mills of the Kavanaughs1 come to ambiguous con­
clusions as it is that they consist of the Interaction, 
the transactions of conflicting thoughts." Lowell no
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longer pursues "the unity of things" but Instead focuses
32on "the struggle" that is necessary to realize "unity."
It is easier to see the process carried out in Anne 
(Cavanaugh*s mind as being a transition within Lowell’s 
process as a poet if we remember not only his retreat 
from Catholicism but also his shift from unifying contrar­
ies to analyzing distinctions. Yenser makes this point 
by linking how Lowell sees to what he sees:
In terms of religious belief, the difference 
is that between one which accepts paradox in 
the name of a faith and one which calls a faith 
into question because it is paradoxical; in 
terms of poetic method, the difference is that 
between one which synthesizes or unites con­
traries and one which analyzes or insists upon 
distinctions.33
The basic paradox in the poem is contained in the Kavanaugh 
motto, "Cut down, we flourish," which in fact is the Winslow
*5 /
motto, Lowell's maternal family. Persephone's alternating 
between being above ground and below ground fits with this, 
and Yenser argues that it is "an intuitive recognition of 
the paradox that ’To die is life,'" but a "secular . . . 
rather than sectarian" one. For him, the paradox is 
"ogygian."35
Ogygius, a Boetlan king, was the son of either Poseidon 
or of the soil, and the poem works both ways: First, if 
Anne conmlts suicide by drowning and if her death can be 
taken as somehow positive because she "accepts" it (Indeed, 
causes it according to Yenser) then the Poseidon reference
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can be associated in a minimal way with the poem's action. 
Second, certainly Ogygius as son of the soil works because 
the Kavanaugh wealth was based upon a timber empire. But 
insofar as the poem is^  "secular," its insistence upon dis­
tinctions calls not "faith" but meaning "into question." 
The poem resists interpretation because its "contraries," 
"dualisms," and loose analogies cannot be correlated in 
a larger intellectual context.
Yenser's approach to the poem leads him into some 
peculiar observations that derive from the poem's incon­
sistent use of myth. For example, he believes the poem's 
closing lines mean that Anne was not abducted but that 
she gave herself to death (committed suicide), which is 
clearly outside the Persephone myth. Rather than finding 
this an inconsistency between myth and action in the poem,
he says it is a "view of the Persephone myth" that is
37"unprecedented." In the name of analyzing distinctions, 
Yenser overlooks the poem's failure in its most basic 
purpose, its final meaning. Or, put another way, if it 
is a "view of the . . . myth," why is it one that cannot
be integrated? Yenser recognizes that "analogies pro­
liferate to reinforce, obscure, and nullify one another
38in stanza after stanza," but in his enthusiasm for 
"contraries" he occasionally makes distinctions where 
there is no framework within which things can afterwards 
signify.
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Patrick Cosgrave's discussion of "The Mills" and of
Lowell's writing in general serves as a counterbalance
to Yenser*s views. For Cosgrave, there is "a complex
system of reference" in Lowell as evidenced by his use
of analogy, but there is an "absence of a complex system
of value" within which meaning can operate. Thus, "the
consequences of Lowell's attempt to fill the vacuum of
of meaning left by his failure to penetrate the meaning
of his own analogies" is related to his failure to deal
39properly with historical experience. Elsewhere, 
Cosgrave says Lowell's real failure is "in his judgement 
of New England history." He uses "the same technique of 
judgement that he condemns in his ancestors. The 
following is a more particular statement:
First, the vacuum is filled by the willful vio­
lence of Lowell's judgement on his own time. 
Ultimately--and despite reservations of fond­
ness and admiration for different men and 
periods--all human experience in history is 
condemned. Secondly, condemnation as such is 
not the poet's ambition: that ambition is to 
find value, to discover the unblemished Adam.
But, thirdly, the method adopted--and the at­
tempt to provide an over-mastering analogy 
for historical episodes and the kaleidoscopic 
jumbling of persons and periods is a method as 
well as an achievement--is ultimately destructive.
Perhaps the best way to contrast Yenser and Cosgrave 
is in this manner; Cosgrave would have meaning and value 
which require static points of reference in a culture, 
thus poetry should discover the order beneath apparent
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disorder; on the other hand, Yenser is willing to accept 
a poetry which "analyzes or insists upon distinctions," 
and he does not press for their final resolution but, 
rather, leaves meaning suspended by process.
In their differences, Yenser1s pluralism makes him 
a poetic minimalist. Cosgrave, however, distinguishes 
"method" and "achievement," and his doing so allows him 
to regard Lowell's poetic mode of thought without being 
inundated by the poetry’s moment-to-moment dialectic. 
That is, Cosgrave has an objective distance from Lowell 
which Yenser lacks, and this enables him to be more op­
timistic about poetry in general, though more reserved 
about Lowell in particular.
As a method, Lowell's "over-mastering analogy for 
historical episodes and . . . kaleidoscopic jumbling of 
persons and periods" cannot be separated from the truth 
claims which his poetry ultimately makes. As Yenser 
correctly suggests, how Lowell sees is vitally bound up 
with what he sees. And one way to test the accuracy of 
what he sees is to look at his methods, his modes of 
thought. As Cosgrave says, early Lowell "uses form 
deliberately . . . for refining and moulding his experi­
ence," though "Eight years later" form is "abandoned for
42the informality of Life Studies." However, beneath 
the ordering function of form for experience and art 
there is the issue of authority. Lowell often makes
public statements based upon his judgment, and this re­
quires an appeal to authority. Part of his early way of 
gaining authority was by form, thus he set form over 
against the "kaleidoscopic jumbling" mentioned above.
Yet the real source of authority for Lowell could 
not reside in form alone, though form could reinforce 
its presence. The source was external to his art, 
grounded in religion. Speaking of Lowell's move away 
from form, Cosgrave is quick to point out the concurrent 
move away from religion, and his observations on the 
inadequacy of that religion in the first place are worth 
quoting:
It was also about this point [his writing 
"Thanksgiving's Over," the last poem in The 
Mills of the KavanaughsI that Lowell abandoned 
religion as the source of an independent sys­
tem of moral reference and evaluation to put 
against quotidian experience in his verse.
The trouble with his religious structure was, 
of course, precisely its failure to provide 
him with--or his failure to find in it--ar 
wide and flexible system of values. His theol­
ogy (his New England theology) was always very 
Puritanical; it was also inhuman. The message 
was that it was wrong to go on as we were going, 
but no suggestion was offered that to do dif­
ferently would make us happier, even in afterlife.
Cosgrave continues by pointing out that there is "no range 
of sin and error in Lowell's catechism." Any failure de­
serves "the ultimate condemnation." Judging "nature from 
conduct" and finding "all conduct sinful," he concludes 
that "all nature" is "repellent," and arrives at what Yvor
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Winters would call ,fMaule,s C u r s e . O n c e  again, how 
Lowell perceives, what mode he uses, vitally affects what 
he perceives.
In line with this, Cosgrave says that much of Life 
Studies is simply thin and does not "merit analysis." 
Abandoning his earlier formal mode grounded in an imper­
fectly understood religion, Lowell turned to "limited 
poems" based upon "the doctrine of the significance of 
the object . . . derived from" a pluralistic emphasis
on "personality" and the "dissolution of sensibility," 
which ultimately dislodges the ability to discriminate.^ 
Lacking their opposite, Lowell's contraries become self- 
defeating in their "hundred visions and revisions." 
Lowell's analogies often fail to be analogous in any 
serious way because the larger religious context that 
gave them meaning before has been abandoned with no re­
placement near its equal. In Cosgrave's view, good and 
evil are set adrift in a failed "system of values. 
Lowell's excessively harsh treatment of his father for 
what were finally minor failures is one dramatic example 
of his own failure to employ a realistic set of values.
In many ways Cosgrave's reservations about "The 
Mills" are consistent with those already registered by 
Arrowsmith, Jarrell and others. While noting the par­
ticular use of time in the poem, that it "combines de­
scription of the present and reverie about the past,"^
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he concludes that "the borders between the two are mixed 
and overlapping." That is, as a linguistic mode that 
deals with experience, and therefore with time, the poem 
breaks down. And this results from Lowell's misuse of 
methods that were successful in shorter poems; as 
Arrowsmith has said, Lowell sought to "expand" his "com­
pressed lyric--at the same compression." The following 
excerpt from Cosgrave*s discussion clarifies the methods 
Lowell used and (excepting problems with casuality) makes 
clear why his narrative structure had to fail:
It ["The Mills"] exhibits all the ambiguities 
of meaning and nuances of symbolism that we 
have seen in ’The Quaker Graveyard' [a shorter 
poem] but to a much greater extent; the re­
sources of Ovid's Metamorphoses are called 
upon by Lowell; and the central ambivalence 
lies in the character of Anne herself, contra­
dictory in all things, even in alternate at­
tachments to life and death, as is appropriate 
to her origin in the myth. Multiple allusions 
are created, to other myths as well as to other 
poets until the poem is clogged, not with judge­
ments , but with references. . . .  The real 
difficulty with a poem such as this, which 
carries to an extreme a tendency to reference 
found almost everywhere in Lowell, lies not 
in the appropriateness or inappropriateness 
of particular references or Images but in the 
structure of the work as a whole.
Cosgrave goes on to say that once the basic Persephone 
motif is established "the symbolism and allusions do not 
advance the argument: they merely decorate the phenomenon." 
Lowell's achievement through symbolism and allusion is 
one of "Decoration," not "concentration." This is because
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many of his references are in excess of the poem's ra­
tional structure, Its ability to digest them. Thus they
are "pseudo" references, and "The result is rich, but
49opaque and decadent."
Aside from seconding observations made by Arrowsmith 
and others, Cosgrave adds a dimension that has been pre­
viously overlooked, and (as I have already mentioned) 
that is Lowell's lack "of a complex system of value" 
within which meaning can operate. Lowell has been cele­
brated as a public poet, but his lack of a value system 
goes to the heart of his failure as a public poet. From 
refusing the draft in protest over Allied bombing of 
civilian targets in World War II to marching in Washing­
ton during the Vietnam war, Lowell has addressed himself 
to contemporary, public issues. However, the theology 
within which Lowell originally grounded his values was 
"very Puritanical . . . inhuman." According to Cosgrave,
Lowell's judgment was negative with no alternative, no
50possibility for positive action. Thus, he has per­
formed only half of the task required of a public poet.
A related example of Lowell's failure as a public 
poet, due to a confused "system of values," is his in­
ability to see evil operating in Benito Cereno as 
Melville certainly saw it; Lowell's reworking of the 
story concentrates on Yankee Imperialism and completely 
overlooks the real issue, evil existing in the heart of
both slave and master, finally the evil inherent in power 
As Phillip Cooper has said of the play, "The world of 
current events is translucently the subject of [Lowell's] 
Benito Cereno, for all its setting in 1803."^ His 
treatment of evil is restricted to the public traumas 
of the 1960's, even when the text from which he is oper­
ating contains something much more subtle.
To summarize for a moment, in terms of external 
failures in "The Mills" Cosgrave would say that Yenser*s 
"contraries" lack meaning without a larger, static con­
text within which such oppositions can have reference. 
While Yenser is willing to leave meaning suspended by 
process in a series of infinite "distinctions," Cosgrave 
is not. For him poetry should finally synthesize order 
by gauging the present against a permanent set of values. 
When Lowell does make a value judgment he does so in a 
confused manner. As often with his father, any failure 
receives "the ultimate condemnation." And with Anne 
Kavanaugh, the rightness or wrongness of her life is as 
ambiguous as most of Lowell's allusions.
Though he disagrees with Yenser, Cosgrave is basical 
ly in agreement with Arrowsmith, Jarrell, Fitts, and 
Staples as to the internal failures of "The Mills." Ex­
cessive use of allusions and symbols which are superim­
posed on the narrative, rather than evoked by it or 
somehow allowed to surface through it, causes the poem's 
internal confusion.
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After The Mills of the Kavanaughs, "Life Studies
52was a major departure11 for Lowell. However, the ex­
ternal dislocation that Cosgrave identifies did not go 
away, though a modified poetic mode sought to counteract 
this internally. Furthermore, in addition to a confused 
mode of understanding and a confused mode of writing,
Cosgrave suggests that "Lowell's own uncurbable personal-
53ity" was a problem. But it was his mode of writing 
that was the immediate cause for an altered poetic per­
ception and understanding.
Richard Fein covers familiar ground when he notes 
that in The Mills of the Kavanaughs "Lowell makes his 
first moves from religious faith to doubt. A major 
characteristic noted by Fein is "intensity of memory," 
something which "The Mills of the Kavanaughs shares with 
Life Studies.” Lowell's characters possess "The power
of recalled experience, or of dreamed experience," and
55they not only "remember well," but "too well." Memory 
constitutes a continuum which is necessary for their 
self locating. As Fein says of Anne Kavanaugh, "She 
herself is her only opponent, her only salvation.
Her memory poses and counterposes the meaning of her 
existence, and much of that existence centers around 
Harry and the Kavanaugh line. Thus in understanding 
herself Anne is confronted with re-collecting the events 
of the Kavanaugh history as well as those of her life 
with Harry.
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Fein states that “The family In Lowell's poetry Is
a structured chaos within which a victim-member continues
57his efforts at survival." Lacking a religious ordering 
principle, Lowell Is left with a natural order, the 
family, whose significance Is bound up In Its lineage. 
Memory is the appropriate tool.
Lowell's movement in The Mills of the Kavanaughs 
"from religious faith to doubt" is, in a sense, the point 
at which he became a modern. The poetry that follows 
appears to wrestle out of radical doubt and to do so with 
only partial success. It ceeks to locate a dislocated 
self temporally In ways that are largely phenomenological. 
What takes place In Anne's mind, her memory which poses 
and counterposes, takes place in a series of lyrics in 
Life Studies. Images from childhood operate as past 
phases of an eidetic ego which transcends the groundless 
present with a sort of Janus consciousness that looks to 
the past and to the future in the same act of transcend­
ing. The present is groundless because, without the 
historical fact of Christ, time is mere process, and it 
passes too quickly for experience and cognition to take 
place at once. A phenomenological bracketing provides 
a way to gauge such process, and, in large part, Life 
Studies represents a new effort at bracketing.
Another aspect of Lowell's movement "from religious 
faith to doubt" concerns his role as public poet. In
85
this role, he is fundamentally undermined because, as 
Fein suggests and Cosgrave argues, he never found a con­
sistent system of value against which he could compare 
particular events; there was "no range of sin and error 
in Lowell's catechism," to quote Cosgrave again. After 
he left the Catholic Church, his judgments could be 
equally black and white, but they were minus external 
authority. Ironically, his reputation as the public 
poet of his era rose as he rejected the public's tradi­
tional grounding for value Judgments, religion. This 
fact may in some way mirror Lowell's age, but mere re­
flection does not qualify him to judge in the manner of 
a public poet.
Thus "doubt" alters Lowell's poetry, and it alters 
his relationship to his audience. As previously quoted, 
Fein states that an important characteristic in Lowell 
is his "intensity of memory" which, in response to un­
certainty, constantly poses and counterposes. For 
Lowell, or his personae, it is a tentative means for 
survival. Of this Fein says:
The speaker of "Mother Marie Therese," like 
Anne Kavanaugh, like the old man with the Aeneld, 
like the woman of "Her Dead Brother," and like 
Michael in "Thanksgiving's Over," must locate and 
live with her turmoils and regrets but without too 
much assistance, if any at all, from religious 
views. In The Mills of the Kavanaughs we listen 
to secular sensibilities who can refer to Christian 
motif (and, of course, to Classical ones), but who 
are finally lost in their world with no sure footing
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except that of their ability to reminisce 
painfully and dramatically. Their honest 
confessions or remembrances are all they 
have.'8
Finding himself in doubt (or, as Fein says, "with no 
sure footing") yet aiming first for absolute knowledge 
then later for relative knowledge, Lowell nears the 
position Husserl describes in the opening of his Cartesian 
Meditations.^
Before concluding, I would like to summarize again 
for a moment. Robert Lowell is, first of all, important 
to us simply because of the serious attention he has re­
ceived. He has become a part of the tradition. Second, 
in many ways he is a public poet, but he is a private 
poet first. Therefore, Lowell's religious shift, which 
was private, has had a weakening influence upon what 
Cosgrave calls his "system of value." Being publicly 
used in many of his poems, the confusion or loss of such 
a system in later poems has meant the confusion of judg­
ments necessary for poetic statements. Nevertheless, 
the direction Lowell has taken is of major significance 
because it represents a serious response by an exceptional 
poet to a dilemma that is increasingly before all of us.
If the response fails to reconcile the dllensna, it has 
produced a handful of remarkable poems which carry some 
interesting implications.
The critics covered in this chapter tend to agree,
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with some exceptions, upon certain characteristics In 
Lowell's poetry. In conclusion, I would like simply to 
suggest some of the implications that these characteris­
tics raise because they point to the following two 
chapters.
1 think that it is fair to say that the single 
most important characteristic shared by The Mills of 
the Kavanaughs and by Life Studies is "intensity of 
memory." Lowell's use of revery or simply his reliance 
upon memory has often been noted. If we look to Husserl 
(who is first of all not concerned with a stream of ob­
jects, as in memory, but in concentrating on only one 
object) a psychological dimension appears in Lowell's 
poetic revery. In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl 
describes the retentional and protentional functions of 
a reduced ego (the "horizon structure" of the ego's in­
tent tonality) as being part of the process by which 
that ego generates intentionallty. Before anything else, 
these functions require memory; then the intentionallty 
which they make possible in turn makes experience intel­
ligible. Suppose you leave a warm glass of milk in a 
dark room, and in your absence someone replaces the milk 
with warm bourbon. Upon returning to that dark room, 
you drink the contents of the glass in one gulp, experi­
encing the usual sensations that go with warm bourbon.
For a moment, before you recognize that you have been
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tricked with a glass of bourbon, you have an experience 
that is in no way preconstructed by intentionallty. That 
is, your intentionallty has been frustrated; you have 
experienced raw matter, something which cannot be inte­
grated into previous experience and which therefore can-
60not be understood. For the sake of understanding, 
intentionallty gathers from the past and projects toward 
the future; it governs the possibility of new experience. ^
The point of the above is that in Lowell memory re­
tains past experience, and the past limits what can be 
understood of future experience. If a metaphysically 
understood past, such as that provided by Congregational­
ism or Catholicism, is rejected, then for future under­
standing to be possible, as Husserl describes it, some 
other past must be inserted in its place. A more limited 
retentional experience will generate a more limited pro- 
tentional experience. Or, by limiting Anne Kavanaugh' s 
past, Lowell automatically limits the possibilities for 
her future. In Husserllan terminology, human experience 
(and meaning) deteriorates because intentionallty is 
narrowed, and this curbs possibilities for future 
experience.
Heidegger offers a way out of this predicament, but
62it is a way that requires a "singing" (or, lyric) poetry, 
not the causal reasoning necessary to elements in narra­
tive. (As Arrowsmith has said, in "The Mills of the
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Kavanaughs" Lowell was still writing a compressed lyric, 
though he was also writing narrative.) Heidegger's al­
ternative is related to why Oedipus, in Oedipus the King. 
sings when out of horror and grief he is beyond his 
former discursive language and accustomed reason. He 
has realized Apollo's decree and, with that realization, 
his own limitation. Dramatically, he is at a point 
where his will has been broken. Heidegger would say 
that he is leaving "the will to power" and entering "the 
will as venture.
In his "The Nature of Language," Heidegger discusses 
Stefan George's poem, "The Word." What he finds taking 
place in George's poem, and in the activity of writing 
the poem, is something very similar to what happens with 
Oedipus when he sings. Realizing Apollo's decree (which 
is experienced linguistically) as he sings, Oedipus 
"experiences an authority, a dignity of the word than 
which nothing vaster and loftier can be thought."
Oedipus is brought to this point by his defeat and grief 
over this defeat. Speaking of "sadness," rather than 
grief, Heidegger makes the following remarks:
True sadness is in harmony with what is most 
Joyful--but in this way, that the greatest joy 
withdraws, halts in its withdrawal, and holds 
Itself in reserve. By learning that renuncia­
tion, the poet undergoes his experience with 
the word's lofty sway. . . . The poet could 
never go through the experience he undergoes 
with the word if the experience were not
attuned to sadness, to the mood of release- 
ment Into the nearness of what is withdrawn 
but at the same time held in reserve for an 
originary advent.
Allowing for Heidegger's own "lofty" diction, the 
point seems clear. In refutation (to go back to the 
glass of milk) or "renunciation" at a particular point, 
we arrive at something "originary." For Oedipus this 
is the realization which he sings. For Lowell, it is 
contained in the phrase "0 to break loose," with which 
1 will deal in a moment.
Out of his being broken Oedipus gains a particular 
knowledge. The first instance of this knowledge, however 
surfaces as song. In his grief he is ecstatic, and, 
being so, he stands outside himself, outside his own will 
Within himself, his cognition has been grounded in par­
ticular past experiences which contributed to his inten- 
tionality, and his intentionality precluded perceptions 
that were wide of it. What he has entered now Heidegger 
would call "the balance" and Rilke would call "unshielded 
ness, and this is fundamental to a lyric mode such as 
that of Lowell's "Waking Early Sunday Morning" in which 
he seys, "0 to break loose . . . jumping and falling
back, / nosing up to the impossible / stone and bone- 
crushing waterfall." The following remarks by Heidegger 
explore this more fully:
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As ventured, those who are not protected are 
nevertheless not abandoned. If they were, 
they would be just as little ventured as If 
they were protected. Surrendered only to an­
nihilation, they would no longer hang In the 
balance. . . . What Is so ventured Is, of 
course, unprotected; but because It hangs in 
the balance, It is retained in the venture.
It is upheld.66
Though he shows no sign that he believes he is "retained," 
Lowell nevertheless wishes to venture himself. Paradoxi­
cally, for Heidegger it is Just by risking the self that 
the self is sustained. Lowell's wish to nose "up to the 
impossible . . . waterfall" is just what Heidegger would
have him do, as he says in "What Are Poets For?," quoted 
above.
Heidegger would say further that Apollo's will "be­
falls" Oedipus. Oedipus undergoes "an experience . . .
not of . . . [his] making, much in the way Lowell
wakes involuntarily to the world he describes in "Waking 
Early Sunday Morning." But the experience is a linguistic 
one:
But when does language speak itself as language? 
Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right 
word for something that concerns u s , carries 
us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we 
leave unspoken what we have in mind and, with­
out rightly giving it thought, undergo moments 
in which language itself has distantly and gg 
fleetingly touched us with its essential being.
Heidegger goes on to say that "No thing is where the word 
is lacking, that word which names the given thing." That
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is, language presences things by naming them, not by 
operating as a sign that merely points but by a naming 
that invokes. He uses the expressions "'in the name of 
the King'" and " 'in the name of God'" to represent what 
he means.
During "What Are Poets For?" Heidegger discusses 
what poetry can do in a "destitute time," an "era" de­
fined by the god's failure to arrive, and this is the 
situation out of which Lowell writes, a world without 
religion, a world of doubt perhaps beyond Husserl's 
expectations. For Lowell, death often seems to be so 
magnified that it is not a venturing of the self but the 
self's annihilation. His basic dualism, life and death, 
remains a dualism so long as his poetry fails to "hang 
in the balance." By its nature, narrative does not lend 
itself to what Heidegger means by balance, but at moments 
the lyric does. Thus, the imaginative free play which 
Lowell used to write "Waking Early Sunday Morning" is an 
instance of what Heidegger would mean were he to say "0 
to break loose." All of the poems discussed in "What 
Are Poets For?" are lyric, just as Oedipus sings a lyric. 
The ecstatic character of the lyric makes it a mode which 
can bring about "unshieldedness" because it does treat 
"the will as venture," the self as vacated. What our 
"destitute time" needs is "unshieldedness" similar to 
that found in the lyric.
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Rather than the god's failure to arrive, which 
typifies our era, Oedipus dramatizes the god's arrival.
As Apollo becomes evident, Oedipus must vacate his "will 
to power" for his "will as venture," that of a blind 
wanderer. In fact, that which made him unique, his in­
tellect, is in Apollo's hands the direct agent of his 
downfall. Because the lyric impulse to song is an in­
stance of "the will as venture," Oedipus's singing is 
Heidegger's "gathering release." Its center, Heidegger 
would say, is Being, as opposed to the mere being of 
human existence, and it is a vacated center. Through 
an imaginative free play with language, the lyric can 
occasion a greater Language. It symbolizes, and by this 
activity our mere being can occasion Being. For Heidegger, 
this means that lyric poetry Is a modality that presences, 
as much as is possible, something transcedent and meta-
£  Q
physical, something outside discursive language and 
in particular outside causality. It does this in part 
by perceiving absence, which is necessary for whatever 
presencing follows. Recognizing an object's absence, we 
are already presencing it.
As with Oedipus, Lowell's shift in his thinking is 
vitally concerned with the god's absence and the god's 
arrival. The concurrent shift in his writing may be seen, 
therefore, as one which moved from a "will to power" to 
the "will as venture." The distinction is like that made
between mere force, which Is exhaustible, and power, 
which is not. Again, the god's absence as opposed to 
the god's arrival.
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3Allegory to Causality: Reduced Signification
I
The most engaging aspect of Robert Lowell's career 
is the dramatic change that took place in his poetry 
between The Mills of the Kavanaughs and Life Studies,
As I have said before, most readers of Lowell focus 
their discussions of this shift upon Life Studies, where 
the change is most easily recognized. In fact, with its 
publication in 1958, Lowell became a major force in po­
etic development, a force still felt today. What has 
been overlooked amidst the many discussions of this evo­
lution, however, is the fact that the basis for much of 
his later development stems from what he was writing 
just before Life Studies.
A consideration of Lowell's mode of writing prior 
to this shift is useful because as much as the success 
of Life Studies. the failure of "The Mills of the 
Kavanaughs" marks the beginning of the major change 
that occurred in poetry after World War II. The revi­
sions Lowell made while rewriting "The Mills" reveal
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his realization that something very basic had altered. 
Between the first and second versions of the poem he 
began to exchange his early objectlvlst, synchronic po­
etry , which had reference to a fixed world order, for 
a diachronic poetry intended to gauge a world understood 
as process.
Lowell's metamorphosis may be seen as twofold, 
first in terms of reduced signification. His movement 
away from a Cathollc-Congregatlonallst myth restricted 
the allegorical function of his narrative. As part of 
this, three of the traditional four levels of meaning 
(the literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical, em­
ployed from Aquinas to Fyre) no longer coincided with 
his poetry because there was no cosmology to which such 
levels of meaning could refer.
The complaint registered by William Arrowsmith upon 
reviewing The Mills of the Kavanaughs for The Hudson 
Review, that Lowell was trying to "expand" his "compressed 
lyric--at the same compression, is related to this 
problem. Lowell had not fully realized the new demands 
he was placing upon his poetry. It could no longer take 
its significance from heaven downward; it must build 
significance from the ground up, from experience. Though 
the practical result of this was that the "compression" 
of Lowell's poetry lessened in Life Studies, something 
more fundamental was occurring.
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A change central to much that has happened to poetry 
In the last thirty years concerns Its function as a mode 
of thought, and here Lowell has been more than a leader. 
As it was first published in The Kenyon Review. 1951,
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" generally represented the 
current objectivist virtues of irony, paradox and mythi­
cal allusion. In fact some of the poem's key stanzas 
were written in 1937 while Lowell was staying with his 
first mentor, Allen Tate. And as the poem's permanent 
version demonstrates, Lowell stuck with much that was 
typical of his earlier manner, that which characterized 
Lord Weary1s Castle. Nevertheless, Lowell's subsequent 
departure from his early style took place while he was 
working on "The Mills," and that change meant that his 
poetry became more a means for perceiving than for rep­
resenting, more diachronic than synchronic. Rather 
than achieve dramatic meaning by aesthetic closure, the 
Intentions of his later poetry were to perceive contin­
gencies always just under the surface of meaning.
As Steven Axelrod has recently pointed out, Lowell 
was at a crossroads. He recognized a "need to bring 
humanity into his poetry" and to avoid "desiccated ab­
stractness." In his attempt to grasp "'direct experi­
ence,"' Lowell "mistook his gift and obsession to be 
fiction when in fact It was autobiography." In fact, 
Lowell's turn within narrative poetry, which ostensibly
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created a fictional world, was only a half step away from 
an autobiographical poetry which he was later to write, 
one that was Intended to gauge experience and, doing so, 
locate the self.
In the light of his lost faith, lost wife, confused 
politics, and troubled mind,^ Lowell's poetry became an 
activity of magnified significance. It could generate 
order in a world that was increasingly disorderly. In 
particular, Lowell's writing obliquely about the disin­
tegration of his marriage was not merely a result of 
that experience but a means for getting beyond It. The 
problem with this, however, was that his mode of writing 
in "The Hills" was not appropriate for the demands that 
were developing. Increasingly, Lowell experienced what 
may be called a sense of dislocation, and this had its 
basis not only in his private life but on a public level 
as well.
Though a catchall, since World War II existentialism 
has become a household word, and with reason. Without 
seeking to rehash philosophical debate or even to codify 
Lowell's thought, it Is fair to say that his divorce 
from Jean Stafford (who was Catholic), his departure 
from the Church itself, and his marriage to Elizabeth 
Hardwick ("who was politically on the left and not reli- 
glous") . . . each of these contributed to Lowell's 
movement away from a cosmology he might share with his
mentor Tate (or, with Aquinas and Frye) and Into some­
thing much more tenuous. Axelrod suggests that it was 
"almost against his will" to enter "the liberal agnostic 
tradition" where Lowell in fact found himself.^
Certainly Life Studies represents a new and increas­
ing reliance upon the self, saint or skunk, to generate 
meaning. There is an emphasis given to experiential 
concreteness not present in Lowell's previous writing.
Out of this emphasis upon existence, he generates unity 
of experience, and he does this, in part, by giving se­
quence to what appears otherwise as a confused, if not 
absurd, outer world.
But this is the much discussed and overly celebrated
later Lowell. There is a vital point that is the fulcrum
to what his writing became during the second half of his 
career which has been generally overlooked. Indeed, most 
students of Lowell appear embarrassed by what they con­
sider to be his foremost failure, and, being so, they 
say little if anything about "The Mills of the Kavanaughs. 
If the reason is not embarrassment, then it is simply 
that, within its own terms, the poem jLs a failure. But 
it is also a landmark in the move away from objectivist 
theories, a transition that has led to a more expressiv- 
istic poetry that contains its own failures.
Reaction to failures internal to a poetry, as well
as new pressures external to it, is a valid reason for
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change. However, the nature of reaction too easily can 
be merely to assume the obverse, the negative counter­
part, to what previously stood. Thus, with Lowell ob­
jectivism is overturned for a brand of subjectivism, or, 
in Axelrod's terms, "autobiography." Similarly, the 
fixed cosmos of the Catholic tradition, arranged from 
heaven downward, is reversed for an existential process 
in which the only meaning is that which is created by 
human initiative. Deduction from a traditional myth 
such as Christianity is no longer valid, or authentic; 
induction, however, carries the dramatic persuasiveness 
of either the participant or at least the eyewitness.
I think that what lies beneath the switch 1 have 
described is that, more than anything else, poetry is 
a mode of thought. Its foremost responsibility is to 
create meaning, for reader as well as writer. But, as 
we are all too well aware, meaning Itself has become 
problematical. To borrow from Hans-Georg Gadamer, "ar­
tistic experience is a mode of knowledge,"^ but the 
unique character of artistic knowledge is that "the 
work's existence" is "the breaking-off of a formative 
process which actually points beyond it. . . . [A) work
g
of art is not, in itself, completable." There are 
problems of text and context, work and audience.
Art exists by a fluid process, "the medial nature 
of the play process," such that the reader actually
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completes the poem. Lowell's early phase was under 
pressure to change because of forces external to It, 
forces that are often first encountered in the reader 
who stands between the poem and its surroundings. In 
sum, text no longer seemed to fit context, or to answer 
it.
Lowell's personal crises could only have been made 
more difficult by their taking place in a world apparent­
ly outside traditional bases for meaning, a world of pro­
cess. To borrow again from Gadamer, "Self-understanding 
takes place in relation to something else that is under­
stood and includes the unity and sameness of the other. 
What Lowell experienced was the lack of "the unity" of 
this "other." He not only "found his Christian myth­
making out of place" but, specifically, "that the global 
apocalypse he had prophesied . . . had failed to occur.
In this sense, his earlier artistic mode of thought ap­
peared to have been invalidated.
In response to this, Lowell changed his mode of 
writing and thus his mode of thought. His poetry became 
a means for self-locating. By writing a series of lyrics 
which, as they were made, looked backwards and forwards, 
Lowell sought to create a continuum of retentional modifi­
cation that located the present for him. In a world 
understood as process, this could only be a mediating 
activity carried out between the known past and an
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expected future. Life Studies was an appropriate title 
for such an activity.
Lowell's best Image for the groundless present In 
a world of process Is the train he rides from Rome to 
Paris In "Beyond the Alps." He Is leaving the failed 
fixity of the Church and arriving at the activity of 
art, Paris. The rest of Life Studies follows. Its 
primary pattern is to telescope back and forth over 
Lowell's personal and cultural past in range-finding 
manner.
But that locating process was already operating in 
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" in the form of Anne 
Kavanaugh's revery. Indeed the major failure of "The 
Mills" lies in the fact that it does not fully realize 
its locating intentions. During the period between the 
version published in The Kenyon Review and the one which 
appeared as a title poem, Lowell removed most Catholic 
allusions. But the poem's thinly disguised autobiographi­
cal elements remained. Though the earlier version was 
flawed and many of the changes Lowell made were for the 
best, the most significant one was the deletion of 
Catholic references, and this change worsened the poem's 
major problem.
The original framework upon which the significance 
of Harry's suicide depended for its dramatic meaning was 
Catholic doctrine. Read in its second version, "The
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Mills" depicts a world that lacks the meaning that such 
a system bestows. Harry's suicide loses significance, 
though it is intended to be one of the major events in 
the poem. In addition, the very absence of a Christian 
framework depends upon our remembering it to make its 
absence fully meaningful. That is, Harry's is a family 
with a long Catholic tradition that has outlived its 
faith, but unless the context of that faith is somehow 
kept before us we cannot fully understand the significance 
of its loss. As part of this problem, Lowell's allegori­
cal level of meaning falls because its referent (the 
external context provided by history, classical mythology, 
and the Christian myth) is reduced by one-third.
In the poem’s second version, Lowell does try to 
be consistent in his move away from the Church. If the 
values by which the poem's action is judged have been 
modified, so the action itself has been modified. Harry's 
suicide was particularly condemnable within a Christian 
understanding: Parallel to the removal of that under­
standing, Lowell removes the specificity of Harry's death. 
In the poem's second version, the camera is turned slight­
ly out of focus. The reader must assume that Harry died 
either as a result of his earlier attempt or as a result 
of a new attempt. The manner of his death is suggested 
rather than stated because there is no longer sufficient 
context to give dramatic meaning to a more specific
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account. Such specificity would be mere detail In the 
poem's second version, and the loss of meaning here Is 
an Instance In the more general loss of an allegorical 
level of signification in the poem.
In the second version, Lowell retains Anne's role 
as Persephone. In fact, the poem depends most heavily 
upon the Persephone motif. Harry Is Anne's Hades, beckon­
ing her to the underworld. And yet there is no sugges­
tion that she will return, which, as Persephone, she 
should do. Lowell makes Anne a combination of two reluc­
tant virgins, Daphne and Persephone. However, only in 
the first version is she contrasted with the Virgin Mary. 
Part of her character, as originally intended, must be 
taken to stem from the presence of all three virgins.
Such a combination would more fully contain all the 
facets of Anne's character and of her predicament. As 
the poem stands upon revision, however, removal of the 
promise of life reduces the dramatic significance of 
the loss of life.
In the poem as it appeared in The Kenyon Review, 
Persephone falls in half of her role, the promise of 
renewal in this world; however the presence of the Virgin 
Mary fills that gap. She provides the promise of the 
next world. Deletion of Mary, as the deletion of Chris­
tian references in general, is part of the leveling pro­
cess that took place in Lowell's revision. Paul Tillich
might say that part of the ''dimension of depth" has been 
sacrificed for a more strictly "horizontal" understanding 
Lowell's version of the four senses of interpretation 
was in trouble. This was particularly the case on the 
level of allegory. The umbrella*like system of thought, 
under which his narrative could operate, was necessary 
for allegorical meaning. Nevertheless, Lowell set this 
system aside with nothing comparable to replace it.
To summarize for a moment, the removal of the Virgin 
Mary and other Catholic allusions, such as Saint Patrick 
and Hallowmass, does not clear up the confusion that al­
ready existed; such removal merely erases part of the 
external framework intended to reconcile the poem's ten­
sions. Originally, the Catholic myth was intended as 
the final myth, among many, one which would provide 
closure to the poem's action. By such closure, the poem' 
method of mythical allusion, including allegorical dimen­
sions, could be encompassed and forced into disclosure.
Lowell decided that the one myth did not adequately 
reconcile the many: The dramatic meaning that his method 
was meant to achieve did not come about. However, his 
answer was merely to get rid of the Catholic allusions, 
retaining the rest of his myth apparatus. The irony and 
paradox that had gotten out of control in the earlier 
version remained out of control, and excessive mythical 
allusion remained a problem, despite the restriction of 
one myth.
1X0
Yec the strong narrative-autobiographical aspect 
of the poem was intact. That is, the poem's second ver­
sion remains, to a large extent, an oblique account of 
part of Lowell's marriage to Jean Stafford. As such, 
the poem (in either version) is not only a locating of 
the poet by bracketing experience, it is also an expres­
sion. Harry's suicide is Lowell's articulation of his 
own predicament. But the expression has lost those sur­
roundings which, as with an earlier poem such as "After 
the Surprising Conversions," would give it full meaning. 
There is no Church opposing suicide, no Church to promise 
redemption for the difficulties of the temporal world, 
and no Church to formalize and sustain a relationship.
During the same year Lowell began the earliest stan­
zas in "The Mills," Alfred North Whitehead began the 
first in a series of lectures later collected under the 
title, Modes of Thought. Much of Whitehead's attention 
Is devoted to the problems inherent in a world of pro­
cess. In particular, he is concerned with Intelligibility
12in our experience and with what he calls "Importance."
In a passage that sounds reminiscent of Kierkegaard's
discussion of the false knight of faith and the true
13knight of faith, Whitehead contrasts "importance" and 
"expression." He defines "Importance" as that which 
"is derived from the immanence of infinitude in the finite." 
But, he continues, "expression is founded on the finite
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occasion. It Is the activity of flnltude Impressing 
Itself on Its environment."^*
What this distinction means In terms of Lowell Is 
that "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" falls on the level of 
"Importance" because the myth by which Lowell grasped 
"infinitude," Christianity, was discarded. In the poem's 
standing version, the mediating function of myth between 
finite and infinite world views is no longer considered 
valid. What is still possible, however, is "expression." 
Though Anne’s and Harry's relationship can be understood 
in a religious framework now only ironically, the poem's 
more direct expression of despair is still possible. In 
fact, concentrating on Kavanaugh as "environment" and 
Anne's experience (actual events and her revery) as "the 
finite occasion," the entire poem may be seen as Lowell's 
expression of despair due to the apparent failure of a 
system that made "importance" and a sense of awe possible.
In addition to expression, however, Lowell’s narrative- 
autobiographical approach could also locate the self.
Anne Kavanaugh is able to bracket her experience (and 
indirectly Lowell's), and her revery appears to be the 
means by which she does this. A peculiar aspect of this 
process is that, while it appears spatial because of 
description and Imagery, it actually provides a temporal 
fix for experience. Anne has been displaced by events, 
and re-presenting them sequentially places her in relation
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to these events. Her narrative, though lacking in al­
legory, still gives sequence to raw experience. Her 
mental process, which largely constitutes the poem, is 
less the New Critics' static, synchronic artifact of 
wit and irony and more a diachronic movement of the mind 
of the persona through a series of re-presentations.
It is the means by which she carries out her self- 
locating process that I would like to discuss next. A 
closer look at Anne's (or, Lowell's) method of re­
presenting may give some indication as to why her revery 
not only locates but is an isolated and isolating process.
II
At this point, Kant can be used to introduce objects 
(that Husserl leaves out) which are part of the immanent 
structure of consciousness. For him, the world makes 
sense only if there's a fixed referent, or object. Thus, 
for example, in causality the world makes sense only if 
there is a First Cause serving as an object to which we 
can refer. Causality without a First Cause, such as we 
get in the narrative of the revised version of "The Mills 
of the Kavanaughs," finally dissolves the self because 
it runs infinitely into the past and Infinitely into the 
future. On the other hand, causality with a First Cause 
gives us some hope of making sense of ourselves, though
we are thus understood as causal selves. 1 mention this 
because the one way that the causal plane of Lowell's 
narrative can be valid is by grounding itself in a First 
Cause. But, by setting his Christian cosmos aside 
Lowell not only undercuts his allegory, he also invali­
dates the self-locating process meant to replace allegory 
By removing First Cause from causality, he removes the 
fixed referent that keeps causality from dissolving the 
self.
As I have already stated, "The Mills" slips from 
the more ambitious goals of allegory and Whitehead's 
sense of "importance" but continues to operate on an 
empirical level as a relatively long, narrative poem. 
Indeed, much of Anne Kavanaugh's revery, and therefore 
much of the poem's organization, depends upon the charac­
teristics of conventional narrative structure; thus, in 
addition to sequence, there are assumptions basic to 
narrative. The act of story telling always entails the 
mind's order being brought to bear on a surrounding world 
What I would like to consider now for a moment is the 
nature of the mind's order, in particular some of Kant's 
"categories":
Just as perceptions arranged sensations around 
objects in space and time, so conception ar­
ranges perceptions (objects and events) about 
the idea of cause, unity, reciprocal relation, 
necessity, contingency, etc.; these and other 
"categories" are the structure into which 
perceptions are received, and by which they
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are classified and moulded Into the ordered 
concepts of thought. These are the very es- 
sence and character of the mind; mind Ls the 
coordination of experience
The forms of perception alluded to above are space and 
time. These and other modes of thought are a priori to 
our grasp of experience:
There is [an exit from blind alleys of thought] 
says Kant, if we remember that space, time and 
cause are modes of perception and conception, 
which must enter into all our experience, since 
they are the web and structure of experience; 
these dilemmas [of thought about a First Cause] 
arise from supposing that space, time and cause 
are external things independent of perception. 
We shall never have any experience which we 
shall not interpret in terms of space and time 
and cause; but we shall never have any philoso­
phy if we forget that these are not things, but 
modes of interpretation and understanding.
Because in dealing with process the function of nar­
rative is to reproduce experience, or to appear to do so, 
narrative is a modality that assumes such Kantian cate­
gories as time, space, cause, unity, and necessity. A 
closer look at the operation of one of these, causality, 
in "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" reveals why the poem 
falls in certain ways, and it provides, representatively, 
one reason for the general shift in poetry following the 
publication of Life Studies. That is, Lowell's poetic 
shift, which occurred after his most ambitious narrative, 
represents an attempt to get away from some of the limits 
that accompany this mode of thought, particularly once 
it has lost its ability to function allegorically.
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Causality requires substance as well as concepts 
of space and time. It assumes unity and, usually, neces­
sity as well. We generally think of all these collec­
tively. When we speak of them, we are likely to say 
realism or to make an appeal to realism.
Lowell's use of classical mythology, of religion, 
and of history in "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" assumes 
causality in a sort of cultural realism. He invokes 
these for the dramatic meaning of events he narrates, 
but the very nature of the events themselves is also 
causal. Those at Kavanaugh are believable to the extent 
that we can ascribe reasons for their taking place; they 
are effects owing their existence to certain causes, and 
we believe or disbelieve them to the extent that we can 
identify satisfactory reasons for their taking place.
Yet Lowell's narrative orders a world at Kavanaugh 
beyond traditional values, in many ways one of mere pro­
cess. By selection, it gives sequence to events, and 
it supplies causes for these In the guise of characteri­
zation, antecedent events, and setting. We are prepared 
for Harry's suicidal tendencies because we know something 
of his character. By our observation, via Anne, of his 
behavior after he returns from the Navy, we learn that 
he is dangerously distracted. Similarly, we know about 
antecedent events in Harry's life because Anne's revery 
recounts these. He had hoped to restore life and order
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to Kavanaugh yet experienced some disgrace in the Navy 
which required his resignation (despite the presence of 
war) and which to a large extent cost him this hope. 
Finally, Kavanaugh, the homeslte of a bankrupt but aristo­
cratic family, sinks into a winter landscape that estab­
lishes the primary setting for Harry's despair.
The detailed causes for Harry's failures and for his 
suicide are more extensive than space allows me to in­
dicate. For example, Anne's psyche plays a major role 
in Harry's disintegration, but to trace its machinations 
would require almost a line-by-line rendering of the poem.
On the other hand, there is one aspect to Harry that 
should stand outside causalty. It is his free will.
Though we rely upon causes to explain his actions, we 
assume that Harry, as well as Anne, enjoys free will.
Yet, as part of the poem's dramatic meaning, Harry has 
his own set of causes and effects by which he understands 
his actions. In particular, the apparent evidence of 
Anne's infidelity, what she says when she talks in her 
sleep, serves as the most active cause for Harry's deci­
sion to attempt suicide.
When we add to this a failed career, with accompany­
ing guilt, plus failure to restore Kavanaugh financially 
and create heirs for it, Harry's actions became very 
believable. Lowell satisfies our sense of realism, and, 
due to a set of deterministic causes, Harry's suicide 
achieves its moment.
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1 should add, that because the poem's determinism 
heightens the significance of a dramatic event does not 
mean that the poem is therefore a reliable method for 
apprehending the world external to it (though it can 
mean that the poem satisfies certain objectivist theories). 
More often the opposite is the case: Rather than being 
purely objective and cognitive, the real purpose of a 
fated or a determined event in a work lacking other 
levels of signification (such as allegory) is dramatic 
in a restrictive sense. If we are afforded free will, 
then the emotional power of a poem such as "The Mills," 
which results from determinism being superimposed upon 
events, is in opposition to its function as a mode of 
thought intended to accurately perceive the world ex­
ternal to it, a world which in Lowell's view at this 
time was not at all deterministic but increasingly 
indeterminate.
The context generated by "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" 
governs actions and their significance by a series of 
causes which, within the terms of the poem, generate 
necessity. Indeed, the unity of the poem depends upon 
the presence of realistic reasons to substantiate events. 
Thus details are marshaled in such a way as to reciprocate 
convincingly. The irony that Anne dreams of Harry as a 
boy only heightens pressure surrounding the poem's outcome. 
The net result is that while achieving dramatic meaning
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Lowell creates a deterministic world that, due to Its 
very effort to be realistic. In sum becomes unrealistic- 
ally fixed.
Put somewhat differently, internally the poem a- 
chieves sufficient cause. Nothing is absent that is 
necessary to create the desired effect, which is finally 
a dramatic effect. Externally, however, sufficient cause 
is lacking, and this becomes a problem in a hermeneutic 
sense. The poem's gothic build up of causes for events 
does not correspond with the way most of its readers 
would understand those events. To return to Gadamer, 
the fluid or "medial . . . play process" necessary be­
tween work and reader is overshadowed by the dictates of 
the poem. The reader does not have a chance to complete 
the poetic process because all conclusions have already 
been overwhelmingly made, and they have been made in a 
way that does not fit the reader's experience.
At points the poem sinks into melodrama. As men­
tioned earlier, stanza twenty-eight is one of the best 
examples of this: Harry's, or Lowell's, manic play on 
the number twenty-eight within a stanza of the same 
number does not have sufficient meaning to satisfy the 
attention it calls to Itself. More generally, however, 
we are taken step by step towards an unavoidable conclu­
sion that loses its meaning by the very fact that it is 
unavoidable.
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A substantial part of meaning Is derived from the 
concurrence of mutually dependent opposites, something 
which determinism largely denies. Harry's suicide, 
therefore, can only have meaning to the extent that its 
opposite is kept in view. But by compounding causes 
for the dramatic necessity of Harry's suicide, Lowell 
loses sight of that which gives meaning to such an action, 
Harry's freedom to choose life.
Apparently Harry never entertains hope even momen­
tarily. Related to this, Persephone is restricted almost 
entirely to her underground role, death, whereas half of 
her significance stems from her return to the upper world. 
The presence of the Virgin Mary would offset the eccentric 
emphasis given Persephone and qualify it were she not 
deleted from the poem's revised version. Thus Lowell 
stacks the deck for dramatic effect, but by doing this 
he invalidates the poem's perception.
Narrative that is free of allegorical intentions em­
ploys an empirical persuasiveness. The realism generated 
in the reader's mind results from accumulated details. 
Similar to this, a series of lyrics such as most of those 
comprising Lowell's later books can operate empirically.
In each case the convincingness of a work's argument is 
based upon an inductive process. Generality is arrived 
at from a series of facts often gleaned by the poet at 
first hand. Confessional poetry, in which Lowell played 
a major role, is a recent example of this.
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Such a process employs an implicit, if not explicit, 
causality. Obviously no one mode of thought is universal­
ly applicable, however. Thus not only is causality in 
narrative limited; the lyrical and ecstatic poetry of 
Holderlin and Rilke for which Martin Heidegger opts also 
has its blind spots. The essential point is that Lowell's 
needs changed before his poetics. By 1951 he could no 
longer assume the constructs of a Christian myth. In a 
sense, he arrived at a truncated view of anything claiming 
to be apodlctic. Nevertheless, he continued to write a 
poetry whose tendencies were to locate the self by ar­
ranging events and by exercising value judgments; a po­
etry which in its very activity sought certitude, what 
philosophically would be called necessity.
Ill
Both Kant and Hume regard causality as incapable of 
arriving at necessity. Kant approaches causality in the 
"Second Analogy" of his Critique of Pure Reason as an 
idealist, while Hume deals with it on an empirical level.
For Kant, causality exists because of our experience 
through the apparent connexity of time, and this apparent 
connexlty exists only In the empirical world, not in the 
world of pure reason. Causality represents connection 
between otherwise discrete events, but it exists "only
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In appearances.” We can "apprehend" such a "continuity 
In the connection of times," but only on the empirical 
level:
I apprehend [erkenne] an object to which I 
must ascribe a certain determinate position 
in time--a position which, in view of the p; 
ceding state, cannot be otherwise assigned.
In his treatment of the pure categories Kant does 
not admit causality as a productive force (a push-pull) 
but does admit it as an ordering of events. Similarly, 
necessity is allowed in the empirical world but is not 
among the pure categories of reason. Causality and neces­
sity are only a means by which we apprehend events by 
perceiving one after another:
Every apprehension of an event is therefore a 
perception that follows upon another percep­
tion. . . . [T]n an appearance which contains
a happening (The preceding state of the per­
ception we may entitle A, and the succeeding 
B) B can be apprehended only as following 
upon A. . . . The order in which the percep­
tions succeed one another in apprehension is 
in this instance determined, and to this order 
apprehension is bound down. . . . [I]n the per­
ception of an event there is always a rule 
that makes the order in which the perceptions 
(in the apprehension of this appearance) follow 
upon one another a necessary order.18
Kant has been contrasting the perceptions of a house 
with those of a ship moving down stream. With the house, 
which is spatially fixed and in that sense synchronic, 
Kant could begin by perceiving the roof and moving down
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to the basement, or he could begin with the basement 
and move upward. The house Is static, and there are 
several ways to apprehend It. Using any one of four ap­
proaches, he can move up or down, right or left. How­
ever, with an event such as the ship's movement the 
perception Is diachronic and restricted by sequence:
For Instance, 1 see a ship move down stream.
My perception of its lower position follows 
upon the perception of its position higher up 
in the stream, and It is impossible that in 
the apprehension of this appearance the ship 
should first be perceived lower down in the 
stream and afterwards higher u p .
Though here only analogous to what Kant is describ­
ing, narrative too relates events. One event necessarily 
follows another and is perceived to do so with cause.
We operate dally in the empirical world which for us must 
be understood as a world of causality and necessity, 
though we lack certainty by this. In sum, such modalities 
are not apodictlc. Setting, characterization, and pre­
vious events exist in the same relation to each other as 
positions through which Kant's ship was seen to move. 
Within Lowell's poetry such a thought process is literally 
makeshift. The apparent certainty resulting from a nar­
rative has no basis for an absolute truth claim.
Much as the house (in its fixity) can be approached 
in several ways, the four levels of meaning operate sev­
erally within the cosmology of a fixed world. Without
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that cosmology, however, we are caught up In process and 
can go no farther than empirical limits allow. We must 
view the ship sequentially because we are time locked.
In revised form, Lowell's narrative is time locked 
as he begins to wrestle with a restricted understanding 
of being. Under an apparently Invalid cosmos, his nar­
rative seeks to generate Its own meaning by sequence and 
causality. No longer skyward looking, the consciousness 
in Lowell's poetry, during his revision of "The Mills" 
and afterwards, becomes a Janus. It is a mind limited 
by and balanced between a retentional past and a proten- 
tional future.
An empiricist such as David Hume approaches causal­
ity from the opposite direction, yet he arrives at the 
same conclusion that Kant makes. In addition to the im­
possibility of achieving transcendence, "absolute time," 
by empirical means, as Kant argues, Hume states that even 
empirically necessity does not follow causality. One 
problem with causality for Hume is that once we begin
tracing causes we enter an infinite regress. Every cause
20is the effect of a preceding cause. It is Kant's ship
infinitely in reverse. Like Zeno's arrow, we never arrive.
The illusion of necessity in narration has to be
present for a narrative to exist, even if it is ultimately
21the "subjective necessity" of which Kant accuses Hume.
The realism (that which is believable to the reader)
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ascribed to necessity cannot come about to convince a 
reader if the causes, such as character, setting, and 
previous events are not sufficient causes.
Because there is an infinite regress of causes, the 
extensiveness of causality becomes its invalidation.
Alone, the narrative mode lacks sufficient cause and 
therefore the certitude for which Lowell's poetry con­
stantly drove. However, the most important point to be 
made in this discussion is that Lowell fell into a po­
etry subject to questions of causality in the first 
place. That is, without an enveloping myth within which 
his narrative could operate on several levels of meaning, 
Lowell's poetic locating process was reduced to a local 
activity.
In particular, his early poetry generally sustains 
an allegorical level of meaning, among others. However, 
as I mentioned earlier, with the loss of his Christian 
myth, Lowell lost the framework within which the allegori­
cal level could function. For Lowell, allegory now 
lacked a referent and could no longer bridge the gap 
between permanence and process. On a practical level, 
the removal of the Virgin Mary apparatus reduced 
Persephone's significance. More generally, the removal 
of Catholic references lessened the significance, both 
dramatic and purely analytical, of Harry's suicide.
Meaning underwent a leveling process. No longer capable
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21of being ontology, as Maritain would have poetry, 
Lowell's writing narrowed to a sort of phenomenology, 
a bracketing of experience perhaps more suitable to the 
many changes he found taking place.
Serious poetry always makes ambitious claims to 
truth. Different poetic modes may be taken to have made 
different assumptions as to how the truth of a situation 
can be apprehended, as well as what that truth may be. 
Because poetry always assumes certain modes of thought 
and those modes are evident first in terms of style, 
Lowell's stylistic shift cannot be separated from a 
cognitive shift the significance of which extends far 
beyond matters of caste, even psychology and politics. 
The details of Lowell's new-found limits and needs, 
which led to a major change in poetics, should be kept 
in mind. They reveal an implicit reduction in the hori­
zon structure of a known past and an expected future 
within which Lowell and many who follow him gauge 
experience.
Notes
^ William Arrowsmith, "Review of Robert Lowell's 
The Mills of the Kavanaughs," Hudson Review, 4 (1951-52),
ppT zittir:---------------
2 Steven Gould Axelrod, Robert Lowell: Life and Art 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p . 8T.
^ Axelrod, p. 80.
** Axelrod, p. 75.
^ Axelrod, p. 76.
^ Axelrod, p. 79.
7
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York:
The Seabury Press, 1975), p~ 87.
0
Gadamer, p. 84.
g
Gadamer, p. 98.
Gadamer, p. 86.
11 Axelrod, pp. 75-76.
12 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New 
York: The Free Press, 1966), p. T"!
1 1 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and The 
Sickness unto Death, Trans. Ualter Lowrie (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 89-91.
^  Whitehead, p. 20.
^  Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., 1943), p. 205.
^  Durant, p. 207.
^  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. 
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St.“Partin's Press, 1965), 
p. 225.
126
127
Kane, p. 221.
^  Kant, p. 221.
20 David Hume, Human Understanding (Illinois: The 
Open Court Publishing Company, 194$), p . 88.
^  Kant, p. 44.
22 Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, Trans. 
J. F. Scanlan (1930; rpt. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for 
Libraries Press), p. 71.
4Changing Modalities 
I
In order to give context to the shift that took place 
in Robert Lowell's poetry between 1951 and 1958, I would 
like to appeal to Heidegger and Husserl. Heidegger pro­
vides a discussion of the imaginative use of language that 
applies to Lowell's cosmology and the changes it underwent. 
Husserl's methodology, as outlined in his Cartesian Medita­
tions , is of importance because it parallels Lowell's lat­
er poetic mode. Husserl's method and Lowell's mode are 
equally grounded in Cartesian doubt from the outset, though 
Lowell's is a radical doubt. That is, Husserl sheds light 
upon how Lowell’s consciousness functions (insofar as we 
can understand such a thing) when he is writing in his 
second poetic phase. At the same time Heidegger provides 
reasons for why this phase operates in a Husserlian manner 
In the first place.
In the preceding chapter I sought to demonstrate 
that Lowell's loss of a Christian myth meant his loss of 
three of the four levels of meaning (the allegorical,
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moral, and anagoglcal). Without Christianity as a static 
and enveloping referent, the possible levels of interpre­
tation in Lowell's poetry were reduced to one level, be­
came horizontal; the action in his work became strictly 
lineal with one event following another in sequence and 
explainable on a causal plane that precluded any notion 
of a transcendent.
In spite of this, Lowell's most fundamental drive 
continued to be toward certitude. The dialectic of his 
antagonisms, as Staples calls them, sprang from dissatis­
faction with that very limitation on the causal plane 
in which such antagonisms existed in the first place. 
Lowell found himself with only a horizon to look forward 
to, nothing transcendent; yet the desire Mto break loose" 
continued to inform his poetry. The fact that "Waking 
Early Sunday Morning" is one of the best poems in his 
second phase is not a coincidence. It is so powerful a 
poem because it returns to one of Lowell's basic drives, 
to break free of or at least see beyond temporal limita­
tion. It is what Allen Tate, once introducing his "The 
Swimmers," called the poet’s one poem which he writes 
and rewrites throughout his career.
In summarizing Patrick Cosgrave's discussion, I 
pointed out that Lowell's loss of an ethical system, 
such as that provided by Christianity, cost him his 
ability to make statements about the morality of events.
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Cosgrave has already touched upon the leveling process 
that began to take place In Lowell's poetry as early 
as "The Mills of the Kavanaughs." Implicit In his argu­
ment Is that Lowell has lost the moral level of meaning.
Because of early Lowell's strong Catholic interests,
I thought it was not an exaggeration to suggest that in 
his first phase his poetry aspired to something like 
Maritain's notion of poetry as ontology. With the loss 
of his Catholic religion, however, Lowell lost the myth 
by which he could grasp a metaphysical understanding of 
being. Since he could no longer take an earthly event 
to be emblematic of heavenly significance, Lowell's al­
legorical level of meaning was flattened. Related to 
this, his ethical system was no longer grounded, and his 
moral judgments lost their conclusiveness because they 
lacked a system to which they could refer. (The implica­
tions of such a situation are explored by Gerald Graff 
in his essays, "The Myth of the postmodernist breakthrough," 
which appeared in TriQuarterly, and "The Politics of Anti- 
Realism," which appeared in Salmagundi.
In sum, Lowell's poetry did move from ontology to 
a sort of phenomenology. Metaphysical questions were no 
longer possible, but a strictly horizontal plane of 
sequence and causality did allow a phenomenological 
bracketing of experience. The first real Instance of 
this bracketing process may be seen in Anne Kavanaugh's 
revery.
131
Later, Lowell realized his Intentions more clearly 
and no longer needed a persona to carry out this process. 
His poetry became explicitly rather than implicitly 
autobiographical. But at the point of his writing "The 
Mills of the Kavanaughs" Lowell was still In transition.
He had not fully realized the change that was taking 
place with his departure from the Catholic belief. In­
deed, his use of a persona represents his halfway stance 
with regard to allegory, A persona could still represent 
Robert Lowell's experience, but Robert Lowell's experi­
ence could no longer represent anything other than itself.
Lowell was not only one of the most talented poets 
of his generation, but he was also one of the better edu­
cated and more Intelligent. Thus his making the shift 
that I have described above indicates that there were 
substantial pressures for such a change. He had the tal­
ent to write much as he pleased yet found it necessary to 
alter his style dramatically. Similarly, he had the 
mind and education necessary to locate his work within 
the tradition; if he had not changed his poetry, he would 
have been able to marshal plenty of arguments for stick­
ing with his earlier mode. The external reasons for his 
taking such a dramatic turn, therefore, must be the re­
sult of pressures of considerable magnitude.
What I would like to do now is to consider changes 
external to Lowell's work which, however, ultimately
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affect It internally. For the moment, I would like to 
auspend in suggestive mid-air various observations taken 
primarily from Heidegger which, allowed to remain in 
suspension long enough, will provide the frame (if not 
the formula) necessary to understand Lowell's poetic 
shift.
II
The first point that should be made is that Heidegger 
argues we exist in a destitute time when the gods have 
defaulted, have failed "to arrive." In many ways, Lowell 
never stopped being an absolutist. And the frustrations 
for an absolutist in a world of process such as Heidegger 
describes are self evident. At the beginning of his es­
say, "What Are Poets For?," Heidegger makes the following 
statement:
The default of God means that no god any longer 
gathers men and things into himself, visibly 
and unequivocally, and by such gathering dis­
poses the world's history and man's sojourn in 
it. The default of God forebodes something 
even grimmer, however. Not only have the gods 
and the god fled, but the divine radiance has 
become extinguished in the world's history.
The time of the world's night is the destitute 
time, because it becomes ever more destitute.
It has already grown so destitute, it can no ~ 
longer discern the default of God as a default.
Technology exemplifies "the world's night." Seeking 
to hold the world over against the self, to dominate the
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world, we obscure It. We cannot see It for what it is 
because of the way we have come to regard it. We can­
not even see that we have obscured the world. In order 
to overcome this, the world (which we affect through art, 
which we alter because of the way art makes us see and 
think) must turn "about fundamentally," turn "away from 
the abyss" that is created by the god's failure to arrive 
which, were the god to arrive, would ground the world.
"But for this it is necessary that there be those who 
reach into the abyss." Such reaching, through the 
imaginative use of language, is the poet's job.
In his "The Way to Language" Heidegger borrows from 
Aristotle and Wilhelm von Humbolt t o develop a defini­
tion of what he considers language to be. For Aristotle, 
spoken language represents what is the soul and writing 
represents what is spoken. Of these he says they "are 
a show in the first place, are among all (men) the same 
passions of the soul." Aristotle's is a "classical archi­
tectonic structure." Writing represents sounds; sounds 
represent "passions in the soul"; and such passions re­
veal "the matters that arouse them." Summarizing,
Heidegger says the following:
Showing [i.e., language] is what forms and up­
holds the Intertwining braces of the architec­
tonic structure. Zn various ways, disclosing 
or disguising. Showing makes something come to 
light, lets what has come to light be perceived, 
and lets the perception be examined. The kinship
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of Showing with what it shows--a klndship 
never developed purely in Its own terms and 
those of Its origlns--later becomes trans­
formed Into a conventional relation between 
a sign and Its signification.4
Heidegger goeB on to discuss the transformation from 
showing to designation, "by which man's mind Is reset and 
directed from one object to another object." Designation 
does not show a thing In the sense of bringing It to 
light but rather has a utilitarian purpose behind it.
The difference which Heidegger here puts in terms of des­
ignation and showing is that between a language which un­
covers , and in that sense shows, something for what it is 
and a language (such as technology) which designates 
something for some purpose and, in its focus upon purpose
rather than what is present, which covers over the real
5
nature of the thing or being.
For Wilhelm von Humbolt language is "persistent and 
in every instant transitory":
In itself language is not work (ergon) but an 
activity (energeia). Its true definition may 
therefore only be genetic. . . . Essentially,
however, only the totality of this speaking 
can be regarded as language.6
Rather than architectonic, as with Aristotle, language 
for Humbolt is an activity. One is reminded of the dis­
tinction between a synchronic and diachronic understanding 
of poetry. In light of Heidegger's notion that ours is 
a destitute time, language performs a special task in which
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It presences that which is otherwise absent. Related to 
this Heidegger makes the following remark:
Since the Greeks, beings are experienced to be 
whatever is present. Since language is, it-- 
whatever speaking occurs at any time-^belongs 
to what is present.7
The implication is that language performs a presenc- 
ing function when properly (artistically) used, and in 
this way It is both architectonic and genetic. As in 
his "Letter on Humanism," published in 1947 when he was 
released from house arrest, Heidegger again argues that
Q
language is "the house of Being." The capitalization 
of being means that Heidegger is referring to the tran­
scendent . Man employs language in an imaginative way
9
that makes way, as he means by "wegen," for Being.
Used properly, our language can occasion Language; en­
gaged in such an activity, man's being can occasion Being.
But to balance the above comparison between Humbolt 
and Aristotle, Heidegger says that "The essential being 
of language is Saying as Showing" (genetically saying 
but at the same time architectonically showing). The 
saying activity shows something systematically arranged. 
Over and above Aristotle's and Humbolt's descriptions 
of language, Heidegger finds it to be related to the 
transcendent. In a sense, language speaks us, though 
it "remains unmistakably bound up with human speaking":
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Language needs human speaking, and yet it Is 
not merely of the making or at the command of 
our speech activity. On what does the being 
of language rest, that Is, where is It grounded? 
Perhaps we are missing the very nature of lan­
guage when we ask for grounds?
Or could it even be that Saying Is itself the 
abode or rest which grants the quiet of mutual 
belonging to all that belongs within the struc­
ture of the being of language?11
Following this circular process or verbal linking 
of our activity with language and the higher implications 
of that activity, Heidegger discusses what he means by 
"Appropriation." Of this he says:
All true language, because assigned, sent, des­
tined to man by the [wegen] way-making movement 
of Saying, is in the nature of destiny.12
Language is an opening process that can grasp what is 
true and therefore direct us to what may be regarded as 
destiny simply because, being true, it is^  what ijs. Being 
led by a lie would not have "the nature of destiny" be­
cause it would lead to nothing, whereas destiny implies 
something present. This should help to clarify what was 
meant above by the statement that in a sense language 
speaks us. It pre-structures the world. In a Husserlian 
sense (that will be discussed shortly) it is a sort of 
absolute Intentlonality.
The idea is related to the god's presencing in 
Oedipus the King, which I discussed at the end of the 
second chapter. As the oracle proves to have been right,
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Oedipus la taken beyond his own power, and yet It was 
his power over discursive language that enabled what 
the oracle said to come about. Because Oedipus' fate 
was spoken by an oracle, its "Saying" was "in the nature 
of destiny." And yet it needed the "human speaking" 
that Heidegger discusses above. Apollo's will is real­
ized not only by the oracle's (who is human) saying 
Oedipus' fate; it is also realized by Oedipus' inter­
pretation of this saying and by his attempt to avoid its 
meaning.
Oedipus uses discursive language in his attempt to 
avoid his fate and, doing so, facilitates that fate. 
However, his final use of language is lyrical; he sings. 
And his singing reveals (or, shows) him, whereas his 
discursive, goal-oriented language obscured the self.
His singing finalizes Apollo's will. Much as the faun 
who challenged Apollo (god of music) to a music contest 
and lost disastrously, Oedipus tries his wits against 
Apollo (also god of prophecy and sunlight) and loses not 
only his future as king but his eyesight. He also loses 
doubly in his attempt to circumnavigate the prophecy be­
cause he is the instrument of his own downfall.
It is along these lines that Heidegger concludes 
his chapter, "The Way to Language," with reference to 
song:
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Saying is the mode in which Appropriation 
speaks: mode not so much in the sense of modus 
or fashion, but as the melodic mode, the song 
which says something in its singing. For ap­
propriating Saying brings to light all present 
beings in terms of their properties— it lauds, 
that is. allows them into their own, their 
nature.13
If we think of Oedipus in this manner, then his sing­
ing represents the moment at which he relinquishes his 
will to the god's will; or, as I said earlier, it repre­
sents the moment at which he moves from a will to power 
to a will as venture. Such a revised willing bridges the 
mortal and the divine to the extent that "it lauds" "all 
present beings" and (following Heidegger) increases their 
being, an activity quite different from the ratiocinations 
of Oedipus as we encounter him earlier in the play, or 
for that matter, an activity quite different from technology.
The lyrical or poetic activity within language bridges 
in the following sense:
our saying--always an answering--remains forever 
relational. Relation is thought of here always 
in terms of the appropriation, and no longer 
conceived in the form of a mere reference. Our 
relation to language defines itself in terms of 
the mode in which we, who are needed in the us­
age of language, belong to the Appropriation.1^
Much as in one’s singing a song what one will sing is pre­
viously determined because (though the song is experienced 
each time it is heard as unfolding through time and the 
activity of its being sung) to be a song it must already
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be and therefore be fixed•*• much as this is the case, 
our saying Is "relational" to something that precedes it.
We answer in our saying as the singer unfolds in his 
singing. Both are relational. To repeat something said 
earlier, without strictly determining, Language pre­
structures and makes the presence of things and beings 
possible. A way has already been made and is followed 
by our saying or singing, yet our activity is necessary 
to that way's being uncovered. We are not only relational 
to language but important to it .
Heidegger says, "All reflective thinking is poetic, 
and all poetry in turn is a kind of thinking." For him, 
"The two belong together," But what happens when for 
some reason the two become separated?
With the loss of his cosmos, which informed his "re­
flective thinking," this is what Robert Lowell experienced, 
and his almost immediate attempts to adjust to a new situa­
tion may be seen in his writing and revising of "The Mills 
of the Kavanaughs." After the adjustment was completed, 
the causes for it and the tracks that reveal it were much 
less discernable. That is, Life Studies tells us less 
about Lowell's shift than "The Mills." It is the fait 
accompli, and, as such, covers over the steps that brought 
it about. But by its very imperfection, its incomplete­
ness, "The Mills" exposes why Lowell initiated such a 
major shift and in many ways how he did so.
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I have referred to William Arrowsmith's review 
often because I think that he touches on the most reveal­
ing aspect in Lowell's shift, his use of compression.
Why did Lowell continue his method of doubly compressed 
writing (by which he compacted the characteristics of 
large poems into the limits of relatively short, lyrical 
poems) when he finally turned to a large poem? There 
are two possible answers.
The simplest answer is that if compression worked 
for him before, why abandon it? However this only skims 
over the surface and, I think, slights Lowell's under­
standing of what he was doing. A more satisfactory 
answer is that Lowell was still interested in the possi­
bilities of a cosmos. As a student of Ransom and Tate 
and as a very serious Roman Catholic, Lowell's early 
strength was his ability to fuse myth, history and reli­
gion in an objective network that appeared to be self- 
sustaining. With the loss of one third of his external 
framework (religion), myth and history were expanded to 
complete the network, though the myth apparatus over­
lapped to the point that it too failed. Aside from the 
more direct autobiographical aspects of "The Mills," 
a large poem written at double compression might be ex­
pected to superimpose its order upon the poet's experience.
On the other hand, a long narrative poem would not 
need to be dense and overlapping to the extent "The Mills"
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is If It had an external context upon which it and the 
reader relied to complete it; for example, a context that 
would make allegory possible. A poem about The Civil 
War such as Davidson's "Lee in the Mountains" has refer* 
ence to a small world of fact by which it achieves its 
significance, a significance that is limited by the small 
number of suitable readers. Dante provides the ideal 
example. The point is that whether history, religion 
or both, we believe in the existence of what is being 
said in such a poem by its implicit reference to an ex­
ternal system.
Not being that of a king, general, or some other 
public figure, Lowell's life history was personal in a 
restrictive sense. Before, his religion gave his experi­
ence a largeness that his world otherwise lacked. With­
out that religion, or some other external referent equal 
to it, what could give his personal experience the public 
significance that published writing always claims? We 
are nearing the dilemma that, 1 believe, has dated the 
recent confessional poets.
Unlike the Eliot of "Ash-Wednesday," Lowell's ascent 
was carried out by one who remained "separated." He 
operated secularly and aesthetically. Hulme might say 
that the overreaching intensity of "The Mills of the 
Kavanaughs" is an attempt to shore up "spilt religion." 
For the purposes of this discussion, however, the striking
142
fact Is that Lowell's doubly compressed long poem repre­
sents an ambitious effort to press aesthetics to the 
point of becoming something larger. It is the descendant 
of Arnold's internalized dialogue, as the epigraph from 
"Dover Beach" suggests, and it is related to Pater's 
"Aesthetic Poetry," in which he says:
Of religion it learns the art of directing 
towards an unseen object sentiments whose ^
natural direction is towards objects of sense.
Lowell's extensive use of myth repeats Eliot's method, 
which assumed that myth could make the modern experience 
intelligible.*** The fact that Lowell failed with this 
method in "The Mills" explains why, when he resumed writ­
ing, he retreated from myth as he already had religion 
and settled for the third stanchion mentioned above: His­
tory, both large and small, became his single referent.
By an aesthetic suspension of horizontal, lineal events, 
Lowell sought to render his experience more intelligible.
Yet while Lowell truncates earlier levels of meaning 
and produces a lineal progression of events, Heidegger, 
in his "Origin of the Work of Art," stresses the allegori­
cal nature of art, that is, that art always has other 
levels of meaning:
The work makes public something other than it­
self; it manifests something other; it la an 
allegory. In the work of art something other 
is brought together with the thing that is 
made. '
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Related to this, Heidegger makes a remark later In the 
same essay which applies to the situation In which Lowell 
found himself after The Mills of the Kavanaughs appeared;
Just as a work cannot be without being created 
but is essentially in need of creators, so what 
is created cannot itself come into being with­
out those who preserve it.l®
This is an observation similar to Gadamer's remark about 
"the medial nature of the play process." The leveling 
of signification in Lowell's poetry that I have described 
was, as 1 have argued already, part of a larger cultural 
shift. Those who might "preserve" his poetry would not 
do so if it were alien to their understanding.
In a quite different essay, "What Was New Criticism? 
Literary Interpretation and Scientific Objectivity," 
Gerald Graff compares the New Critics (who informed early 
Lowell's poetics) with phenomenological hermeneutics, 
which has some interesting relations to later Lowell. 
Graff argues that both schools contain a "drive toward 
monistic transcendence." But there is a basic difference 
in the way each grounds this drive:
Unlike the hermeneutics . . . the New Critics
at least sought an objective basis for inter­
pretation and also, some of the time, for the 
referential truth of literature. To this ex­
tent, and setting aside the fact that their 
organlclst assumptions frustrated their at­
tempts to establish this objective basis, the 
alms of the New Critics were in my view admir­
able. These critics were willing to face up
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Co the feet that without objective criteria 
for correctness In Interpretation, the reader's 
experience of a literary work is subject to 
triviallzatlon by an unchecked relativism in 
which all readers, however distorted, are 
equally "correct."19
After "The Mills," Lowell lacked "objective criteria
for correctness." He was more likely to agree with
Heidegger's assessment of modern thought, of its "root- 
20lessness." Or, put differently, he was no longer cer­
tain of those "who preserve" a work because there was no 
"objective basis" upon which writer and reader could agree.
Related to the loss of a fixed culture and therefore 
an audience that would share consistent values, Lowell 
confronted stylistic difficulties. His poetry could no 
longer build prismatically by reflecting several levels 
of meaning at once. Grounded now in experience, in per­
sonal and public history, it had to assume a lineal 
character.
Summarizing some of his statements about language 
made in "The Way to Language," 1 said that, for Heidegger, 
language speaks us, that it pre-structures. Similarly, 
in his essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger 
suggests that art pre-structures:
If art is the origin of the work, this means 
that art lets those who naturally belong to­
gether at work, the creator and the preserver, 
originate, each in his own nature.21
But how art can pre-structure depends upon how the artist
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and the preserver view the world. If they no longer 
agree upon a myth by which they might previously have 
grasped the transcendent, then they must agree upon 
some other basis. In Lowell's case, this was the know­
ledge contained in history and personal experience. As 
I will argue shortly, the problem is one of intentional- 
ity. For the moment, however, Lowell's transition to a 
lineal understanding of experience was coupled with his 
transition to a lineal artistic mode, and such a mode 
pre-structures the way artist and preserver confront 
each other.
Viewed from one angle, we have never left the oppos­
ing positions held by Aristotle and Humbolt. For Aristotle, 
language involves "Showing." It is, if not prismatic, 
architectonic. All of these descriptions share in their 
spatial character a tendency to be synchronic. On the 
other hand, rather than "Showing" something which, to be 
able to be shown, must already be present somehow... 
rather than this, Humbolt understands language to be an 
"activity," to be "genetic." His approach is more 
diachronic.
Beyond their differences, however, these two descrip­
tions apply to Lowell's poetic shift and are united by 
his career. Early Lowell understood the world to be 
architectonic and prismatic. There were structures to 
be shown. But later, Lowell relied upon recollection and
saying to carry him along a lineal progression of events 
that by their arrangement helped him to locate himself. 
Finding he was dislocated by the loss of a fixed point 
of reference, which the Christian cosmology had provided, 
Lowell made his poetry a self-locating process. Though 
there was no certainty of the hereafter, he still could 
bring into focus a before and after.
Not black and white, the distinction is subject to 
emphasis. But it does exist and fits Lowell's poetic 
shift. In addition, Heidegger's discussion of our roman­
tic tendency to hold the world over against the self 
(as in technology) and of, therefore, the god's failure 
to arrive is revealing as to why Lowell's personal and 
poetic changes came about in the first place.
But there are also consequences to Lowell's poetic 
shift. Discussing the relatedness within which all art 
must stand, Heidegger uses the example of a Greek temple 
which encloses the figure of a god yet which in the act 
of concealing allows the god to stand out into "a holy 
precinct." The god's extension and the temple's delimits 
tion constitute the god's presence; together they make
of space a place, a precinct whose closure discloses the
22holy. The fluid relation between the man-made and 
that which is greater than man is suggested by Heidegger* 
balancing "extension and delimitation." As a delimiting 
process, art can occasion that which, strictly speaking, 
is greater than it can ever be.
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The process Is something like the fusion that occurs
in a symbol. (And earlier, Heidegger says, "The work is
a symbol." ) We usually think of a symbol as something
that derives its meaning and therefore its power from
its being purely natural. This is the way I. A. Richards
24understands a symbol in Speculative Instruments. Yet,
as Kant argues, the symbol is not only natural but,
25equally important, it is anthropomorphic. That is, 
the symbol exists by a dual nature of extensiveness (the 
purely natural aspect that Richards cannot get over) yet 
at the same time delimitation, man's limiting act of as­
signing importance to one thing while passing over another.
One aspect of Lowell's later phase is a reluctance 
toward "delimitation." Rather than assign importance to 
one event at the exclusion of another, Lowell seems to 
be saying that hierarchies will never work. His poems 
seek to gauge, to bracket, the swatch that comprises his 
experience as "extension" without assigning orders of 
significance. After such a leveling process, a skunk 
carries as much meaning as a saint. But by its very 
nature art delimits. A poem frames an experience which 
is therefore taken to be important. The consequence, 
thus, for Lowell is confusion. The lineal relation be­
tween events precludes an hierarchical understanding of 
their significance. They become equipollent. But by 
the framing process and selecting process of a poem,
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Lowell implies that some sort of hierarchy Is In use, 
apparently a personal one. Yet, following Graff, is 
this not an instance "of a literary work [being] subject 
to trivialization by an unchecked relativism'*?
Another aspect that should be noted is the distinc- 
tion Heidegger makes between thrownness and projection 
and the suggestive way this distinction applies to Lowell's 
metamorphosis. First, here is Albert Hofstadter's com­
ment on Heidegger's distinction because It gives a better 
summary than 1 am capable of giving:
Thrownness . . .  is understood in Being and 
Time as an existential characteristic of 
Dasein, human being, its thatness, its "that 
it is ," and it refers to the facticity of 
human being's being handed over to itself, its 
being on its own responsibility; as long as 
human being is what it is, it is thrown, 
cast. . . . Projection . . .  on the other
hand, is a second existential character of 
human being, referring to its driving forward 
toward its own possibility of being. It takes 
the form of understanding, which the author 
speaks of as the mode of being of human being 
in which human being is in its possibilities 
as possibilities. It~Ts not the mere having 
of a preconceived plan, but is the projecting 
of possibility in human being that occurs 
antecedently to all plans and makes planning 
possible. Human being is both thrown and 
projected; it is thrown project, factleal 
directedness toward possibilities of being.26
As I will discuss later, though this antecedent pos­
sibility does not pre-structure as we normally think of 
pre-structuring, it does precede, and 1 think that in 
part it touches upon what Husserl means by Intentionality.
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But for the moment, In a different vein, the above dis­
tinction is reminiscent of Kierkegaard's remarks on
27Philistinism in The Sickness Unto Death. That is, 
Kierkegaard contrasts probability (which is a kind of 
modern day thrownness) and possibility (which parallels 
Heidegger's notion of projection). Perhaps the most 
important thing to note is that probability is charac­
teristic of Philistinism, in Kierkegaard's view. (Re­
membering that Heidegger relates romanticism and technology, 
what is more Philistine than technology?) Making such a 
parallel provides comment upon Lowell's own thrownness 
plus his shift to a lineal poetic process, a poetic view 
that precludes the possibility of a transcendent (which 
is one type of projection).
In terms of his experience, Lowell might say that he 
definitely finds himself thrown, and he might add that 
his writing is an attempt at projection. As thrown, he 
lives in a world that understands itself by such modali­
ties as probability, a world that Heidegger finds to be
swept up in the equlpmental understanding of the techno-
28logical approach. As a writer who projects, he uses 
his imagination in a non-utilitarian thought process, 
one characterized by free play, to explore (or, drive 
"forward toward") "possibility of being." In both his 
early and his late phases Lowell found himself thrown 
yet at the same time found his poetry to be a means for 
projection.
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A song's singing Is a pre-structured activity, much 
as a poem's being read is pre-structured. A song's being 
written Is similarly controlled once the melody Is dis­
covered. But what do we say of a poem? As we have seen, 
Heidegger says that all true language (and this includes 
poetry in particular) is "the way-making movement of 
Saying" that is somehow "sent." True language is a "Say­
ing" of "destiny." Of poetry, it is a "way-making." 
Though it is minus the music in a song, it is neverthe­
less guided by a sort of melody, a tone. For Lowell in 
the activity of writing, it is all of these. To repeat 
Hofstadter:
It is . . . the projecting of possibility in
human being that occurs antecedently to all 
plans and makes planning possible.
But if, as in Lowell's experience, there no longer Is a 
transcendent to be aimed for, then poetic projection 
toward possibility is seriously restricted.
In his chapter, "What Are Poets For?" (in Poetry. 
Language, Thought), Heidegger stresses the verbal char­
acter of being, the fact that we are in process. Nature
is not nominative, as we usually think of the word, but 
verbal:
Natura . . .  is the Being of beings. . . .
This is the incipient power gathering every­
thing to itself, which in this manner releases
every being to its own self.29
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The poetic activity facilitates "the Being of beings," 
and in this way occasions (but does not control) what is 
transcendent. This, in Heidegger’s view, is the ultimate 
"projection" for poetry, and, though poetry does not con­
trol what occurs, it does uncover Being, thereby making 
it possible:
Poetry, however, is not an aimless imagining 
of whimsicalities [in its projection toward 
possibility] and not a flight of mere notions
and fancies Into the realm of the unreal. What
poetry, as Illuminating projection, unfolds of 
unconcealedness and projects ahead into the 
design of the figure, is the Open which poetry
lets happen.30
Lowell’s more restricted versions of "the Open" oc­
cur in his poetry often at the conclusions of his poems, 
probably for dramatic reasons. I have in mind not only 
Anne Kavanaugh's giving "Whatever brought . . . [her]
gladness to the grave" but the conclusions to "For the 
Union Dead," "Waking Early Sunday Morning," "Near the 
Ocean," "Beyond the Alps," and "For Sale," to name a few.
Each of these poems ends by opening out into a distance
that (similar to Heidegger's Greek temple) is at once 
definite and indefinite. Aesthetically definite, the 
poem gives closure to a perception that, being perceived, 
discloses the presence of something compellingly out of 
reach. Such an opening draws in the reader and by doing 
so gives name to what otherwise would be missed.
Following the above description, Lowell's poetry
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not only makes us recognize the existence of what we 
can never fully grasp but also reminds us of such limita­
tion. Lowell teaches us awe at the Inscrutlble amidst 
our ordinary patterns and rhythms for living. A brief 
poem such as "For Sale" demonstrates this. Lowell*s 
description presents us with the everydayness of his 
father's cottage and the efficient removal of all that 
was his father's from it. Owned for a year and then 
sold at his father’s death, it dramatizes transience be­
cause it is a home and should represent fixity, yet, 
being on the market twice in twelve months, it actually 
represents just the opposite. The poem concludes:
Ready, afraid
of living alone till eighty,
Mother mooned in a window, 
as if she had stayed on a train 
one stop past her destination.
The house is the train gone one station too far.
Both it and the train reflect Mrs. Lowell's condition by 
their fusion. Yet they are natural opposites; the one 
meant for movement, the other for staying in place. Mrs. 
Lowell has become a fusion of mutually dependent opposites 
(Staples would remind us, "life and death"), each achiev­
ing significance by the existence of its counterpart. In 
the process of a major change in her life, she neverthe­
less moons statically at a window, which frames and fixes 
what she sees (or, more precisely, what she thinks). And 
of course, her mooning contains fused opposites also.
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The point is that, because neither relents, such 
opposites open up a neutral ground, a clearing, In 
Heidegger's terms. As Lowell's mother has been, we are 
forced to recognize the effect the life-death process 
has on us. As living beings who die, we anticipate and 
experience the ultimate closure to our own perceptions.
In Its disclosure, such closure teaches us awe at what 
remains inscrutable in our coming and our going. But 
Lowell's naming the predicament objectifies it, localizes 
it, and enables us to move ahead, beyond it. His naming 
opens the poetic projection toward possibility.
Noting the priviledged (linguistic) position that 
poetry enjoys over the other arts, Heidegger adds:
Language, by naming beings for the first time,
first brings beings to word and to appear­
ance. , . . Such saying is a projecting of
the clearing, in which announcement is the 
Open a s .31
The naming may be negative with Lowell. He often names 
what "beings come into the Open as" having failed to be. 
Nevertheless, the naming process does take place.
Nautilus Island is renamed, and by such naming magnified, 
as a result of Lowell's writing "Skunk Hour."
To summarize, for Heidegger the above uses of poetry 
involve the assumption of a possible transcendent at all 
times, even when the transcendent is, in one way or an­
other, specifically shown to be missing. Of Lowell he
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might say such uses of poetry (though not the poetry It­
self) remain the imaginings of a skyward looking man. 
Husserl might add that they are made possible because 
in his early phase Lowell believed there was something 
transcendent (due to his religion), and, later, this 
enlarged his intentionality, even though he then saw 
things very differently. Regardless, the first way we 
meet Lowell's poetry in his second phase is by recogniz­
ing his thrown position (outside a religious framework, 
his "being on . . . Ibis] own responsibility") and the
lineal process within which he operates.
Though his later poetry also projected toward a 
"clearing," Lowell abandoned his Christian myth and 
thus lost the means by which he could project toward a 
transcendent, as we usually understand it. No longer 
able to poetize vertically, he turned to a poetry of 
lineal progression, one that at first used mythology 
and history but that soon leveled to personal experience, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, history as public 
experience. At first, Lowell sought to overcome the 
restrictions of a historical, lineal view by sheer aes­
thetic force, as in "The Mills of the Kavanaughs." It 
was as though by writing the long, doubly compressed 
poem that Arrowsmith describes he could generate internal­
ly the four levels of meaning that, externally, were no 
longer possible.
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By turning to a poetry of experience, many of the 
possibilities that could exist in Lowell’s first phase 
were precluded. To this extent, his poetic shift amounted 
to a limiting of possibility within the Imaginative free 
play of the poetic process. The lineal view of his second 
phase uncovered new insights in its own, specialized man­
ner, but at the same time it denied projection toward a 
transcendent, as such. Stated in the extreme, such a 
poetic shift amounted to a move from ontology to phenome­
nology. Heidegger might add that Insofar as Lowell's 
second phase results in a poetry based solely on experi­
ence, it represents a restricting approach to experience 
by the very fact that it is based upon what it regards.
It is much like the figure of a Janus, privileged with 
seeing what comes before and what comes after, but incap­
able of seeing that which is Immediately present because 
it is underfoot. Though tangential here, Heidegger re­
marks on the relation between art and experience, saying
32that "perhaps experience is the element in which art dies."
But artistic possibilities always project beyond 
what we mean by experience. To deny this is to restrict 
a vital element in art that uncovers certain parts of the 
future. Yet an art whose intentionalltles (whose imagina­
tive expectations) go no farther than what is empirically 
known of this world (or an art reluctant to go farther) 
uncovers less than an art whose horizons are wider to
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begin with. The horizons in Lowell's early phase ran 
past "the rainbow" of the Lord's "will" to infinity.
The horizons of his second phase, however, tend to be 
restricted to this world of "realistic," causal experience. 
As will be discussed in the next section, Husserl over­
comes this problem (though not artistically) by dividing 
the self into an ego as experience and a transcendental 
ego as the observer of the experiencing ego. Within 
the poetry of his second phase, Lowell employs a similar 
division.
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Lowell's poetic shift represents his movement into 
a world of mere experience, a world basically restricted 
to empirical Judgment. Having lost a cosmology, he turns 
to art (Paris, in "Crossing the Alps"), not so much cer­
tain of what he knows as certain of what he does not know.
Where Lowell uses art to gauge experience, Husserl 
proposes a phenomenological methodology to accomplish 
much the same thing. The two approaches are very dif­
ferent, however. The former is imaginative and fortui­
tous while the latter is thoroughly systematic. Yet they 
share basic characteristics.
What I would like to do is to suggest that, begin­
ning with "The Mills of the Kavanaughs," Lowell's later
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sequences of poems bracket his experience much in the 
manner that Husserl's method, as outlined In his Cartesian 
Meditations. was intended to do. Without the assumption 
of a transcendent, poetry (particularly a series of ly­
rics in the manner of Life Studies) can perform the func­
tion of a loosely structured phenomenology and, by doing 
this, locate the self. The change is something like 
shifting from celestial navigation to piloting one's way 
from one local point to another.
First, it is necessary to summarize Husserl's method, 
allowing him to do some of the work though trying to be 
as concise as possible. At the same time, 1 would like 
to suggest four analogies which relate Husserl's propos­
als to what Lowell in fact did by writing Life Studies.
The analogies distort some of Husserl's methodological 
procedures, but they arrive at his conclusion.
Like later Lowell, Husserl starts from a position 
of doubt:
I have . . . chosen to begin in absolute pover­
ty, with an absolute lack of knowledge. Begin­
ning thus, obviously one of the first things 
I ought to do is reflect on how I might find a 
method for going on, a method that promises to 
lead to genuine knowing.33
Much as Husserl begins "in absolute poverty . . .  of 
knowledge," Lowell concludes The Mills of the Kavanaughs 
with a farewell to the knowledge provided by Catholic 
theology. The final poem in The Mills is "Thanksgiving's
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Over.*' The conclusion to the first stanza states the 
poem's overall direction:
Now Michael sleeps, 
Thanksgiving's over, nothing is for keeps:
New earth, new sky, new life: I hear the word 
Of Brother Francis, child and bird, descend. 
Calling the war of Michael a pretend;
The Lord is Brother Parrot, and a friend.
A few years later, Lowell had completed his turn 
from the Church, He and Flannery O'Conner had become 
friends in the late forties when they were both staying
q  i
at Yaddo in Saratoga Springs, New York, and, judging 
from her letters, Flannery O'Conner made an effort to 
keep up with her friend and fellow Catholic; however, 
in early 1954 she learned something of the changes he 
had been undergoing. In a letter to Sally and Robert 
Fitzgerald she writes the following:
Cal Lowell [writes that he is not] "rejoining 
the flock." He thought he "could do more good 
outside, at least for myself." And some other 
claptrap about Henry Adams being a Catholic 
anarchist and he was the same, only agnostic 
too. I wrote him that his not being in the 
Church was a grief to me and I knew no more 
to say about it. 1 said I severely doubted 
he would do any good to anybody else outside 
but that it was probably true he would do 
good to himself Inasmuch as he would be the 
only one in a position to.’*
O'Conner might have made the same assessment of anyone 
seriously employing a phenomenological approach to his 
experience. At any rate, anarchy was the political
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manifestation of Lowell's doubt, agnosticism the 
religious.
The next stop in Lowell's development is "Beyond 
the Alps," which 1 have cited before. Marking his de­
parture from the Church, from Rome, and his arrival at 
the city of art, Paris, it is the opening poem to Life 
Studies. From now on Lowell's poetic process will be 
secular and, as "Studies" suggests, tentative.
Operating out of Cartesian doubt, Husserl decides 
to split the ego (what Lowell might call the conscious 
self) and pursue a transcendental ego as the phenomenal- 
ity of everything that is. Such an ego is in many ways 
analogous to Lowell's poetic imagination. But for the 
moment, Husserl:
At this point, following Descartes, we make 
the greatest reversal that, if made in the 
right manner, leads to transcendental subjec­
tivity: the turn to the ego cogito as the ul­
timate and apodictil cally [sic] certain basis 
for judgments. . . .
[T]he world is for us only something that 
claims being. . . . [Njot just corporeal 
Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life- 
world Is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon 
of being, instead of something that is. . . .
[T]he being of the experienced world remains 
unaccepted by me, still this abstaining is what 
it is; and It exists, together with the whole 
stream of my experiencing life. Moreover, this 
life is continually there for me. Continually, 
in respect of a field of the present, it is 
given to the consciousness perceptually, with 
the most originary originality, as it itself; 
memorlally, now these and now those pasts
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thereof are "again" given to consciousness, 
and that implies: as the "pasts-themselves". 
Reflecting, I can at any time look at this 
original living and note particulars; I can 
grasp what is present as present, what is 
past as past, each as Itself, . . .
Meanwhile the world experienced in this 
reflectively grasped life goes on being for 
me (In a certain manner) "experienced" as 
before, and with just the content it has at 
any particular time. It goes on appearing, 
as it appeared before; the only difference 
is that I, as reflecting philosophically, no 
longer keep in effect (no longer accept) the 
natural believing in existence involved in 
experiencing the worldl--though that believ­
ing too is still there and grasped by my 
noticing regard.2 The same is true of all 
the processes of meaning that, in addition 
to the world-experiencing^ ones, belong to 
my lifestream . . . when I am in the natural and
non-reflective attitude. . . . [Tlhe philosophi­
cally reflective Ego's absention from position- 
takings . . . does not signify their disappearance.
Husserl is describing his "transcendental epoche,"
which he calls a "transcendental-phenomenological reduc- 
37tion." He is pursuing a more objective grasp of ex­
perience by, as he says, a "great reversal," a radical 
subjectivity. His phenomenological reduction provides 
a bracketing of the real world that helps him locate 
himself within his ongoing experience. As part of this 
he divides his conscious self into an ego as experience 
and a transcendental ego as the phenomenality of every­
thing that can b e .
Such a self-division is basic to Lowell's poetic 
process. In the radical subjectivity of the Imaginative 
process, Lowell turns his own existence into an object.
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It is a variation on the Cartesian split with the subject 
(rather than thinking about or doubting his existence) 
Imagining variations upon that existence. By allowing 
his transcending and imagining ego to be the observing 
and rearranging subject over his objectified ego as ex­
perience, Lowell manages to bracket his experience on 
the one hand and, on the other hand, to explore possi­
bilities for new experience.
In the above quotation, Husserl gives the first 
hint of intentionality as he uses it when he says that 
the "life-world is for me . . . only a phenomenon of
being." As a phenomenon, it can be affected by his ln- 
tentlonality, what he expects to see, which is molded 
by what he has already seen. He also provides for a 
time sense by distinguishing between past and present, 
to which he later adds a protentional positing of the 
future. Finally, though (as he says) he abstains from 
accepting the experienced world, he nevertheless recog­
nizes that the world or its object is in some sense 
apodictlcally given.
To summarize the correspondences between Husserl's 
method and Lowell's process, I would like to use four 
analogies which, taken simultaneously, approximate the 
sort of consciousness that both poet and philosopher 
intended. The analogies are as follows: The conscious­
ness of space-time experience as a solitary skin diver;
Che process of recollection from Che past and projection 
Co the future operating in the previous consciousness 
much as a column of slides in a slide projector in which 
the present is the slide being shown at the moment; in- 
tentionality operating in a consciousness that contains 
at once both the diver's process and that of the projec­
tor, an intentionality which governs yet is capable of 
being refuted (as with the milk-bourbon analogy given 
earlier) but one which can be varied to allow for dis­
covery of what, not normally being Intended, might not 
be experienced; and, finally, the consciousness of time 
as a retentional and protentional continuum, a Janus 
consciousness.
One way to think of the above four analogies is as 
a group of transparencies which one overlays on a map 
or chart. That is, though I identify them as distinct 
processes, they actually occur in the consciousness 
simultaneously. Indeed, though I name them separately, 
they cannot be independent of each other and still exist
Because he will eventually be seen to be the most 
inclusive of the four, the diver is the best figure with 
which to begin. Having descended into a lake, at first 
he does not know what to expect. He can see for approxi 
mately forty feet in any direction through water that 
has sediment but that is relatively clear. Having de­
scended to twenty feet above the bottom, he swims in a
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straight line, and the distance he covers cannot be 
separated from the amount of time that passes. Thus, 
his swimming is a space-time continuum.
As he swims he remains twenty feet from the bottom. 
Each Instance in the time he swims is coupled with a 
different spot on the lake bottom over which he passes 
spatially just as time passes in its manner. In this 
sense, his experience is synchronous and might lend it­
self to a sort of calculus, were the diver outside his 
experience. At this point, however, he is not; he is 
Husserl's ego as experience, though a modified version 
of this. The modification I have made is that, rather 
than experiencing only one object through the eidetic 
reduction as an eidetic horizon (as Husserl does), this 
ego experiences a whole series of objects appearing over 
an ever-opening horizon. He has been put into process 
and, to this extent, psychologized, something Husserl 
does not d o .
What he experiences is a lighted disk on a lake 
bottom that changes with his space-time swimming. His 
horizon of experience is, though 360 degrees, always only 
forty feet away. As he swims, he notices whatever fea­
tures the lake offers coming into view over that horizon, 
various fish, rocks on the bottom and so forth. However, 
gradually he begins to expect to experience certain fish 
or certain sized rocks because of former fish and former
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rocks. He is building up a bank of past images that in­
form his receptiveness to what lies in the future.
The past images retained in the diver's conscious­
ness are constantly pushed farther back by new images 
which become part of the past as soon as they are ex­
perienced, These past Images are like the slides column 
fed through the projector. Future images are yet to be 
screened, but past images are retained and can be called 
back to mind much as one might reverse a projector. 
Eventually, however, past Images become forgotten; they 
are covered over and lost unless something happens to 
startle them back into memory. They are covered or 
sedimented in the diver's consciousness much as the hori­
zon behind him is obscured by sediment and distance as 
he swims away from it.
Because what he sees informs his consciousness, 
these past images constitute past phases of the ego, 
what can be called an eidetic ego because it is formed 
by use of the eidos. Because he is in part formed by 
this past, what the diver encounters in the future is 
modified by earlier encounters. This is the basis for 
intentionality; we are able to experience a thing be­
cause our expectation has in some way pre-structured 
its coming about. The man who expected warm milk did 
so because of his previous experience with putting the 
milk in a glass and leaving it. His consciousness is
actually startled into an original (rather than expected) 
experience by having his expectations or intentionality 
refuted with warm bourbon.
So far 1 have mentioned the diver, the slide projec­
tor and the man who Intends to drink milk. What remains 
is the Janus consciousness, which incorporates all of 
the above analogies and adds its own particulars. Having 
gathered experience, the diver's consciousness is like 
a slide projector in that it retains the past while pro­
ceeding ahead moment to moment, or slide to slide. Each 
slide is the fleeting present. The Janus incorporates 
this function and adds something to it. The backward- 
looking Janus retains the past, as does the slide column. 
The forward-looking Janus, however, adds the intentional- 
ity of the man who expects milk plus the space-time move­
ment of the swimmer that uncovers new experience.
The Janus may be seen as a combination of the other 
three functions. Yet there is one difference that sets 
the Janus apart. Just as the two-faced guardian of por­
tals is able to experience past and future (beginnings 
and endings) simultaneously, which the above three can­
not do, he is Incapable of seeing what is immediately 
beneath him, and that is the present, what John Bricuth 
would call "the magic ground, / Lost or fled or sundered.* 
The points over which the diver swims are instances of 
discrete, punctual experience, yet the full experience
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of the consciousness described by all four analogies Is 
excluded from the present because It Is In constant 
process. Being time-locked, It moves from one moment 
to the next synthetically and by the very nature of such 
movement Is Incapable of fixing on any one moment such 
as the present, which is in itself also fleeting.
Furthermore, our whole approach to this multi-faceted 
diver has been from somewhere outside him. I have de­
scribed him in such a way that he is always before us 
but separate from u s . And yet 1 have been trying to 
grasp the process of his consciousness. This multi-faceted 
diver represents the ego as experience, but there is that 
other ego, the transcendental ego.
What this means is that, following Husserl's method 
and Lowell's poetic process in terms of the above analogy, 
the diver has a double who is swimming directly above him 
watching him watch, experiencing his experiencing only 
removed so that there is greater room for variation. This 
is the transcendental ego (or, in Lowell, the poetic 
imagination). It is the ego that has thrust itself out­
side the ordinary continuum of experience, never letting 
that experience become lost, however. Repeating a dis­
tinction made between "adequacy" and "apodicticity" of 
that evidence we gain as experience and maintaining that, 
in this area, "adequacy" will suffice, Husserl continues:
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Perhaps this remark was made precisely with 
the case of transcendental self-experience in 
mind. In such experience the ego is accessible 
to himself originaliter. But at any particular 
time this experience offers only a core that is 
experienced with strict adequacy", namely the 
ego’s living present (which the grammatical 
sense of the sentence, ego cogito. expresses); 
while, beyond that, only an indeterminately
feneral presumptive horizon extends, corapris- ng what is strictly non-experienced but neces­
sarily also-meant. To it belongs not only the 
ego's past, most of which is completely obscure, 
but also his transcendental abilities and his 
habitual peculiarities at the time. External 
perception too (though not apodlctic) is an 
experiencing of something itself, the physical 
thing itself: "it itself is there". But, in 
being there itself, the physical thing has for 
the experlencer an open, infinite, indetermi­
nately general horizon, comprising what is it­
self not strictly perceived--a horizon (this 
is implicit as a presumption) that.can be 
opened up by possible experiences.39
Two positions exist: The diver and his double. There 
Is thus a doubling, eventually a multiplying, of horizons. 
The experiencing diver comes upon objects which also have 
horizons, horizons other than his. But first, the tran­
scendental ego (or, diver) can watch the experiencing ego 
(or, diver) from his horizon structure and gain a second 
structure. Next, if the experiencing diver is encounter­
ing an object with its own, third horizon structure, then 
the possibilities become multiple.
What this finally represents is the opening up of 
possible experiences in an eidetic ego. The imagining 
poet regarding his own experience, or the transcendental 
ego as diver regarding his experiencing ego, is able to
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use that experiencing self as a second locus t and when 
that experiencing ego encounters another object with its 
implicit locus and horizon structure, a whole world struc­
ture becomes possible for an otherwise time-locked and 
isolated consciousness. In fact the experiencing ego 
encounters many other objects over a period of time, 
and this greatly expands possible horizons, possible 
worlds, for an intentional self. The important point 
is that at first a triangulation of experience occurs, 
and (as in navigation and in piloting) this is the most 
basic method of self•locating, the primary method.
But such a triangulation can only occur after a 
"Pairing," such as that between ego and alter ego, has 
taken place. It is an "Appresentation" of an "Other," 
an "organism" which proves it is other by its "continuous
change in behavior from phase to phase." Much as the
transcendental diver who watches the experiencing diver 
who has his own experience,
The character of . . . [an] existent "other"
has its basis in . . . [a] kind of verifiable
accessibility of what is not originally ac­
cessible. . . .  In other words, another monad 
becomes constituted appresentatively in mine.^0
Husserl is describing a monadic consciousness which con­
tains within itself all that exists outside Itself. It 
is a microcosm.
One is reminded of Sidney's view of the poet "freely
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ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit. How­
ever, the present view involves an Isolation of the con­
sciousness that would have been antithetical to Sidney's 
understanding, particularly his belief in the allegorical 
function of a poem standing between philosophy and history 
as a "speaking picture .
Just as later Lowell's poetic consciousness is one 
that exists without a theology, Husserl's description of 
consciousness involves one that exists without a philoso­
phy. But both have history, and (though not by philoso­
phy or theology) both also have means for exploration of 
possibility. In Husserlian terms, because there "is a 
universe of compossibilities," as a result of the commu­
nity of monads, there is a rationality of time. Working 
systematically, the ego is capable of a unified experience, 
a history:
We can call it furthermore a formal regularity 
pertaining to a universal gen e s i s ^ which is 
such t h a t p a s t , present, and future, become 
unltarily constituted over and over again, in 
a certain . . . formal structure of flowing 
modes of givenness.
But, within this form, life goes on as a moti­
vated course of particular constitutive per­
formances with a multiplicity of particular 
motivations and motivational systems, which, 
according to universal laws of genesis, produce 
a unity of universal genesis of the ego. The 
ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to 
speak, the unity of a " h i s t o r y . " ^
Somewhat like the past of the column of slides that
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has already been screened, like Che retentional Janus 
and like the intentionality of the man expecting warm 
milk, the "flowing modes of givenness" become "a unity 
of . . . genesis of the ego," a history. One Is re­
minded of Lowell's poems which are often almost a snapshot- 
series of past phases (static images much like slides) 
within his consciousness. But as an eidetic ego that 
transcends his time-locked "flowing . . .  of givenness," 
or as a poetically imagining consciousness capable of 
free play and projection, Lowell can not only trace his 
past development, but by eidetic variation he can also 
explore "an infinity of forms," including possibilities 
held in the future. His intentionality may direct which 
"forms" he chooses, but "an infinity of a priori types 
of actualities and potentialities of life" make choice 
possible in the first place. Husserl calls this capa­
bility the "universal Apriori," itself an "eidetic form" 
in the transcendental ego but a form that contains "an 
infinity of forms .
What we are approaching is an isolated consciousness 
that works its way out of isolation by first positing a 
"non-Ego," which "lj3 the other Ego," and which ultimately 
sees itself existing in a community of monads:
[T]he intrinsically first other (the first 
"non-Ego") is the other Ego~! Xnd the other 
Ego makes constitutionally possible a new 
infinite domain of what is "other": an
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Objective Nature and a whole Objective world, 
to which all other Egos and I myself belong. . . 
[A]n Ebo-community, which includes me, becomes 
constituted (in my sphere of ownness, naturally) 
as a community of Egos existing with each other 
and for each other--ultimately a community of 
monads. which, moreover, (in its communaTizeH 
intentionality) constitutes the one identical 
world.
Husserl is describing the world as a "transcendental inter- 
subjectivity . . .  in which . . . the Objective world" is 
constituted. But "the constitution of . . . [such a]
world essentially involves a ’harmony1 of the monads."
He argues that he has moved from the realm "of the 'as 
if,'" a realm of "phantasies," to "Objective experience" 
dealt with by "scientific activity.
The preceding sentence makes a claim that cannot be 
applied to Lowell's poetry, which remains in the realm 
of the "as if." I know of no actual "scientific activity" 
taking place within Husserl's method; however, his de­
scription is illuminating as to the problems faced by the 
secular subjectivity of the modern poetic imagination, 
which remains the predominant poetic imagination today.
In addition, Husserl's overcoming what we generally call 
the romantic subject-object split (by using that very 
split with a vengeance) parallels the most common modal­
ity that we find in modern poetry.
In his The Situation of Poetry, Robert Pinsky touches 
on John Berryman's use of a persona. Henry allows 
Berryman to get away with "Tennysonian" language. Using
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Henry Is a strategy "for retaining or recovering the 
elevation of Victorian d i c t i o n . B u t  something more 
basic takes place as well. At times, Henry can be an 
appresentation of Berryman. A b Husserl would have it, 
Berryman (the imagining poet as transcendental ego) ap- 
presents Henry (the experiencing ego). Such a method 
gains the stylistic objectivity that Plnsky identifies, 
but more importantly it also provides objectivity for 
the poem as a mode of thought. In terms of taste, 
Berryman may get away with "Tennysonian" diction by put­
ting it in Henry's mouth; but he also gets beyond the 
modern predicament of radical subjectivity by doubling 
that subjectivity. Henry becomes another monad, and 
the horizon structure of his experiencing ego is incor­
porated into the poet's horizon structure. Each object 
observed by Henry constitutes a third structure, thus 
(as mentioned earlier) we are able to build a self- 
locating system of triangulation within "an Objective 
Nature . . .  a community of monads."
Pinsky's concern at this point is primarily a 
stylistic one which he relates to the tradition; however, 
his remarks about Lowell and Berryman, immediately after, 
carry an assumption that is much the same as "the unity 
of a 'history'" that Husserl discusses. The tradition 
that Plnsky is concerned with represents that history. 
Language that Lowell or Berryman would like to use (such
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as that of James or Tennyson) represents the sensibility 
(and the point of view) of a particular past phase in 
the retentional consciousness of each poet, even though 
learned second hand. The problem is how to recognize 
that past phase of the poet's (and reader's) transcendental 
ego in the present. It is part of the present in Husserllan 
terms because as a past experience it modifies the inten­
tionality by which we encounter the present; in Plnsky's 
terms, because it is part of the tradition, which might be 
seen as a specialized instance of intentionality. More­
over, we may discuss this as a stylistic concern, but, as 
I have tried to demonstrate, style cannot be separated 
from thought.
Discussing Lowell's "Women, Children, Babies, Cows,
Cats" (a poem that "is entirely enclosed between quotation 
marks," which means that a second ego is speaking), Plnsky 
notes that we are presented with the "contours of the 
speaker's character" and with "the subject of remembering."^ 
The poem is a self-locating process for Lowell in Husserllan 
terms of time and experience and, though vaguely, self- 
locating in the broader terms of guilt and responsibility.
A monadic voice speaks, recollecting past phases of experi­
ence which were violent encounters with others whose experi­
ence was equally monadic and equally valuable, therefore 
the guilt.
Before leaving Plnsky, 1 would like to quote a paragraph
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In which he relates Lowell and Berryman In their use of 
protagonists:
To assign part of the poem to a voice or 
protagonist gives the attributed element a 
kind of autonomy, however Illusory or con­
ventional. Lowell has used that illusion of 
autonomy as a way to approach elusive or am­
bivalent judgments of outward matters, values 
of a cultural or social kind [a strategy meant 
to overcome the loss, that Cosgrave identifies, 
of a system of value upon which to base judg­
ments] . In John Berryman's poems dramatic 
devices often seem to work similarly in rela­
tion to more wholly inward judgments; the 
quasi-autonomous element in the poem supplies 
a way to have one's self-dramatization and 
yet to Judge it--or at least to stand a little 
apart from it. (Ted Hughes' Crow seems to 
carry this principle even further.)
Stylistic matters of persona, protagonist, or voice (as 
in "Women, Children, Babies, Cows, Cats" or as In Anne 
Kavanaugh's revery) become even more important to the 
discussion of poetry when they are recognized as also 
being widely employed modes of thought. As modes of 
thought, they are strikingly similar to Husserl's separa­
tion of the experiencing ego (here the persona) from the 
transcendental ego, here the poet.
Though it is different from Heidegger's example of 
a Greek temple, poetry operating in a roughly Husserllan 
manner is a world-building activity. Largely because it 
is linguistic, it can occasion more than in itself it 
ever is, Heidegger's "Open" which makes the possibility 
for the god's return. Related to this, Husserl's method
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Is not a psychology of experience; nor is Lowell's. 
Toward the end of the "Fifth Meditation," Husserl dis­
cusses the "Metaphysical results of our explication of 
experiencing someone else." As already mentioned, he 
has arrived at a plurality of monads that spatlalizes 
and temporalizes the world. It Is seen as a space-time 
continuum much like the diver's swimming. Wallace 
Stevens understands such a world (particularly in its 
protentional and projecting aspects) as being informed 
by "supreme fictions":
There is, in fact, a world of poetry indistin­
guishable from the world in which we live, 
or, I ought to say, no doubt, from the world 
in which we shall come to live, since what 
makes the poet the potent figure that he is, 
or w as, or ought to b e , is that he creates the 
world to which we turn incessantly and without 
knowing it and that he gives to life the su­
preme fictions without which we are unable to 
conceive of it.
Without such fictions informing our intentionality, we 
will fail to see what they protentionally provide for 
the future. Heidegger would say that such fictions can 
project toward that transcendent which, lacking them, we 
generally miss. Husserl would say they are the products 
of eidetic variation carried out by the transcendental 
ego which gives us "an Objective world."
Closer to Heidegger here than elsewhere, Husserl 
would also say that such fictions are "Our monadological 
results" and that they "are metaphysical. if it be true
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that ultimate cognitions of being should be called meta­
physical." Having abandoned the objective world by a 
method of radical subjectivity that arrived first at one 
then two monads, then more, Husserl continues:
[T]he two [or more] worlds are then . . . mere 
"surrounding worlds" . . . mere aspects of a
single Objective world, which is common to 
them. . . .  As imagined by me, each of them 
is in necessary comnunlon with me (or with me 
in respect of a possible variant of myself) 
as the constitutive primal monad relative to 
them. Accordingly they belong in truth to a 
single universal community, which includes 
me and comprises unitarlly all the monads and 
groups of monads that can be conceived as co­
existent. Actually, therefore, there can exist 
only a single community of monads'! the commun­
ity of all co-existing monads. Hence there 
can exist only one Objective world, only one 
Objective time, only one Objective space, only 
one Objective Nature.51
This is quite a distance from the apparently rela- 
tivistic (if not nihilistic) beginnings of Husserl's 
method grounded in doubt. Indeed the above is more the 
articulation of an ideal than it is of a fact. But it 
leads directly to the possibility of eidetically varying 
the self through imagination to cope with our time-locked 
consciousness which has no other means to proceed but 
synthetically:
Leibniz is right when he says that infinitely 
many monads and groups of monads are conceiv­
able but that it does not follow that all these 
possibilities are compossible; and, again, when 
he says that infinitely many worlds might have 
been created", but not two or more at once,
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since they are Imcomposslble [sic]. It is to 
be noted in this connexion that, in a free 
variation, I can phantasy first of all myself, 
this apodictlc de facto ego, as otherwise and 
can thus acquire the system of possible variants 
of myself. each of which, however, is annuled 
Tsic] b y e a c h  of the others and by the ego who 
I actually am. . . . If I phantasy myself as
different from what I actual-a pure possibility  
ly am, that possibility in turn prescribes what 
monads exist' for him as others. And proceeding 
in this fashion, I recognize that each monad . . 
predellneates a compossible universe, a closed 
''world of monads", and that two worlds of monads 
are lncompossible, just as two possible variants 
of my ego (or of any presupposedly phantasied 
ego whatever) are incompossible. "
We are not as far away from Lowell as might seem the 
case. Because of its imagery, his poetry appears to repre­
sent a spatially dislocated self. But in fact, since "two 
possible variants of . . . [the] ego . . . are incompos-
sible," the dislocation is a temporal one. This first be­
comes clear in Anne Kavanaughrs revery, by which she (as 
transcendental ego) re-presents past phases of her experi­
encing ego. They are past and must be re-presented be­
cause no two horizon structures are identical, and because 
her moving through such plateaus of past experience ex­
plains her present situation, thus locates her.
In the poem's opening lines we Immediately have the 
three horizon structures of possible experience necessary 
for triangulation. Anne's present, reflective self repre­
sents a transcendental ego, and her past self is an experi­
encing ego. Lowell, as poet, provides a third monad, the 
one closest to us, though obscured. Harry provides a
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fourth horizon. Harry and Anna as children provide 
others, as do Harry's mother, Red Kavanaugh and, distant­
ly, even Anne's drunken father. Ultimately, all of these 
are experiencing egos for Lowell's transcendental ego, or 
poetic Imagination. They all contain variations upon 
Lowell's own experience, which has been dislocated because 
time-locked in mere process. As Husserl says, no "two 
or more" worlds can be conceived at once "since they are 
imcompossible [sic]."
Because for Lowell time was no longer grounded in 
the historical fact of Christ as, within a Christian 
understanding, it once had been, he found time to be a 
dislocating process. Lacking an adequately grounded sys­
tem of value, his judgments were in danger of becoming 
relative, indeed situational to the point of mere opinion. 
An historical consciousness was intended to correct this; 
however, as with Lowell's dramatic version of Benito 
Cereno. his judgments often lacked perspective and in­
stead were provincial in terms of the brief time frame 
(the sixties) that informed them.
Similarly, lacking a transcendent that was fixed so 
that the process of his allegory might reflect it pris- 
matlcally, Lowell turned to the fixity of a personal and 
a public past. Dislocated by time, he employed time to 
relocate himself, much as Husserl exploited subjectivity 
to overcome subjectivity.
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IV
In a letter that Is part of her extensive corre­
spondence with a person so far known only aB "A," Flannery 
O'Conner summarizes her experience with Robert Lowell 
around the time he was writing and revising "The Mills 
of the Kavanaughs":
You ask about Cal Lowell. I feel almost too 
much about him to be able to get to the heart 
of it. He is a kind of grief to me. I first 
knew him at Yaddo. We were both there one 
fall and winter. At that time he had left 
his first wife, Jean Stafford, and the Church. 
To make a long story short, I watched him that 
winter come back into the Church. I had noth­
ing to do with it but of course it was a great 
joy to m e . I was only 23 and didn't have much 
sense. He was terribly excited about it and 
got more and more excited and in about two 
weeks had a complete mental breakdown. That 
second conversion went with it, and when he 
came out, he was well for a time, married a- 
gain a very nice girl named Elizabeth Hardwick, 
and since then has been off and on, in and 
out, of institutions. Now he is doing very 
well on one of these drugs--but the Church is 
out of it, though I don't believe he has been 
able to convince himself that he doesn't be­
lieve. . . . The last thing he wrote was 
called The Mills of the Kavanaughs. Right now 
he is writing an autobiography. This is part 
of some kind of analytical therapy.*3
And then in a letter to the same person four years later:
Let me right now correct, stash & obliterate 
this revolting story about Lowell introducing 
me as a saint. . . .  At the time it was hap­
pening, poor Cal was about three steps from 
the asylum. He had the delusion that he had 
been called on some kind of mission of
180
purification and he was canonizing everybody 
that had anything to do with his situation 
then. 1 was very close to him and so was 
Robert [Fitzgerald]. 1 was too Inexperienced
to know he was mad, I just thought that was 
the way poets acted. Even Robert didn't know 
It, or at least didn't know how near collapse 
he was. In a couple of weeks he was safely 
locked u p . It would be funny if it had not 
been so terrible. . . . Robert and I both 
made fun of him when he said such things, but 
there was no deterring him. He mixed it all 
in with his wild humor. Things went faster 
and faster and faster for him until I guess 
the shock table took care of it. It was a 
grief for me as if he had died. When he camee. 
out of it, he was no longer a Catholic. . , .
Not only was Lowell's autobiographical writing a 
"kind of analytical therapy" (or, self-locating), as the 
first quotation maintains, but, as the second suggests, 
his religious Interests, his poetry, and his illness are 
intertwined. In all three he was an absolutist from the 
start. As O'Conner first knew him, he would have agreed 
with Denis Donoghue' s recent remark (made in The Sover­
eign Ghost) , "that imagination is the secular name we 
apply to the soul" in our efforts "to live peacefully 
with our neighbors." Donoghue goes on to say that he 
"cannot believe . . . the imagination is other than divine 
in its o r i g i n , a n d  he later adds, "the poet believes 
that the direction of his work is a kind of destiny."^®
These opinions would be perfectly agreeable to Lowell 
as Flannery O'Conner knew him at Yaddo and shortly after. 
But consider the difficulty involved in his intellectually 
rejecting such notions (particularly deciding that his
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poetry Is, after all, not "a kind of destiny") yet re­
maining an absolutist by temperament and beyond dissua­
sion. O'Conner's observations are interesting because, 
though mentally healthy, she too confronted illness, 
was a writer, and was a serious Catholic. Her position 
on Lowell seems to have been that he never gave up a 
religious desire but that because of his Instability he 
stayed Intellectually and emotionally clear of tradi­
tional Christian doctrine or formal practice as much as 
possible. In sum, Lowell continued to have the absolut­
ist's drive for certitude, as I believe that "Waking 
Early Sunday Morning" and "Near the Ocean" demonstrate. 
But because of his instability it was a drive without a 
goal, a desire without an object or, to borrow again 
from Pater (only something that sounds as though it could 
be from Heidegger), "a love defined by the absence of 
the beloved."
Discussing what he calls "enterprises especially 
congenial to the imagination," Donoghue lists the con­
templative, descriptive mode, Allen Tate's angelic mode, 
and the negatlng-dlfferentiating mode. Early Lowell 
tended toward the second of these, the angelic, but later 
he tended toward the third, the negating-differentlating 
mode which is reminiscent of the "antagonisms" that 
Staples identifies in Lowell and the "contraries" for 
which Yenser opts. But to return to Donoghue*s idea of
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the angelic mode of imagination, which fits much of 
early Lowell:
Sometimes the act of imagination Is felt as a 
desperate necessity, like an act of faith in 
the absence of evidence in its favour. Natural 
forms are not felt as sustenance, and the leap 
of faith is made in the needy hope of aspiring 
beyond nature to more complete satisfactions.
If nature is not enough, the imagination must 
act upon its own authority. Such an imagina­
tion is often "angelic," to use Allen Tate's 
description, and it results in a hypertrophy 
of feeling, will, and intellect; of feeling, 
since it exhibits "the Incapacity to represent 
the human condition in the central tradition 
of natural feeling"; of will, since it features 
"the thrust of the will beyond the human scale 
of action"; and of intellect, since it shows 
"the intellect moving in isolation from both 
love and the moral will, whereby It declares 
itself independent of the human situation in 
quest of essential knowledge."57
The above description fits Lowell's early phase only 
in part, as is also the case with the summary of the 
negating-differentiating mode's application to his second 
phase. Nevertheless, the concentrated writing in Lowell's 
first phase, that Arrowsmith picked out, has its own 
"desperate necessity." With very little violence done 
to them, most of the poems in Lord Weary's Castle and The 
Mills of the Kavanaughs do read like acts "of faith in 
the absence of evidence." Also, they are too strained 
and uncomfortable to be representations of "the human 
condition" in anything like a "tradition of natural feel­
ing," and, in their concern with an absolute that is often 
more Calvlnistic than Catholic, they are Instances of the
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writer's will thrusting "beyond the human scale of ac­
tion." On the other hand, Donoghue's description of the 
angelic imagination's "intellect" is less satisfactory 
because at this time Lowell's Catholicism tended to in­
tegrate his thought and "moral will."
Discussing the negatlng-differentiating mode, 
Donoghue alludes to the Preface to Hegel's The Pheno­
menology of Mind, "where [Hegel] speaks of the mind en­
gaged with distinctions and difference." By negating, 
the self makes a difference evident, and making distinc­
tions is fundamental to the mind's synthetic progress 
toward knowledge. However, there also exists a gray 
area in the negating-differentiating mode. If you ne­
gate with a great deal of "vehemence you make the reader 
aware of the vehemence necessary to banish" the object
in the first place. This has the effect of increasing
38the object's presence.
Whether the object is maintained by "faith in the 
absence of evidence," as with the angelic mode, is ne­
gated, or is again made present by the vehemence of its 
banishment, there exists an absenting and presencing 
tension. Both modes confront this; they merely stand 
on opposite sides of the process. "The Mills of the 
Kavanaughs" stands between the two sides. Lowell's re­
visions amount to a banishment in themselves; however, 
the dual nature of Anne Kavanaugh as Persephone amounts
184
to a negating-differentiating mode in itself, but at 
the same time she is emblematic of the renewal of life. 
She can negate life in part, and her doing so amidst the 
Maine countryside amounts to a differentiation. However, 
she also stands for the return of life, and in this 
capacity she represents an instance of "faith in the 
absence of evidence." The latter significance applies 
to Anne Kavanaugh particularly in the first version of 
"The Mills" when the Catholic references were still 
present to reinforce this half of her.
The negating-differentiating mode is summarized by 
Donoghue, with even a reference to Pater that is close 
to the one used earlier in this discussion. Donoghue 
begins with a positive use of negation that reminds one 
of Husserl's first step with Descartes:
Human language alone contains the principle 
of negation. Negation is therefore a linguis­
tic marvel by which the mind repudiates its 
dependence upon objects. The objects exist, 
they are there, [much as Husserl finally ac­
knowledges an objective world] but the 
mind exerts itself by rejecting them [much 
as Husserl follows Descartes by beginning 
with doubt], I assume a direct relation 
between the principle of negation and 
Pater's account of those moments in which 
the mind replaces the object in nature by a 
wealth of sensations and Impressions [similar 
to eidetic variations]: these are the only
remaining traces of the object, and thereafter 
their intensity is Independent of the object 
[as they become mere phenomena which are part 
of the horizon structure and intentionality 
of a consciousness].59
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1 have Interrupted Donoghue with comparisons to 
Husserl because the parallels between his third mode 
and Lowell's second phaBe are even more striking than 
those between his second mode and Lowell's first phase. 
The overriding point to be emphasized is that in his 
description of three ways the modern imagination has 
come to operate, two of Donoghue's modes do outline the 
two phases of Lowell's poetic imagination that I have 
described. If Lowell were not a leader in the move from 
the second imaginative mode to the third, his poetic 
shift would still be a prime example of the distinction 
that Donoghue makes.
I might add that, as previously suggested, Lowell's 
early phase is not altogether religious. He has all of 
the Judgment that negates the world and little of the 
grace that enlivens it. This characteristic also fits 
the angelic mode:
[T]he imagination proposes to set against the 
natural world a rival fiction which owes as 
little as possible to nature and nearly every­
thing to itself.60
That is, the implicit system of value by which Lowell 
makes judgments is "set against the natural world" in its 
very negativity as "a rival fiction."
Not only in some ways negative in its Judgment, an 
early poem such as "The Drunken Fisherman" demonstrates 
the three characteristics of the angelic Imagination
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given above. The poem suggests that our modern life Is 
a "dynamited brook" whose waters "peter out." Acknow­
ledging the recurrent failure that Peter represents, it 
nevertheless appears to conclude positively. Yet at 
the same time it includes the angelic characteristics, 
which are not positive: First, the poem's violent diction 
("this bloody sty," "raging memory drools," "bloody 
waters," "remorse, / Stinking," and so forth) is part 
of the eccentric and negative view it represents of 
(as Donoghue says) the "human condition," and (again 
Donoghue) such diction does not "represent . . . the
central tradition of natural feeling." Second, in its 
vision of the power of Christ over "the Prince of Dark­
ness" who stalks us in our human limitation, the poem 
opts for "the thrust of the will beyond the human scale 
of action," here in religious terms. Finally, the 
fisherman's Christian ruminating (or, "intellect") is 
so isolated from anyone else that it demonstrates neither 
"love" nor "moral will” but instead seems intent upon 
a "quest" for "essential knowledge" (Donoghue*s terms), 
which surpasses the "bloodstream['s] , . . Stygian term";
in his drunken isolation, if not solipsism, the fisher­
man's preoccupation is with an "essential knowledge" 
that, going beyond his place in the world, is angelic.
Other early poems, such as "Mr. Edwards and the 
Spider," "After the Surprising Conversions," "Her Dead
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Brother," "Mother Marie Therese," and "Thanksgiving's 
Over" contain isolated consciousnesses similar to the 
one I have described above. In stmt, the dislocated 
self, whose isolation is so evident in Lowell's second 
phase, was already present in his first phase, only 
needing certain modifications to then surface as his 
main concern.
Before discussing the alternative to his early 
phase, Life Studies, I would like to recollect the basic 
pressures for Lowell's abandonment of his earlier style. 
Up to "The Mills of the Kavanaughs," the Christian 
framework provided a transcendent order within which 
human action took place. Having a First Cause gave 
adequate grounding to the causality in the narrative of 
"The Mills." Without a First Cause, however, one faced 
an infinite regress through preceding causes and an at­
tendant loss in the significance of any one instance of 
cause and effect, due to the multiplicity of causes and 
effects in a groundless, infinitely ongoing process.
The loss of such a transcendent also meant the loss of 
three of the four levels of Interpretation.
Jerome Mazzaro has noted that the poems in The Mills 
of the Kavanaughs "complete the disintegration of the 
anagogical level in Lowell's p o e t r y . A s  far as he 
goes, Mazzaro is correct, but he overlooks the changes 
that made the anagogical level unworkable, changes that
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first appeared In the two versions of "The Mills." The 
disruption of the moral level of meaning and that of 
allegory came first. And the key to the loss of all 
three lies in allegory because, moving step by step with 
the narrative, it is the link between the temporal world 
of human experience and the divine world of a-temporal 
value. An anagogical level of meaning cannot come about 
until the literal, moral and allegorical levels are fully 
in place. Thus, moving one step farther back, it was 
the loss of his Christian myth that cost Lowell the 
grounding for causality, and it was the same loss that 
undercut his allegorical level of meaning. Without these, 
he needed a new modality, a new poetics.
By looking at the titles of the poems in Life Studies, 
one sees that Lowell begins operating with a narrower 
world view. The majority of the poems deal with his per­
sonal experience, which is informed by and reflective of 
the secular world he has come to inhabit. Neither Lowell 
nor the world he perceives is capable of projection beyond 
a horizontal plane.
"Waking in the Blue" contains a reference to the
Azure which seems to be an allusion to Baudelaire's "meta-
62physical disgust." Lowell says, "Azure day / makes my 
agonized blue window bleaker." An important change has 
taken place. The early Jonathan Edwards poems express 
their own type of "metaphysical disgust," as do other
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poems of the first phase, but the disgust Lowell ex­
presses in "Waking in the Blue" (unlike that of his 
earlier poems and unlike that Baudelaire expresses) is 
restricted to this world. Lowell says derisively of 
himself that he is "Cock of the walk." Rather than for 
the metaphysical, his contempt is now for the thoroughly 
pedestrian mental patient, one who forestalls the ab­
solute and metaphysical question of death by using "a 
locked razor."
As a series, the poems begin with Lowell's revised 
view of the world in "Beyond the Alps.” Next there are 
three variations upon the present, "The Banker's Daughter," 
"Inauguration Day: January 1953," and "A Mad Negro Soldier 
Confined at Munich." The Intended condemnation is repre­
sented in almost snapshot fashion.
Each of these poems provides a bracketing of Lowell's 
postwar experience. "The Banker's Daughter" and "A Mad 
Negro Soldier Confined At Munich" are experiencing con­
sciousnesses which Lowell explores variatlonally so that 
he may take measure of the worlds they re-present. The 
former begins with an objective voice then moves into 
Marie de Medici's consciousness, while the latter is in 
the soldier's consciousness throughout. The other two 
poems in the first group are in Lowell's voice, but each 
of the four provides an "other," an Husserllan appresenta- 
tion which provisionally regards the "experience of some­
one e l s e . " ^
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Such an other's experience operates reflexlvely 
upon Lowell in two ways: The condemnation of public val­
ues is the first thing one notes; however, more basic 
than that, and eventually more significant, the poetic 
mode by which Lowell is perceiving the world makes pos­
sible much of the experience with which he is able to 
work. The figures whose consciousnesses he uses pre­
clude some insights just as they make others possible.
In "The Banker's Daughter," Marie de Medici gives an 
historical context for the political brutality that took 
place during World War II, for example, Mussolini’s Italy. 
But by the nature of that context she is incapable of 
making a statement like, "The Lord survives the rainbow 
of His will."
The second section of Life Studies is the prose 
piece, "91 Revere Street," which first appeared in The 
Partisan Review, Fall, 1956, as part of an autobiography 
that was in progress. The flat, factual narration of 
events is in marked contrast to the narrative in "The 
Mills of the Kavanaughs," reflecting the abandonment of 
allegory. Moreover, the assertiveness and compounding 
allusions that were characteristic of the first phase 
are noticeably absent. And though this absence is in 
part because, here, Lowell is writing prose, it is also 
part of a more general lessening of concentration. The 
essential point is that here Lowell regards past phases
191
of himself as an experiencing ego, which he (in the pre­
sent as a transcendental ego) varies into an arrangement 
that reveals his present position by the past's contrast­
ing appresentations. No longer looking to heaven, he 
can still locate himself, but it must be by looking back­
ward and forward rather than upward.
The book's third section is made up of four portraits 
of other modern literary figures: Ford Maddox Ford, George 
Santayana, Delmore Schwartz, and Hart Crane. Each may be 
taken as a variation upon some part of Lowell, who at 
the same time regards his experience plus that of the 
other four as at least five sides of the modern man of 
letters. Each represents an experiencing ego whose hori­
zons are identified so he might round out an objective 
world for Lowell's imagining and transcending ego. That 
they are seen as isolated consciousnesses is consistent 
with the fact they are all seen as alienated in some way.
As the observer, Lowell is alienated also, and his 
eidetic variation of four others who are like him in that 
regard means that he exploits a predicament in order to 
overcome it. As Husserl uses subjectivity to get past 
subjectivity and into an objective world, Lowell uses his 
alienation (which is a type of subjectivity) within mere 
process to get beyond the dislocating effects of time and 
process. He locates himself in a world that is eidetical- 
ly mapped by the four portraits which serve collectively 
to locate him.
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The fourth and final section of Life Studies Is 
broken Into two parts. All of the poems in both parts, 
however, are autobiographical, except '"To Speak of Woe 
That Is in M a r r i a g e " This poem is in the voice of a 
woman married to perhaps an exaggerated, manic version 
of Robert Lowell.
Other than the above, the poems in this section 
are explicitly about Lowell. They tend to be conglomer­
ates of past phases in the poet's eidetic ego. In fact 
most of the pieces in the book are monadic because their 
images (or, Lowell's past phases) round out the horizon 
structure of an other located elsewhere in a space-time 
continuum. They become microcosms of the world that 
existed then and there, and, located variously around 
the transcendental ego, they constitute the reference 
points by which the present can be located, though only 
relatively.
I have suggested a spatial disposition for these 
poems of past, monadic consciousness, but if taken too 
literally this could be misleading. Each disposition 
is first and foremost a temporal one. Most of the poems 
are made up of past phases in Lowell's experience. They 
contain past profiles of him and of the world he inhabited. 
The simplest way to locate himself is for Lowell to place 
what phases he recalls in sequence. But in addition to 
providing sequence, the poems contain horizons. Thus
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there Is a spatial quality In their relations to each 
other. In fact, placed In sequence, they are in con­
stant comparison with one another.
This comparison Is most visible In terms of the 
various criticisms Lowell launches. However, the mere 
ordering of his space-time experiencing ego (which is 
like the diver) Is what first gives the possibility 
of arrangement to the later, imagining Lowell. We are 
near a conclusion Husserl makes, the mutual dependence 
(or, intersubjectivity) of the conscious self and the 
"other" that it posits and confronts. If order is found 
to exist external to the subjective consciousness, it 
can only be found because there already was "an Objec- 
tlve Nature," Of course even the tautological character 
of this situation does not prevent the subjective con­
sciousness from eidetically varying into worlds that do 
not exist, or do not yet exist. Lowell's self-locating 
is both retentional and protentional. He finds out where 
he is by seeing where he has been, and he varies this 
information to open up possibilities that lie in the future.
Before leaving Life Studies, 1 would like to take a 
closer look at one poem that represents the building pro­
cess that is possible for the transcendental ego that 
operates throughout Lowell's second phase. First, one's 
past experience is objectified, and the imagining self 
operates without a history as it objectively turns upon
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its experiencing self. As said above, the final effect 
of this is not only to locate the present self but to 
project into the future as well.
In "My Last Afternoon with Uncle Devereux Winslow" 
we are presented with the world of Lowell's childhood. 
Lowell, as an experiencing ego, is also presented. There 
are several other experiencing egos within the poem, 
each carrying his own horizon structure. Taken collec­
tively, these help to round out Lowell's horizon, both 
present and past. The retentional consciousness of the 
Janus and of the slides gathers the diver's past horizons. 
Uncovered, they trace how he got to the present; freely 
varied, they project protentionally into the future of 
possible experience, broadening his intentionality so 
that the possibilities for experience in the future are 
increased. Indeed, insofar as his expectations contribute 
to the future, not only his experience of it but the 
future itself is increased. On the level of modality, 
this process does something similar to Heidegger's notion 
of the "Open," also the will as venture. The difference 
is that Heidegger sees the basic element in this process 
not as phases of experience but as words.
There are four experiencing egos in the poem that 
are substantial enough to count. Foremost, there is 
Lowell; secondarily, there are his grandfather, his aunt 
Sarah, and his uncle Devereux Winslow, who is dying.
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The poem recollects the Initiation of a "five and a half" 
year-old Robert Lowell Into his first knowledge of death. 
The "earth and lime" with which he plays double in sig­
nificance retrospectively, as do other details, but these 
are all within the experiencing ego of a child. Other 
horizons (though not completely re-presented as is at­
tempted with a rounded character in a novel) are implied 
and partially revealed by the presence of the other three 
experiencing egos.
Aunt Sarah represents an isolated, eccentric, and 
defeated life. She supposedly "jilted an Astor." (Lowell 
has a weakness for the social register.) Then, a pianist, 
she "failed to appear" for a recital which was to begin 
her career. She now practices on a dummy piano to avoid 
disturbing Lowell's grandmother who is tone-deaf. Uncle 
Devereaux, knowing that he will be dead soon, neverthe­
less wants to go abroad. Grandfather Winslow is respon­
sible for the world which these characters inhabit. He 
has made it possible with "his Liberty Bell silver mine," 
though he also owns "fools'-gold nuggets." The point is 
an ironical one. There is not wealth and freedom here, 
in a human sense, but poverty of spirit and entrapment.
As Heidegger might say, we are given people who when 
thrown (on their "own responsibility") have failed to 
project "forward toward . . . possibilities] of being." 
Their attempts to project are consistently thwarted
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because there seem to be no goals toward which they 
can project. Again, the god's default.
Uncle Devereux would travel to broaden his experi­
ence when he is dying; Aunt Sarah practices furiously 
on a dummy piano and will never actually make music; 
Grandfather Winslow Inhabits the world which he has 
built but which has turned out to be "overbearing, dis- 
proportioned"; and young Robert is in his most formative 
process, soon to confront mortality yet stereotyped 
like a manikin in "Rogers Peet's boy's store." Each of 
these circles of experience is in some way short-circuited, 
and each is seen to prefigure the truncated world of 
Lowell's second phase.
The poem brackets a past phase in Lowell's experi­
ence, a past horizon in fact, and by adding the implicit 
horizons of his aunt, his uncle, and his grandfather it 
becomes monadic. Its primary function is to give Lowell's 
consciousness an other by which he can measure his present 
location. Much as Anne Kavanaugh's revery does elsewhere, 
the poem helps to gauge the poet's experience; tangentlal- 
ly, the reader’s also. As a series, all of the poems in 
Life Studies operate cumulatively to this end.
On the level of experience approached methodically, 
Lowell has made an artistic and therefore somewhat ar­
bitrary limiting of experience that delimits it and makes 
meaning possible. Reminded of Kant's point as to the
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anthropomorphic aspect of an otherwise "natural" symbol, 
we can see how the natural flow of one's experience must 
be anthropomorphlcally (and to that extent not naturally 
but arbitrarily) limited to ferret meaning from it. The 
process is one of closure to achieve disclosure.
And yet Heidegger says that the limiting process 
creates an "Open," that what we close off is thereby 
opened up in a way that uncovers the activities and pro­
cesses that constitute us. Much of this mystery stems 
from the nature of language. Neither Aristotle nor 
Wilhelm von Humbolt was wrong. We are presented with 
mutually dependent opposites, reciprocal and in constant 
process.
Lowell’s Anne Kavanaugh is an early instance of 
John Berryman's Henry, John Irwin's Bricuth (the Old 
English, to bridge a gap, and as used by Irwin, a tempo­
ral gap), or Crow, for Ted Hughes. Later Lowell uses 
past phases of himself for himself (the split ego now 
being less disguised) in the same manner that Anne's 
revery created a Janus-like space-time continuum from 
her childhood forward for her bracketing. Her retentlonal- 
protentlonal range-finding gauged her experience and. 
Indirectly, Lowell's.
Robert Pinsky sees the use of a protagonist or per­
sona as a stylistic strategy to regain an expressivistic 
language that we have become too self-conscious to use
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openly. What I would like to add to his argument Is 
that, seen as a mode of thought, the stylistic peculiari- 
ties of a given period in the history of poetry (even 
within only a decade) reveal how much of the world we 
are able to accept at the time.
Finding large segments of a previous order impossible 
to sustain (as with the post World War II poets) writers 
seem to set about reclaiming what has become lost. In 
this sense, many modern poets have sought to write beyond 
the relativistic and secular world they Inhabit. They 
have entered the indeterminate, forward moving "Open" of 
the will as venture pretty much as Heidegger would have 
them do, though they may have failed to look as closely 
at the language by which they were doing this as he would 
like. In addition to this, because of the way the poetic 
imagination operates in the first place and because post­
war poets begin with an unusually strong sense of doubt, 
the process of much recent poetry has been directed toward 
a bracketing of the poet's experience that performs the 
sort of phenomenological process that Husserl proposed.
Since we are time-locked, we must create strategies 
to adequately grasp our world and locate ourselves. 
Poetically, there are two basic systems for this that 
are currently operating jointly. One is the appresenta- 
tion of an experiencing ego by a transcendental, imagining 
ego. By such a method we (as subjects) detach our experi­
encing selves to be regarded objectively.
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Treated thus, our experience Is seen as the accumu­
lation of horizons, the past phases and past profiles of 
an intending consciousness moving through a space-time 
continuum. In terms of poetry, our past is retained by 
a series of images, and we operate both imaginatively 
(varying that past) and as a Janus, gathering phenomena 
retentionally and protentionally.
But that is only the synchronic side of the poem.
As a second system, the poetic activity, the writing
and the reading of a poem, carries us dlachronlcally.
In fact the formal poem's rhythm and phonetic patterns
constitute a melody which, according to Schopenhauer,
64orders our willing through time. By melody, we can 
repeat a time experience. Reading a poem which is formal 
enough to be able to tell you how it is to be read causes 
a repetition in experience.
You not only make a span of time repeat itself me- 
lodically, but by the eidos you also re-present past in­
stances, moments of punctual experience which could not 
be understood at the instant they were experienced and 
which, if not re-presented, are eventually sedimented 
by process and lost. Such past phases increase our know­
ing by building our intentionality, which modifies future 
experience. Thus regarded in this light, a melodic poem 
fuses knowledge and experience, the analytical with the 
emotional, somewhat like Schopenhauer's title, The World
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as Will and Representation. Put another way, Aristotle's 
and Humbolt's views of language are joined in such a 
poetry.
A melody diachronically contains the will's willing 
and orders the emotional aspects of our experience. As 
modern psychology has repeatedly told u s , many images 
represent things we cannot grasp on the surface of our 
normal discourse. Within poems, such images are the 
synchronic moments of an eidetic consciousness. Past 
Instances are not only re-presented, but their signifi­
cances are symbolized such that whole networks of rela­
tions between one thing and another are recalled. And 
such relations can be grasped even by those who did not 
actually have the experience.
As Husserl says, a phenomenological method will 
give adequate but not apodictic knowledge. Within poetry 
such an approach has been adequate not only for Lowell 
but, judging by his critics, for the vast majority of 
readers as well. And yet we should not forget that such 
a poetics i^ s a strategy that answers what Heidegger 
calls "the default of God."
Flannery O'Conner's summary of his experience during 
the early fifties indicates that certainly for Lowell 
(both healthy and ill) the god had defaulted in some ter­
rible and tragic way. However, it is only fair to add 
that for O'Conner and many others (such as, the Fitzgeralds
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and the Tates) the god had not defaulted. For them, 
the revised poetics 1 have been describing would merely 
lack the power of allegory, and therefore the moral and 
anagoglcal levels of signification.
To those who retain a cosmology, Lowell's second 
phase, influential and acclaimed as it has been, repre­
sents the inauguration of a minimal poetry whose language 
signifies but cannot embody. Finding horizons to have 
become local, such a poetry's expectations are equally 
local. A restricted intentionslity will produce an 
equally restricted protentional experience. Forgetting 
the possibility of a transcendent precludes knowing it.
Poetry cannot do philosophy's job. Recent poetry 
is not phenomenology. But the external pressures of a 
given period are felt by both poets and philosophers, 
and a comparison of the solutions that surface in their 
very different disciplines can often tell us a great 
deal about those pressures. We also clarify the change 
that has occurred within a discipline by comparing it 
to that of another. Husserl and Heidegger are useful 
because they uncover some of the steps an absolutist 
such as Robert Lowell took to find certainty amidst rela­
tive surroundings. Previously, it has been taken for 
granted that Lowell's poetic shift came about in Life 
Studies. There the change was apparent. However, "The 
Mills of the Kavanaughs" is actually where the shift
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took place, and It merits our attention because Its 
artistic difficulties expose both the new and the old 
modes of thought with which a representative Robert 
Lowell was struggling.
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